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Research and contemporary practice indicate that people labelled as 
learning disabled remain positioned on the margins of humanity, despite 
decades of hard work from the disability rights movement, support workers, and 
families and whānau, among many others (Goodley, 2017). In this thesis, I seek 
to find some answers as to why this situation persists. I seek further to 
investigate if this ongoing marginalisation can be challenged through using new 
materialist theory to reimagine disability.   
The thesis begins by outlining the big picture of disability oppression in 
Aotearoa New Zealand and across the globe. Thereafter, literature from disability 
studies and the humanities more widely is drawn upon to argue that the binary 
notions of “learning disability” and “normal, ideal humans” are not fixed, 
indisputable concepts. Instead, they can be viewed as artefacts of the historical, 
spiritual, political and social structures which have emerged over the past few 
centuries in the Western world. Learning disability becomes of necessity 
positioned as inferior within this binary and,  it can be argued further, this 
positioning plays a crucial role in the validation and perpetuation of disability 
oppression.  
The key conceptual frameworks shaping policy and practice in Aotearoa 
New Zealand are examined. This is done with a focus on the ontological 
underpinning of the ideal human inherent in many of these frameworks, and 
how this underpinning inhibits challenge to exclusionary structures and 
practices. 
The conceptual framework is formed from agential realism (Barad), 
citational chains and lines of flight (Bergson / Butler, as used by Davies), 
performativity (Butler), affect (Wetherell), desiring silence (Jackson and Mazzei), 
and disability pride (Parsons). Datum was generated through a series of nine 
“hui”, or research meetings. These were held with a co-facilitator and seven 
participants, all of whom have been assigned the label of learning disabled 




The analysis begins with participant responses to the collaborative 
exploration of ideas related to disability pride and ableism. Whilst there was 
evidence that participants enjoyed discussions related to ableism, many 
displayed a powerful adverse reaction to visual displays on pride. In particular, 
participants’ affective responses to the videos and discussions regarding pride 
signalled the limitations of the view that the problem is largely discursive.  
Exploring this challenge using the conceptual framework ultimately 
enabled me to propose a new means of conceptualising disability: disability as an 
ongoing series of entanglements. The entanglements which rose to the fore 
during data generation and analysis were the affective entanglements of 
disability, the desire for recognition as a viable subject, the silences regarding 
disability, and the drive to help. This thesis proposes that these entanglements 
serve to further the inferiorisation of disability and hold it in a static place of 
“otherness”, and thus foreclose potential for radical transformation to 
exclusionary structures and practices. However, by drawing upon agential 
realism I also highlight the ever-present possibility of rupture which lies within 
each of these entanglements. Based on the findings of this thesis, I conclude that 
radical potential for change can potentially be found by understanding and 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction  
I started this thesis wanting to fix things for people. After more than a 
decade of enriching, challenging and immensely frustrating work in the disability 
support sector, I came to this PhD hoping to discover ways to make life 
conditions better for disabled people. However, what began as a project to help 
“others”, has ended up as an exploration of a number of everyday practices, 
including the way we speak, feel and act towards disability, in which I am 
unmistakably complicit. These practices position people labelled as disabled as 
“other”, and ultimately enable disability oppression to flourish in our world.  
The purpose of this thesis is thus to examine how it is that people labelled 
as disabled are continually positioned on the margins of humanity, and how we 
can start to shift this problematic positioning. In short, this thesis will explore 
how we think, feel and talk about learning disability in the Aotearoa1 New 
Zealand context. This will be done through investigating how thoughts, feelings, 
words and subsequent actions contribute to the flourishing of disability 
oppression. The thesis will also contribute to a new way of conceptualising 
learning disability that may present a new path forward for the disability rights 
movement.  
The work in this thesis is grounded in my personal experiences in the 
disability sector, and has been accomplished thanks to the generosity of the 
hundreds of people who have given me the gift of letting me into their lives to 
share in their experiences. I have worked in a wide variety of roles in the sector, 
and with a wide variety of people; although, mostly with people assigned the 
label of learning disabled. I have worked with people of all ages and types of 
disabilities, including people considered “profoundly” disabled, people 
considered “high-functioning”, and everything in between. I have worked in 
                                                     




kindergartens, schools, group homes, learning disabled people’s own homes and 
with people who live with their families. I have done “hands-on” support and 
also worked as a team leader, a service coordinator, a regional advisor, a self-
advocacy coordinator and as a life-planner.  
These experiences and the problems that I observed have driven this 
thesis. To me, the fundamental issue is that while many of us are working 
incredibly hard in order to make things better for disabled people, little seems to 
change. People labelled as learning disabled stubbornly remain one of the most 
disadvantaged groups in society. As someone working in the disability support 
sector, I saw that our efforts to change this situation appeared to do little more 
than scratch the surface of this issue, regardless of how hard we worked or how 
much we tried. It is from this realisation that the desire was born to do some 
research to find out what is needed to shift this situation.  
 
In this opening chapter I will outline the big picture of disability 
oppression, including key statistics and the role of support services, as well as 
other factors which cannot be captured in a statistic. I will then outline how I 
believe the “problem” of disability needs to be reshaped if we in the sector are 
to move forward, and I introduce the two key concepts which have guided and 
shaped the formation of this thesis.  
 A Note on Writing Style 
Throughout this thesis I move between two different styles of writing; 
“from a distance” and “from the inside”. This approach follows that of Cath Laws 
(2011), whose work and writing style has inspired much of this thesis. With the 
exception of this chapter, the bulk of the thesis is written “from a distance”, in 
more traditional, academic prose, as demonstrated here. This style is utilised so 
as to fulfil the requirements of academic writing expected in a PhD thesis.  
 
In contrast, more personal writing “from the inside” will be placed inside 




academic voice to draw upon my own experiences and examine the challenges, 
thought processes and ultimate “truths” which seemed to emerge through the 
research of this thesis. Because these sections pertain to my thoughts and 
experiences, the writing style is more casual. 
 
Two important terms will be utilised throughout the thesis: learning 
disability and disabled people. These terms have been chosen because they 
emphasise the disabled aspect of a person’s identity as a valid and unashamed 
way of being. As I shall highlight through the thesis, I believe that the need to 
emphasise the common humanity of a person, or to downplay any aspect of 
their identity, contributes to the marginalisation of people labelled in those 
categories.  
Learning disability is used in preference to a more commonly used term 
in New Zealand, intellectual disability. I have chosen this term because it is the 
label which members of People First New Zealand, a disabled persons 
organisation run by and for learning disabled people, have chosen as a mark of 
identity for themselves (People First, 2013). This terminology is consistent with a 
key underlying principle of this thesis, which is to support the voices of people 
who have been assigned the label of disabled, as fully agentic members of 
society with full human rights. As H. Brown and Smith (1992) note, it is important 
to listen to the voices of marginalised groups and accord them “the respect of 
using the labels they choose for themselves” (p. 127).   
The second term, disabled people, is used in preference to a commonly 
used term, people with disabilities. People with disabilities and people first are 
frequently used terms within the disability sector and disability rights movement. 
People assigned the label disabled are viewed as people, first and foremost; their 
disabilities are secondary to the fact that they are fully-fledged human beings. 
However, the term people with disabilities can be viewed as “apologetic 
phrasing” (H. Brown & Smith, 1992, p. 127), which works to downplay the 
disabled aspect of a person’s identity. This phrase then signals shame and 
invalidates the disabled identity as a legitimate form of human-ness, ultimately 




Oh you see us as PEOPLE first? Because apparently being disabled 
means not being a person? Because disability negates ones 
humanity? (np)  
In contrast, the term disabled people can be viewed as an identity that can be 
worn as a badge of pride, in the same way that someone might call themselves a 
woman, rather than a person who is female, or Māori, rather than a person who 
is Māori.  
Disability Oppression - The Big Picture 
This section presents statistics and evidence related to disability 
oppression, both internationally and within Aotearoa New Zealand. Information 
which can be measured, including statistics relating to abuse, health, and poverty 
will be presented. Other elements of disability oppression which are much 
harder to measure, such as the emotional labour many people are expected to 
take on will be discussed. Information in this section largely pertains to the wider 
category of disability; information relating to learning disability will be included 
when it is available.  
The World Health Organisation (2011) estimates that more than a billion 
people globally experience some form of disability, with approximately 1-3%  of 
the world’s population categorised as having a learning disability (Scior et al., 
2015). Evidence shows that disabled people tend to have worse health outcomes 
and lower life expectancy compared to the general population, and face 
significant barriers to accessing healthcare services (Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, 2014; IHC New Zealand, 2017; Scior et al., 2015; World 
Health Organisation, 2011). Johnson and Walsmley (2010) note that learning 
disabled people in particular “are 2.5 times more likely to have health problems” 
(p. 6), are four times more likely to die of preventable diseases and are “58 times 
more likely to die before the age of 50” (p. 6) as compared with people in the 
general population. 
Disabled people are also more likely than the general population to suffer 




particularly problematic for learning disabled people (French & Swain, 2006; 
Goodley, 2017; Mirfin-Veitch, Bray, Moore, Walker, & Ross, 2000; Munford, 
Sanders, Brigit Miffin, & Conder, 2008). Given these circumstances it is not 
surprising to find that rates of depression and other psychiatric disorders for 
disabled people are three to four times higher than for the general population (J. 
Davis, Judd, & H Herman, 1997). 
For learning disabled people in particular, there are significant barriers in 
relation to accessing sexual and reproductive healthcare services, as well as 
support to establish and maintain healthy intimate relationships (Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014; Crawford & Ostrove, 2003; 
Hamilton, 2006; Macguire, Gleeson, & Holmes, 2019; Mirfin-Veitch, 2003). This 
barrier exists because of the poor availability and accessibility of services, lack of 
training and subsequent fear and uncertainty on the part of support workers on 
how best to support people with this aspect of their lives, as well as negative 
community attitudes leading to discriminatory practices in which sex and 
sexuality are seen as taboo topics that have no applicability to the lives of 
learning disabled people (Hamilton, 2006; Hinsburger, 1995, 2006; Macguire et 
al., 2019; Sitter, 2015). 
Globally, learning disabled children face significant barriers to accessing 
regular education; it is not uncommon for learning disabled children to be 
excluded from education altogether (Goodley, 2017; World Health Organisation, 
2011). Although all children in Aotearoa New Zealand have the legal right to 
attend their local school (Human Rights Commission, 2016), in practice many 
learning disabled children are either excluded from mainstream education, or 
not adequately supported to be able to achieve in mainstream education 
settings (IHC, n.d.; IHC New Zealand, 2017). This situation arises in no small part 
because, as the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (hereafter referred to as the UNCRPD) (2014) notes, “there is no 
enforceable right to inclusive education” (p. 6) in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Currently, IHC New Zealand, the largest provider of services for learning disabled 
people in Aotearoa New Zealand, has a complaint filed with the Human Rights 




discriminatory treatment of disabled children in New Zealand schools which, as 
noted earlier, has resulted in the exclusion of many learning disabled children 
from mainstream education.  
 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(2006) asserts: 
[T]he right of persons with disabilities to work, on an equal basis 
with others; this includes the right to opportunity to gain a living 
by work freely chosen or accepted in a labour market and work 
environment that is open, inclusive and accessible to persons with 
disabilities. (p. 19) 
Although a relatively short period of time has passed since the Convention was 
instituted, it is important to note that disabled people internationally continue to 
experience lower rates of employment than people without disabilities (van 
Dalen, 2017; World Health Organisation, 2011). In Aotearoa New Zealand, the 
disabled population has over double the unemployment rate compared to the 
non-disabled population: 11.4% compared with 4.5% (Statistics New Zealand, 
2017a). The UNCRPD (2014) has noted its concern at the low employment rates 
for disabled New Zealanders, particularly for disabled Māori and Pasifika people.  
According to the 2013 Disability Survey (Statistics New Zealand, 2013a), 
34% of intellectually (learning) disabled people are employed. However, it is 
important to note that there were only 59 respondents with a learning disability 
in the survey, all of whom lived in private households and thus not in residential 
group homes. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the actual employment rate for 
learning disabled people is significantly lower than 34% (Cindy Johns, personal 
communication, November 4, 2016). Alongside the low employment rates, 
disabled people are more likely to work part-time (Statistics New Zealand, 2017a; 
van Dalen, 2017), with limited-to-no opportunities to progress from entry level 
positions. The hidden difficulties associated with obtaining meaningful 
employment have been noted in a recent research study conducted in Aotearoa 




It’s all right to have a job. Disabled people have jobs, that’s 
awesome. But how many of them have careers?... There’s a big 
difference between the two. (van Dalen, 2017, p. 8)  
Disabled people are also often paid significantly less than non-disabled people 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2013a, 2017a). In a recent study, Statistics New Zealand 
(2017a) found  that the average weekly income of disabled people was $458; just 
over half of the $833 being earned by their non-disabled counterparts.  It is 
furthermore still legal to pay a learning disabled person less than the minimum 
wage (Employment New Zealand, 2018). In 2014, the UNCRPD noted that, at a 
time when the New Zealand minimum wage was $13.75 per hour, there were 
approximately 1,200 disabled people being paid less than the minimum wage 
under a minimum wage exemption permit.  Of those on the permit, 73.5% were 
paid less than $5 an hour, and 51% were paid less than $3 per hour (Jeffs, 2014).  
As a consequence of the lower employment rates, lower incomes and 
higher costs of living associated with having a disability, disabled people globally 
are over-represented in the statistics on poverty (Goodley, 2017; United Nations, 
2006; van Dalen, 2017; World Health Organisation, 2011). Aotearoa New Zealand 
is no exception to this situation, and in 2014 the UNCRPD noted their concerns at 
the poverty rates of disabled people in New Zealand. In particular, they noted 
that disabled children are over-represented in statistics on child poverty. This 
situation has had a significant impact on everyday lives, as this quotation from a 
recent survey reveals:  
[P]eople with intellectual disabilities and their families do not have 
enough money for food, clothing, bills and transport – let alone for 
going out, holidays, celebrations or paying for additional disability 
costs. (IHC, 2017, np) 
When set against other intersectional elements such as gender, class, 
sexuality, age and race, the gaps in the statistics between disabled and non-
disabled people become even more pronounced (van Houten & Jacobs, 2005). In 
New Zealand, Māori and Pasifika disabled people have been shown to have 




other ethnic groups (Statistics New Zealand, 2017b). Disabled women in 
particular occupy a specific site of exclusion, as they are more likely to live in 
poverty than disabled men (Goodley, 2017), experience higher levels of abuse 
(Braidotti, 2013), are more likely to find public space unwelcoming and 
threatening (Goodley, 2017), and experience higher levels of depression 
(Goodley, 2017). However, within all statistics gathered in key life areas – life 
expectancy, access to reproductive health services, employment rates or poverty 
statistics – learning disabled people stand out as the most affected group in 
these problematic social conditions.  
The figures in this chapter only give information on issues which are 
easily measured. What is harder to measure is how disabled people spend a 
significant part of each day dealing with a world which has been designed to 
exclude them (Keith, 1996) – both socially and physically. Cheyne (2016), Price 
(2016) and Sheppard (2017) discuss the added emotional labour of having a 
disability. Interacting with disability can be a source of discomfort for many 
people, and as a result disabled people often take on the emotional labour of 
easing this discomfort (Cheyne, 2016; Price, 2016).  This affective work, which is 
often ongoing and tiring, involves “[p]erceiving the emotional state of someone 
they’re talking to or interacting with, interpreting it” (Cheyne, 2016, 22:10) and 
then, if the disabled person chooses or feels the need to, adjusting their 
behaviour accordingly.  
 
In mulling over the statistics in this chapter, what troubles me about 
presenting information in this scholarly way is that it obscures a key idea on 
which this thesis is based: that there are real people with real stories behind 
every statistic. Behind every statistic I have presented in this chapter, there are 
people I know whose lives are circumscribed by these data. I have worked with 
women who want children but have been sterilised without their knowledge or 
consent, with families who have had to move cities because their disabled child 
was not able to attend any of their local schools, and with people who receive 
such poor healthcare that they have been forced to walk on a broken hip, or 




Many of the learning disabled people I know struggle to find houses to live in, 
money to warm their houses, and to have enough food to eat. It is not 
uncommon for people to be bullied, sexually harassed, have no meaningful 
vocation, or spend years (and sometimes a lifetime) fruitlessly searching for a 
job. Many are lonely and have few meaningful relationships outside of family and 
paid support staff.  
What further troubles me about these statistics is the information which 
is not captured, such as the lack of opportunity for learning disabled people to 
have a voice and the resources necessary to challenge these situations. Often it 
has seemed to me that unless someone is fortunate enough to be born into a 
supportive and well-resourced family, there is little opportunity for learning 
disabled people to take charge of what is happening and get themselves out of 
adversity. For instance, during the period in which I was working on this thesis I 
witnessed people being denied the right to have a hot drink outside of approved 
meal times, to attend rugby matches, to choose not to eat sausages for dinner, 
to choose not to live with someone who regularly threatens them with physical 
violence, to choose not to be supported by someone they cannot stand, to use 
their personal savings to go on a (supported) holiday to Australia, or to buy a cat, 
or a remote-controlled aeroplane. In most of these situations the learning 
disabled people did not have any recourse when the other people in their lives – 
the people upon whom they rely for support to enact goals – told them “no”.  
The lack of opportunity for learning disabled people to have a voice in 
their own lives was highlighted in a 2008 Social Services Select Committee 
Report. In this report, the Social Services Select Committee (2008) found that 
people in support services “often feel they have little control over the services 
they receive” (p. 10). This includes having little choice over “whom they live with, 
who provides them with care, what they eat, or when they get up and when they 
go to bed and what they do during the day” (p. 24). As a support worker I have 
experienced being the person who has the power to decide such things as when 
a person is “allowed” to shower, how much they are “allowed” to eat, and when 




The issue which most vexed me about the situation outlined in this 
chapter was that I did not believe it was caused by large-scale malicious intent. 
Instead, these situations arose when disabled people’s “best interests” were held 
in mind. I could see the role that I played in perpetuating these circumstances, 
while, at the same time working hard to challenge these practices. Time and time 
again I both witnessed and participated in people being denied basic human 
rights, and although I was unable to explain exactly why we kept doing it, I 
sensed it was because of an issue much bigger than “poor attitudes” or lack of 
training and understanding about disability rights.  
Rethinking the “Problem” of Disability  
I came to this thesis wanting to learn what it is that we need to do 
differently in order to change the situation I saw around me. I came to realise 
that if our hardest efforts to help are not making much headway into solving the 
problem of disability oppression, then perhaps the solution did not lie in simply 
trying harder. Perhaps what we needed to do was to step back from what is 
happening and take a look at how we are thinking about disability and the 
problem we are facing, to interrogate the underlying assumptions inherent in our 
ways of thinking, and to see if it is possible through doing this to find a new and 
more promising path forward. In particular, I am drawn to a quote which 
Garland-Thomson (2002) drew from Nancy Eiseland (1994), in which she states, 
“the way we imagine disability and disabled people must shift in order for real 
social change to occur” (p. 23). I believe the reason we are not making much 
progress in challenging the “big picture” of disability is that we are asking the 
wrong questions. We are asking how to include people, rather than asking what 
is causing exclusion, and we are asking how we can help disabled people 
overcome the barriers to full participation, without asking what is creating the 
barriers in the first place. It is furthermore my belief that the theoretical tools we 
have been using to think about disability, including normalisation, the social 




of disability. These tools have not enabled us to explore the full breadth of forces 
at play in disability oppression, and have not enabled us to explore the everyday 
ways in which all of us, myself included, are thoroughly complicit in this process.  
The overall aim in this research is thus to examine the theoretical 
perspectives we have been using to think about the “problem” of disability, and 
to contribute to a new way of conceptualising learning disability that may inform 
future policy and practice in Aotearoa New Zealand.  
Tools for Rethinking the “Problem” of Disability  
Two key concepts have helped me to rethink the “problem” of disability: 
ableism and pride. These have been the threads which have guided, shaped and 
woven this project together. I will outline each concept briefly below, and 
explore them in more detail in the following chapters.  
Ableism.  
Ableism is the belief that there is such a thing as a “normal”, “ideal” 
person, that we should all be that person, and that to be other than that, such as 
to be disabled, is a problem. The assumption of this ideal norm is a phenomenon 
around which much of our world is shaped. Many of our homes are built 
assuming everyone can walk, many of our jobs are designed assuming a certain 
level of cognitive ability, and much of our social world is built around the 
assumption that people can understand social cues. 
One of the key ways in which the theory of ableism shaped my thinking 
was that it shifted my view from the “problem” of disability as being located in 
disabled individuals, to the “production, operation and maintenance of ableism” 
(Campbell, 2009a, p. 4); that is, the assumption that everyone is meant to be the 
ideal norm. Shifting the focus of the problem in this way has meant that I no 
longer think of trying to include disabled people into “the community”, as is 
often asserted in human services, but rather that I look to the systems, process 
and individual acts which exclude people and “otherise” people in the first place 





The second key concept which proved foundational in shifting how I 
thought about the “problem” of disability was Pride. I first came across the 
notion of disability pride after reading Ian Parson’s (1999) book, Cripples, Coons, 
Fags and Fems, in which he compares  the gay and lesbian rights movements, the 
women’s rights movement, and the aboriginal rights movement with the 
disability rights movement. Disability pride is about being proud because of 
disability; not in spite of disability, or in the common humanity of disabled 
people (Parsons, 1999). Disability pride is about the acceptance and celebration 
of difference; “it is about subverting negative valuation and reclaiming disability” 
(Shakespeare, 1996, p. 106). I believe, as I will highlight throughout this thesis, 
that pride can be a useful tool to challenge the ongoing inferiorisation of 
disability in our world.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have argued for the need to reimagine disability if we are 
to move forward in tackling disability oppression. I have detailed the “big 
picture” of disability, focusing specifically on the various statistics and other 
factors related to disability oppression. I have explored some of the challenges I 
have faced in my work in disability support services, and what has driven the 
desire to do this research project. This includes the view that the “problem” we 
are facing is not caused by poor intentions and attitudes, but rather issues which 
lie beyond the scope of intentionality.  Lastly, I have explored the two key 
concepts which have guided and shaped my (re)thinking about disability 
throughout this thesis.  
Thesis Structure  
This thesis is broadly split into three sections. Chapters One to Three 
examine the background issues that set the scene for the thesis, exploring the 
problem underpinning the research and existing strategies and policies which 




research was shaped, exploring the conceptual framing, methodology and 
method for data generation, and analysis method. Chapters Seven to Eleven 
constitute the analysis of the thesis, including discussion on the findings. Lastly, 
Chapter Twelve provides a summary of the thesis and discusses implications for 
policy and practice.  
Chapter Outline  
Chapter Two outlines the rationale for the thesis, which is founded on the 
culmination of three core ideas. First, literature from disability studies and the 
humanities more widely are drawn upon to argue that the binary notions of 
“learning disability” and “normal, ideal humans” are not fixed, indisputable 
concepts. Instead, they are viewed as an artefact of the historical, political, 
spiritual and social structures which have emerged over the past few centuries in 
the Western2 world. Second, that the notions of “disabled” and “abled” 
(otherwise known as “normal” or “ideal”) are born from and grafted upon each 
other. The concept of disability then functions as the requisite “constitutive 
outside” (Campbell, 2005), enabling the notion of “ideal, normal humans” to 
exist. Third, I argue that the positioning of disability as “naturally” inferior within 
this binary plays a crucial role in the validation and perpetuation of disability 
oppression. 
Chapter Three examines the key conceptual frameworks related to 
learning disability in Aotearoa New Zealand, as evidenced through Government 
policy and strategy. These frameworks are the medical model, normalisation / 
social role valorisation, the social model, rights-based approaches and Māori 
perspectives on disability. The progress-gains from each of these frameworks are 
explored, as well as the limitations. With the exception of Māori perspectives on 
disability, each of these frameworks is underpinned by the modernist notion of 
                                                     
2  The use of the term “Western world” is utilised throughout this thesis to indicate a range of 
countries whose culture “is derived from European civilisation as distinct from oriental nations… 
African non-Islamic nations, and Communist states generally” (Arnold-Baker, 2001, np). Countries 
include United States of America and Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and those in Western 




the ideal human. This ontological foundation inhibits the ability to challenge 
exclusionary structures and practices which lead to disability oppression.  
Chapter Four outlines the conceptual framing for this thesis. Whilst the 
conceptual framing draws upon multiple frameworks and scholars, it is grounded 
in Barad’s work on agential realism. Drawing upon the agential realist view of 
ontological inseparability, I propose a new means of conceptualising disability: 
disability as an ongoing series of entanglements. This view does not see disability 
as a static, bounded entity, but rather as a difference which emerges through the 
iterative entanglement of multiple, performative agencies. After coming to this 
view, the research centred around a key problem statement: the entanglements 
of disability materialise in such a way that they reiterate disability oppression. 
The research questions stemming from this problem statement include exploring 
what the entanglements of disability are, what the performative agencies within 
the entanglements are, how these entanglements enable disability oppression to 
be perpetuated, and what the entanglements present potential for. 
In order to answer these research questions, I draw upon multiple other 
conceptual frameworks. These include citational chains, lines of flight, Butler’s 
work on performativity, Wetherell’s work on affective and social practice, and 
Jackson and Mazzei’s work on desiring silence. I also explore the notion of 
disability pride, an under-theorised concept which I believe can be used as a tool 
to disrupt the problematic iterative entanglements of disability.  
Chapter Five outlines the methodology and particular methods used in 
this thesis. The methodology was formed from an entanglement of 
methodological perspectives, including inclusive research, participatory action 
research, community based participatory methodologies, culturally responsive 
methodologies, and decolonising methodologies. These frameworks were 
chosen for their emphasis on power sharing, co-creation, and the desire to enact 
change, rather than merely investigating an existing situation. The 
methodological framework is further underpinned by the drive not to perpetuate 
the harms visited on learning disabled people through research conducted 
historically, and the desire to do research that works for learning disabled and 




series of nine “hui”, or research meetings. The content of the hui was developed 
using a co-creation approach, working with a co-facilitator and seven 
participants, all of whom have been assigned the label of learning disabled. A 
range of resources and activities were utilised during the hui, including a series of 
role-plays on bullying, a topic which emerged as an important issue for 
participants.  
Chapter Six describes the analysis method used for this thesis: diffractive 
analysis. This framework has been further developed by Jackson and Mazzei 
(2011) in their work on “plugging in”. These frameworks take into account the 
view that all phenomena - research questions participants, researchers, 
emotions, theory, and data included, necessarily affect and interfere with each 
other. The Deleuzian questions of how does it work and what does it do not what 
does it mean prove formative in the analysis. These questions are used to 
explore how the entanglements of disability function, and what they in turn 
produce.  
Chapter Seven introduces the analysis of the findings. This chapter 
outlines a series of critical moments which happened when participants were 
presented with videos and discussions highlighting disability pride. These 
conversations were introduced in order to explore the first research question: 
does pride present potential for a positive reimagination of disability?  From this 
result, the view of disability as an ongoing series of entanglements was 
developed. Chapter Eight explores the first territorialising force inhibiting the 
development of pride within the hui: affective practice, drawing upon 
Wetherell's (e.g., 2012) work on affective practice. Chapter Nine examines the 
notion of the disability identity and how this subject positioning was taken on, or 
not, by participants. Chapter Ten investigates participants’ understanding of 
disability and how this understanding entangles together with the practices of 
silence. Chapter Eleven examines a powerful and somewhat perplexing 
phenomenon which arose during data generation: that of help. Chapter Twelve 
provides a concluding discussion for the thesis, including implications for policy, 
practice and future research. I review the key problematic entanglements of 




entanglements foreclose and present potential for. I conclude by demonstrating 
the radical potential for change which I believe can potentially be found by 






Chapter 2:  
Conceptualising Learning Disability 
At the time I enrolled to do a PhD, I had given little thought to my own 
status as a “non-disabled” person, or about the permeability of the disability 
category. It never occurred to me to see learning disability as anything other 
than a fixed, essential concept which has always resided in nature; or, for that 
matter, to question the positioning of the people placed in this category as 
“other” to myself. Through the journey of the PhD I have come to question these 
ideas. I have realised that my lack of thought regarding my status as a non-
disabled person is integrally connected with the processes which position people 
assigned the label of learning disabled as “naturally inferior” beings. 
Furthermore, I have come see that the processes which position people as 
inferior are entwined with the adverse material circumstances faced by the 
people placed in this category. I believe the view that disability is inferior is 
entangled within, and lays the foundation for, disability oppression.  
 
The rationale for this thesis is founded on a combination of three core 
ideas outlined in this chapter. First, that learning disability is not an essential 
category, but rather an artefact of the historical, political, spiritual and social 
structures which have emerged over the past few centuries in the Western 
world. These structures play an integral role in shaping how the human body and 
mind have come to be understood (Blackmore & Hodgkins, 2012), enabling us to 
see people as “normal” and “disabled”. The structures are modernism, with its 
focus on the “ideal human” and the statistical norm around which this ideal is 
based (Yates, 2005), and capitalism, with its focus on “desirable”, “abled” and 
productive workers. Inherent within both of these structures is the notion of the 




The second key idea is that the notions of “abled” and “disabled” are 
born from and grafted upon each other. Ableism is used as a conceptual tool to 
understand and critique the notions of disability and the ideal/modernist human. 
It is further utilised to investigate how the material and social world has been 
built around this ableist norm.  
The third key concept relates to how disability becomes “of necessity” 
positioned as inferior or lacking within the ableist binary. The connection 
between the view of disability as inferior, and the poor material circumstances in 
which many people assigned the label of disabled find themselves, will be 
explored.  
Finally, this chapter will explore how the processes which constitute 
learning disability as an essentialist, inferior category are not isolated 
phenomena. Instead, these processes are viewed as inhering within much wider 
processes of “othering”. In these processes, to be viewed as “different from” the 
norm, whether this difference relates to disability, race, sexuality or any other 
identity category, spells inferiority (Braidotti, 2013).  
Truth-Claims of Learning Disability 
Marks (1999) points out that contemporary conceptualisations of 
learning disability are often based around a “common-sense” understanding of 
the term. This understanding sees disability as a flaw inherent in individuals 
whose bodies and minds do not “work properly”, or conform to the expected 
norms of society. Scior et al. (2015) note that the most common internationally 
adopted definitions of learning disability come from the ICD-11 Mortality and 
Morbidity Statistics (“6A00 Disorders of intellectual development”, 2018) 
(hereafter referred to as the ICD-11), and the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) (2013). In addition to this, the 
American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) 
(2018) is another frequently cited definition of learning disability.  
The ICD-11,DSM-5 and AAIDD have similar definitions of learning 




term. In the ICD-11, “disorders of intellectual development” sit under the parent 
category of neurodevelopmental disorders, and are defined as: 
[A] group of etiologically diverse conditions originating during the 
developmental period characterized by significantly below average 
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior that are 
approximately two or more standard deviations below the mean 
(approximately less than the 2.3rd percentile), based on 
appropriately normed, individually administered standardized 
tests. Where appropriately normed and standardized tests are not 
available, diagnosis of disorders of intellectual development 
requires greater reliance on clinical judgment based on 
appropriate assessment of comparable behavioural indicators. 
(para 1) 
Within the DSM-5 definition, “intellectual disability” is defined as:  
[A] disorder with onset during the developmental period that 
includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in 
conceptual, social, and practical domains. (Intellectual Disabilities: 
Diagnostic Criteria. Para. 1, emphasis in original) 
Similarly, the AAIDD defines “intellectual disability: as:  
Intellectual disability is a disability characterized by significant 
limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive 
behavior, which covers many everyday social and practical skills. 
This disability originates before the age of 18. (para 1, emphasis in 
original).  
The use of the terms “significantly below average”, “deficit”, and “significant 
limitations”, as well as the need for tests to be “individually administered” in the 
ICD-11, highlight the definitions’ interpretation of learning disability as a lack 
inherent in individuals.   
The DSM-5 notes three criteria which must be met in order to qualify for 




confirmed by standardized intelligence testing and clinical assessment; and 
deficits in adaptive functioning, which limit a person’s independent functioning 
in daily life activities. These deficits must have evidence of onset during the early 
developmental period (i.e., before the age of 18) and not be the result of trauma, 
such as a head injury. The ICD-11 and DSM-5 definitions also categorise learning 
disability into four types of “severity” - mild, moderate, severe and profound. 
These are based deviation from the mean in the ICD-11, and on level of skill as 
compared with non-affected peers in the DSM-5.  
In Aotearoa New Zealand, the Operational Guideline for the Assessment 
of Intellectual Disability to Access Disability Support Services Contracted for 
People with Intellectual Disability (Ministry of Health, 2012a) incorporates both 
aspects of the definitions noted above. In this country, a learning disability is 
defined as present in cases of “[s]ignificantly sub-average intellectual 
functioning” with “an IQ of approximately 70 or below” (Ministry of Health, 
2012a, p. 6). The criteria also include the following: 
Deficits or impairments in current adaptive functioning in at least 
two of the following areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social and interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-
direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and 
safety. (p. 6) 
Further, these difficulties must be evident before the age of 18 (Ministry of 
Health, 2012a). 
The definitions noted on the previous pages play a powerful role in 
positioning the notion of learning disability as an irrefutable claim to truth. This 
idea of “truth-claims” stems from the French philosopher, Michel Foucault, 
whose work has profoundly shaped the field of humanities, including much of 
the literature used in this thesis. In particular, Foucault is interested in the 
connection between power and knowledge, noting that claims to “truth” are 
inextricably bound up in regimes of power. As he notes: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: 




as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true. (1980, p. 131)  
In this understanding, the notion of learning disability can be viewed as a 
sanctioned form of knowledge, a regime of “truth” accepted within Western 
society. In particular, this truth-claim is established and reinforced through 
predicating access to vital services or supports on receiving a diagnosis. In 
Aotearoa New Zealand, a diagnosis of learning disability must be established 
before learning disability support services will be provided (Ministry of Health, 
2012a). Diagnosis assures access to the Supported Living benefit when it is 
needed (Ministry of Social Development, 2018); the Supported Living benefit 
stands in contrast to the more easily obtainable Jobseeker benefit, which 
provides a lower weekly payment, has numerous obligations, and can be 
drastically reduced if the obligations are not met (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2018).  Furthermore, in order to receive funding for support at 
school, children in Aotearoa New Zealand must display significant “deficits” in 
any one of the following areas: learning, hearing, vision, mobility, language use 
and social communication (Ministry of Education, 2017); these criteria are in line 
with those used to determine a disability diagnosis in the ICD-11 and DSM-5. 
Salvador-Carulla et al. (2011) note that access to vital services in most countries 
are similarly predicated on a diagnosis. As they discuss, diagnostic criteria “are 
used throughout the world to specify which people are eligible for what health 
care, educational and social services under what conditions” (p. 176).  
The training for many support workers for learning disabled people draws 
on these definitions of disability. The New Zealand Certificate in Health & 
Wellbeing (Support Work) Level 3 (IHC New Zealand Incorporated, 2016) 
discusses the three definitions noted earlier, along with definitions from the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006), and 
the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) 




deficit, and none suggest any level of ambiguity as to the assertion that learning 
disability is an identifiable and measurable phenomenon.  
All of the entities noted earlier – support services, government agencies 
and training bodies - are positioned to shape the materiality of people’s lives. 
This includes ensuring people have sufficient money and support to live, enabling 
access to education, and granting qualifications necessary to find work. No 
diagnosis from a qualified medical professional means no access to learning 
disability support services, and less money to live. For support worker trainees, 
refusing to demonstrate an understanding of these definitions means no 
qualification, and fewer job opportunities. The power vested in these 
authoritative bodies ensures that the understanding of learning disability as 
individual deficit, and as a measurable, identifiable entity is continually 
established and maintained as a “truth-claim”.  
Although there is a general level of international agreement regarding the 
view that learning disability is an essential category, there is less agreement 
about what specific term should be used. Variations include “intellectual 
disability”, the most preferred term in New Zealand (Ministry of Health, 2012a), 
as well as “mental handicap”, “mental retardation”,  “learning difficulties” and 
“mental disabilities”; the latter term can be used in such a way that no 
distinction is made between mental illness and learning disability (Scior et al., 
2015).  
In the following section, I briefly detail how the claims to truth regarding 
what is now known as learning disability, have changed over the past millennia.  
Pre-Contemporary Conceptualisations of 
Learning Disability  
Conceptualisations of disability have undergone significant shifts over 
time. In ancient Greece, disability was viewed as evidence of the Gods’ dismay 
with a community (Bragg, 1997). As a result of this thinking, many disabled 
people were exiled (Bragg, 1997). Aristotle (384BC – 322BC) is known for stating 




1932, p. 109). For both Aristotle and Plato (circa 428BC – 348 BC), “men” were 
separated from beasts because of their capacity for reason (Stainton, 2001). To 
be found wanting in respect of reason – to be what would today be called 
learning disabled - was to be “less than human, to lack value, to stand apart from 
and deserve to be cast out of the polity” (Stainton, 2001, p. 453). 
In medieval Europe, disabled people were seen to belong to a sphere of 
mysticism, and as more intimate with God than mainstream society (Stiker, 
1999). As Stiker (1999) notes, disabled people  were “sites and moments for 
contemplation and adoration… one in whom you recognized God, one who 
became like a living sacrament, like the sacred itself” (p. 81). Furthermore, Bragg 
(1997) states that in literature from the Northern European Middle Ages, 
impairment was generally taken as a sign of contact with a deity. Many deities 
were themselves impaired and / or showed evidence of mutilation (Bragg, 1997). 
However, Bragg (1997) cautions that the early Middle Ages should not be viewed 
as a kind of golden age for disabled people. Much of the literature from this 
period suggests that exceptionalities, such as what is now defined as learning 
disabled, were undesirable. During the Renaissance period, having a child with a 
disability was viewed as a punishment from God for wrongs committed by the 
parents (Huet, 1993). In more recent times, disability has moved away from a 
spiritual view, towards a more medicalised understanding. In this interpretation, 
disability is seen as individual pathology which involves some kind of a sensory, 
cognitive and/or physical failing (Goodley, 2011).  
To conclude this brief section, it appears that what is currently 
conceptualised as learning disability has undergone significant shifts through 
history. Contemporary conceptualisations posit that learning disability as it is 
understood today is an undeniable “truth-claim” which has existed throughout 
the ages. However, different eras have each produced differing 
conceptualisations and truth-claims regarding what learning disability is 
understood to be. What is interesting to note is that learning disability has not 
always been viewed as being equated with inferiority, but instead as something 
which can indicate a deeper connection with divine beings than non-disabled 




and thus the people upon whom the label is placed, is viewed as either less-than-
human, or as a lesser form of human.  
The next section will explore the emergence of ideas related to (learning) 
disability as an essentialist category. This exploration will include a focus on key 
social, scientific, material and political structures which have played an integral 
role in shaping how the human body and mind have come to be understood 
(Blackmore & Hodgkins, 2012). 
Learning Disability as an Artefact of Modernity 
and Capitalism  
From the first half of the nineteenth century, “idiocy” became recognised 
as a distinct condition which could be identified through the use of scientific 
measurements such as the IQ test (Licia Carlson, 2005). This practice is still 
currently in use (Ministry of Health, 2012a; Scior et al., 2015). Various categories 
emerged to classify the different intellectual levels and “types” of disabilities, 
including “idiot” “imbecile”, “feeble-minded”, “defective”, “cretin”, “moron”, 
“fool” and “simpleton” (Hamilton, 2008; Marks, 1999; Simpson, 2011). In 
Aotearoa New Zealand, the Mental Defectives Act (1911) made use of these 
terms to differentiate “between persons of unsound mind, persons mentally 
infirm, imbeciles, the feeble minded and epileptics” (1900 to 1970, para. 4). 
However, rather than viewing disability as an essential pathology, 
disability scholars (see Oliver, 1990, 1996; Tremain, 2001, 2005b) argue that 
learning disability can be seen as an artefact of the political, material and social 
structures which have emerged as powerful forces within Western culture. These 
include modernity, with its focus on “ideal” humans and the “norm” (Tremain, 
2005), and capitalism, with its focus on abled and productive workers.     
The Modernist Human, Capitalism and the Emergence of 
Learning Disability 
The period of Modernity emerged out of the Age of Enlightenment, 




kingship as the source of all truth were superseded (Gannon & Davies, 2007). 
This period is characterised by a “great faith in the ability of reason to discover 
absolute forms of knowledge” (Crotty, 1998, p. 185). Prior held beliefs became 
seen as superstition and irrationality, to be replaced with notions of universal 
truth, reason and logic (Crotty, 1998). Emerging from this time of reason, logic 
and universal truths came the notion of independent individuals from whom 
reason and logic necessarily emanated; individuals who are “distinct, bounded 
and separated from others” (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2016, p. 8).  
“Western Man” became the standard against which all other bodies (and 
minds) were compared (Davies, 2016), the ideal human which all are meant to 
embody. Yet, for Braidotti (2013), this ideal figure was:  
[N]either an ideal nor an objective statistical average or middle 
ground. It rather spells out a systematized standard of 
recognizability – of Sameness – by which all others can be 
assessed, regulated and allotted to a designated social location. (p. 
24) 
Further, the ideal individual of modernity is autonomous, always in control and 
self-reliant (Crotty, 1998), as well as ideally white, heterosexual, male, able-
bodied, capable, responsible and middle-class (Davies, 2016; Goodley, Lawthom, 
& Runswick-Cole, 2014). Above all else, this individual is rational. These criteria 
continue to play a powerful role in shaping understandings of the ideal traits 
which all humans are expected to embody. This idea can be seen in Article 1 of 
the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1948), which asserts: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. (Article 1, 
emphasis added) 
The assumption that all humans will embody these criteria, particularly the 
criteria of rationality, plays a powerful role in shaping the (Western) world. For 




including Aotearoa New Zealand, is built around the assumption that all children 
will learn to be self-reliant, will learn to be in control of their emotions and be 
able to learn at a “typical” speed and in a “typical” fashion (Hehir, 2002). 
Children who do not meet these criteria are viewed as failing to meet the 
expected standard and are subject to “special” conditions, such as individualised 
education plans and placement in “special” schools. Further, the neoliberal 
economic system, which plays a powerful role in shaping the behaviour of 
governments, institutions, communities and individuals (Davies, 2016), is 
founded on the assumption that humans are rational beings who make rational 
behavioural and economic decisions (Olssen & Peters, 2005). Modernist notions 
of the ideal human, and the concept of reason in particular, also play an integral 
role in shaping an understanding of what makes for a “good life”. As Johnson and 
Walmsley (2010) state, “reason is central to the good life in Western philosophy” 
(pp. 50-51).  
These notions of reason and the ideal human also profoundly shape 
contemporary conceptualisations of “personhood” – that is, what is necessary in 
order to be considered a full person. Johnson and Walmsley for instance note 
that when reason is impugned, one’s status as a human being may be doubted. 
Scully3 (2016) argues furthermore:   
Entire academic careers have been devoted to articulating criteria 
to ascertain who is and is not a person. These criteria are often 
about having specific capacities such as rationality, agency, 
independence, self-awareness, the ability to communicate, to 
establish relationships, and so on. (np)  
This notion of “personhood” is particularly problematic for learning disabled 
people because, as Scully (2016) notes, many people with learning disabilities fail 
to meet these standards. The exclusion of learning disability from the category of 
the human has at times been overtly stated and is particularly evident in 
Linnaeus’ Systema Naturae (1735) (Hughes, 2012). Here, a distinction is made 
between two ‘types’ of human -  homo sapiens and homo monstrosus, under 
                                                     




which “impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the 
human family” (Hughes, 2012, p. 22). 
Capitalism is isolated as the second key force that shaped the emergence 
of the category of (learning) disability. In a period that saw large numbers of 
people moving into factories to perform uniform tasks, a new conceptualisation 
of desirable workers and bodies emerged. Drawing on the work of Karl Marx, 
McRuer and Wilkerson (2003) highlight the powerful connection between 
capitalism and the notion of the able-bodied worker. As they note, “[e]mergent 
industrial capitalism needed ability so much that it produced a new identity, that 
of the able-bodied worker” (p. 14). A second, stigmatized identity emerged as 
the binary opposite to the ideal worker, that of disability. Any cognitive, sensory, 
physical and psychiatric differences impacting on productivity and educability 
became faults localised in individual bodies (D. Mitchell & Snyder, 2017). Those 
unable to meet the expectations of productivity became seen as “a particular 
kind of social problem” (Oliver, 1990, p. 78). Under this guise, disabled people 
became categorised as unproductive and viewed as forming a “surplus 
population” (Erevelles, 1996, 2000). Subsequently, people positioned as disabled 
came to be excluded from the “mainstream” community (Clapton, 2009). This 
situation played a powerful role in positioning disability as individual pathology 
(Oliver, 1990).  
The relationship between capitalism and the notions of productivity, 
economic contribution and social worth (Clapton, 2009; Hyde, 2000) impacted 
heavily on people with profound physical, sensory and learning disabilities. 
Institutionalisation became the preferred means by which to contain and 
support unproductive citizens, as well as to “protect” wider society and 
“defectives” from each other. Institutionalisation further helped to ensure that 
“defectives” did not procreate and contaminate the gene pool (Clapton, 2009). 
These ideas remain barriers to the full inclusion of all disabled people in the life 
of their community in contemporary society (Wolbring, 2008). 
In Aotearoa New Zealand, rapid European settlement post 1840 meant 
that many European ideas, including those regarding the Modernist ideal human, 




country (Hamilton, 2018). From 1863 onwards, what were then called asylums 
were built in order to house “the disturbed, the dangerous, the unpredictable” 
(Campion, 2012, p. 12). These terms described forms of appearance or behaviour 
that could not be altered to fit what was socially expected at the time (Hamilton, 
2018). Removing learning disabled people from the wider population furthered 
the positioning of this group of people as “other”.  
The Bell Curve and the “Norm”  
One particular phenomenon which played a powerful role in shaping the 
modernist conception of the ideal human, and which continues to shape how 
disability is viewed today, is that of the norm. Foucault (1977) notes that, in the 
last two centuries, normalisation has become “one of the great instruments of 
power” (p. 184) of contemporary Euro-Western concern. Measuring individuals 
in relation to “the norm” enabled otherwise disparate groups of people to be 
divided, classified and ordered into discrete ontological categories, such as 
“disabled” and “normal” (Tremain, 2005b). According to Foucault (1980), the 
ability to group populations into discrete ontological categories was necessary as 
it not only enabled an increase in the utility of individuals, but also worked to 
ensure their subjection to governmentality.  Normality became a means through 
which subjects could both be identified, and come to understand themselves. In 
turn, these processes of subjection became integral to making populations 
governable (Tremain, 2005). 
The idea that “intelligence” might be a knowable, measurable entity can 
be traced back to the field of psychology around the turn of the twentieth 
century (Gould, 1996; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Key early scholars, including 
Francis Galton, Alfred Binet and Henry Goddard, utilised a growing body of 
knowledge in the field of statistical analysis in order to begin finding measures by 
which to assess an individual’s levels of intelligence (Gould, 1996). Alfred Binet’s 
work, wherein he developed tests of reasoning in order to classify children who 
required special educational support, proved to be immensely productive in this 
area. Binet was clear that intelligence could never be represented with a single 




convenient excuse to remove disabled and other “troublesome” children from 
general education settings (Gould, 1996). Gould further (1996) notes that Binet 
was steadfast in his belief that the tests should only be used in order “to identify 
in order to help and improve, not to label in order to limit” (p. 182). However, as 
Gould (1996) remarks, Binet’s intentions regarding not positing a single score for 
intelligence and not using tests to label and limit children were overturned by 
those who built upon his work. Henry Goddard was the first person to translate 
Binet’s work into English and to popularise what was then termed the “Binet 
Scale” in the United States of America (Gould, 1996). Goddard went on to assert 
that scores did in fact measure a single, innate entity known as intelligence. He 
wished further to identify children with lower levels of intelligence in order to 
“limit, segregate and curtail breeding” and to “prevent further deterioration of 
an endangered American stock” (Gould, 1996, p. 189).  
This work in statistical science and the measurement of intelligence 
culminated in the development of the “normal distribution” of intellectual 
quotient (IQ), otherwise known as the Bell Curve (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 14: Defining the Cognitive Classes (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, 
p. 121). Image description: A bell curve with IQ scores across the 
bottom line, ranging from 50 to 150.  There are five evenly spaced 
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sections labelled “Very Dull”, “Dull”, “Normal”, “Bright” and “Very 
Bright”. 
 
The Bell Curve is widely used today in the discipline of psychology and diagnostic 
processes for learning disability (see for instance Ministry of Health, 2012a).  
The idea that disability is a deviation from the norm is openly used to 
define intellectual (learning) disability in the Operational Guideline for the 
Assessment of Intellectual Disability to Access Disability Support Services 
Contracted for People with Intellectual Disability in New Zealand (Ministry of 
Health, 2012a). In this guideline document, intellectual disability is placed at the 
low end of the “Standard Bell Curve of IQs of the general population” (p. 6). The 
Bell Curve is not explicitly used in the World Health Organisation’s World Report 
on Disability (2011). However, the idea that disability is a concept which deviates 
from the “norm” is expressed:  
Disability is interpreted in relation to what is considered normal 
functioning, which can vary based on the context, age group, or 
even income group5. For example, older persons may not self-
identify as having a disability, despite having significant difficulties 
in functioning, because they consider their level of functioning 
appropriate for their age. (pp. 23-24)  
Internationally, it is generally accepted that an IQ score lower than 70 is 
the cut-off point for establishing learning disability (Scior et al., 2015). However, 
the Ministry of Health Operational Guidelines (2012a) and the DSM-5 (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013) allow for factors associated with adaptive 
functioning to be taken into account if a person’s IQ is found to be marginally 
higher than 70. Marks (1999) notes that the use of 70 as a cut-off point was 
developed by Cyril Burt, who decided on this specific number by calculating the 
number of pupils which the special education settings at the time could 
accommodate. The decision to use 70 as the cut-off point thus appears to say 
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more about the educational facilities in Cyril Burt’s time than it does about any 
naturally-occurring dividing line which exists in nature (Marks, 1999). The use of 
70 as a cut-off point is further called into question when other factors are taken 
into consideration, including the wide array of critiques regarding the inherent 
cultural and social biases in IQ testing (see for instance Gould, 1994, 1996; 
Quaye, 1995). The fact that Cyril Burt was discredited for the use of fraudulent 
data in his work (Gould, 1996; Marks, 1999) adds further doubt to the use of this 
cut-off point.  
Learning Disability and the “Norm” 
The category of learning disability, as well as disability more widely, 
includes a wide variety of people who have little in common with each other 
aside from the fact that they are “different” from the statistical norm (Allen, 
2005) – that is, “they have failed to be ‘normal’” (Inckle, 2015). For instance, the 
category includes people who have acquired a disability through a sports injury, 
people with Down Syndrome, people who are blind, and people with autism. 
With the foundational role that Western science and medicine plays in asserting 
claims to “truth”, the positing of certain types of bodies and minds as “disabled”, 
or “not normal”, came to be established as an irrefutable truth-claim (Hughes, 
2005). Hughes (2005) sums this up in the following statement:  
A group of people known as “the disabled” can only be constituted 
as a “real” population in the wake of medicine’s “[plunge] into the 
marvellous density of perception” (Foucault, 1973, p. xiii), for in 
that moment, medicine reinvents itself as the rational repository 
of truth with respect to the biological integrity of individuals and 
populations. (p. 83) 
The use of the standard deviation of intellectual quotient in order to 
measure and understand populations has had some chilling consequences for 
those who were unable to conform to normative expectations. For instance, 
Herrnstein and Murray’s book The Bell Curve (1994) argued that, on a population 




than white (non-Hispanic) Americans. They claim further that this difference can 
largely be attributed to genetic factors. Herrnstein and Murray argue that, owing 
to inborn cognitive limitations, people such as beneficiaries cannot be helped, 
that money placed in social welfare programmes is better used for gifted 
students, and that there should be an increase in the custodial state in order to 
keep people of low IQ in check (Gould, 1994, 1996; Quaye, 1995). The Bell Curve 
(1994) has been subject to heavy criticism, including for its misuse of statistical 
methods, as well as for justifying racism, classism and sexism (Fischer et al., 
1996; Gould, 1994, 1996). However, despite these criticisms, ideas presented in 
The Bell Curve (1994) continue to be influential.  
In more recent times, the notion of normality has become a moral 
judgement as well as a statistical measure (Stephens, 2014). The statistical 
average has become equated with the “average man” (L. Davis, 1995), and the 
norm has become “fused with average as natural” (Goodley, 2017, p. 87). As De 
Schauwer, Van de Putte, Blockmans, and Davies (2016) note, normality benches 
the conditions under which the “morally ascendant and natural state of being” 
(p. 4) are assessed. This leads to the idea that everyone is at the very least 
expected to be “average” (Goodley, 2017). When someone does not fall within 
the expected range, it is considered to be a flaw inherent in the individual. 
However, as Borgioli (2008) notes: 
[B]y the very nature of distributing a population normally (e.g., 
applying a Bell Curve), some students will always exist in the 
“below average” stanines. It is impossible for all of the population 
to be “average” or “above average”.  (p. 136) 
Within the concept of the normal distribution of intelligence represented in the 
Bell Curve, there will always be elements of a population grouping who are 
“above” or “below average”, some significantly so. This variation enables the Bell 
Curve to be established.  
Lastly, although the norm can be seen as pervasive, and can be taken to 
be the “natural order” of society, it is a concept which few people, if any, ever 




“normal” is highlighted in an article which discusses a competition called the 
“Search for Norma” (Stephens, 2014). This competition, held in 1945, was a 
search for the most perfectly “average” woman in America. Despite the large 
number of entries in the competition, no one, including the winner, came close 
to meeting all of the average criteria. Nor did the eventual winner look anything 
like the “average” female model drawn up for the competition based on the 
statistical averages. The “Search for Norma” competition highlights the 
contradictions inherent in the conception of the “norm”; whilst there is an 
expectation that everyone will meet this standard, it is paradoxically difficult, if 
not impossible, to attain.  
In conclusion, the twin notions of “learning disability” and “normal 
people” are not natural phenomena awaiting accurate scientific interpretation. 
Instead, these concepts can be understood as artefacts of the political, material 
and social structures which emerged through the social structures of modernity 
and capitalism. The modernist ideals of rationality, independence, self-control 
and able-bodiedness continue to play a powerful role in shaping how humans are 
conceptualised and, most notably, in conceptualising those who do not meet the 
expected standards. 
Ableism and the Concept of the Ideal Human 
The notion of the ideal human is a foundational component of the 
emergence of learning disability as a concept, and continues to play a powerful 
role in shaping the way this term is understood in contemporary Western 
society. Any account of how learning disability is conceptualised must therefore 
include tools which enable a critique of this concept; ableism has emerged as a 
valuable concept to facilitate this analysis.  
Ableism is a nebulous concept. At times it seems easy to pin down and 
define, whilst on other occasions it evades identification and definition (Hodge & 
Runswick-Cole, 2013). Campbell (2009a) asserts that it is important not to hold 
to a rigid understanding or definition of ableism. She argues further that ableism 
should not be used as a universalised grand narrative to provide an all-




used to highlight exclusionary categories and ontologies in the production of the 
“human” (Campbell, 2009a).  
This thesis utilises Campbell’s (2001) definition of ableism, which she 
defines as:   
A network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a 
particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is 
projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential 
and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of 
being human. (p. 44) 
This definition has been chosen in preference to Campbell’s later definitions 
(e.g., 2017a, 2017b), which do not place a strong focus on “ableism’s function in 
inaugurating the norm” (Campbell, 2009a, p. 5), a critical idea for this thesis. As 
noted earlier, the assumption of a corporeal standard, or ideal human, is a 
phenomenon around which much of the Western world is shaped. For instance, 
many homes are built assuming that everyone can walk, many jobs are designed 
assuming a certain level of cognitive abilities, and much of the social world is 
built around the assumption that everyone can understand social cues.  
Imbricated within the notion of the normative ideal human comes its 
binary opposite – the “other” who is different, inferior, undesirable and 
dehumanised. (Hacking, 2007; Hodge & Runswick-Cole, 2013).  Campbell’s work 
on ableism also highlights how contemporary understandings of learning 
disability can be understood as the “constitutive outside” of how humans are 
conceptualised (Campbell, 2005). In short, the terms “abled” and disabled” are 
born from and grafted upon each other – neither can exist without the other 
(Campbell, 2009a).  As Campbell (2005) notes:   
In order for the notion of “ableness” to exist and to transmogrify 
into the sovereign subject of liberalism it must have a constitutive 
outside – that is, it must participate in a logic of supplementarity…. 
disability is always present (despite its seeming absence) in the 
ableist talk of normalcy, normalization and humanness. (p. 109, 




Thus, in order for the notion of the “ideal” human to exist, there is a requisite 
constitute outside -  the “other” to the ideas of rationality, able-bodiedness and 
normal IQ. The “abled”, “normal” subject is only knowable through the (hidden) 
presence of the disabled subject. Simultaneously, truth-claims related to 
disability as an essential category are dependent upon ableism for their very 
legitimisation (Campbell, 2008b). As Simpson (2011) notes, drawing on the work 
of Derrida (2002), in any discussion of a “normal” or “typically developing” child 
there is a suppressed other term – that of “idiocy”, or learning disability.  
The Inferior “Other” of the Ableist Binary  
Central to the binary logic of any form of identity and otherness –  
white/non-white, heterosexual/non-heterosexual, and abled/disabled  –  is the 
establishment of ascendant and subordinate terms within the binary (De 
Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017). The ascendant term 
functions to signify what counts as normal and desirable, whilst the subordinated 
term functions to signify what is non-normative, abnormal and undesirable; that 
is, as a “problem” in need of fixing (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, & Davies, 2017; 
De Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017). To be categorised 
in descendent terms is to be marked as “different” from the ascendant norm, 
where difference spells inferiority (Braidotti, 2013). This is in contrast to 
placement in the ascendant category where people remain unmarked and are 
taken to be “normal” and “naturally human” (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van 
Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017). Thus, the notion of “abled-ness” relies on disability 
embodying a devalued status, “in order to showcase its own capacitated 
desirability” (D. Mitchell & Snyder, 2017, np).  It is this notion of being “normal” 
and “naturally human” which shaped my own lack of thought regarding my 
status as a non-disabled person, as noted in the introduction to this chapter.  
People placed in a subordinate category are at risk of social exclusion, 
and are further “subjected to normative pressure to become more like those 
who are read as normal” (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 
2017, p. 1). The subsequent desire to pursue normal is thus read to be an 




inferiorisation, however, are often obscured and difficult to pin down (Hodge & 
Runswick-Cole, 2013). This thesis explores some of the key beliefs, practices and 
processes which enable this inferiorisation.  
Although non-disabled people’s aversion to disability appears to be an 
aversion to the “other”, Nussbaum, Nussbaum and Nussbaum (2006) argues that 
it is a form of self-aversion. This idea is also argued by Bunch (2017). Drawing on 
Julia Kristeva’s (1984a, 1984b, 2006, 2010, 2013) work on vulnerability, Bunch 
(2017) asserts: 
Where the differently embodied person is rejected, the deficit that 
appears on the surface to be associated with impairment, is 
instead a universal kernel of anxiety that lies at the centre of every 
self. (p. 142) 
Hughes (2012) argues this point further, noting that this aversion is a means by 
which we “hide from the bodily basis of our own humanity” (p.23). He argues 
that aversion, or what he terms “ableist disgust”, derives from discomfort with 
bodily functions; people’s oozy, sticky, leaky bodies, and the shame and 
embarrassment brought to bear upon people whose leakiness is exposed to 
others (Hughes, 2012).  
Although being placed in an ascendant category requires little-to-no 
conscious attention by the people who are in that category, one’s ascendant 
status is neither static nor guaranteed (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, & Davies, 
2017). In particular, De Schauwer, Van de Putte, and Davies (2017) draw on 
Schildrick’s insights about the concept of “monstrous others”. They argue that 
one’s position in an ascendant category must be continually maintained because 
the border between one’s place in ascendant and subordinate categories cannot 
ever be guaranteed. As they state:  
None of us exist simply on one side or the other side of the deeply 
problematic binary…. Our borders are much more porous than we 
usually imagine they are. (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, & Davies, 




Aversion to disability can thus be understood as a discomfort or anxiety which 
derives from the instability of one’s placement in this hierarchy.  
Broader Processes of Othering  
The processes through which learning disability is constituted as inferior 
to the norm are not isolated phenomena. Rather, they are part of a much wider 
process of othering. Although the term “othering” is not often noted or 
discussed in detail in the disability studies literature (for exceptions to this trend 
see Loja, Costa, Hughes, & Menezes, 2013; Mik-Meyer, 2016; Simpson, 2011), 
the connection between disability and various “othered” groups is well noted. 
Most often, this connection is made in reference to various human rights 
movements, to which the disability rights movement and field of disability 
studies are indebted (see for instance Campbell, 2009a; Goodley, 2011; Oliver, 
1990; Overboe, 2012). These fields of literature (and wider rights movements), 
such as critical race theory, feminism and queer studies, have critiqued “the 
Eurocentric, masculine, heterosexist view of the Cartesian body/mind split… 
[which] was fabricated to justify the European man of reason as superior to 
other lesser bodies including women, racialised others, queer people and ‘the 
disabled’” (Overboe, 2012, p. 114). 
The concept of “othering” appears periodically in other academic 
discipline areas, such as geography (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002), 
Women’s studies (Ezzell, 2009; Nnaemeka, 1997), Healthcare (Canales, 2000; J. 
Johnson et al., 2004; Petros, Airhihenbuwa, Simbayi, Ramlagan, & Brown, 2006) 
and Race studies (Jensen, 2011). However, although these fields are imbricated 
within previous critiques of the Eurocentric ideal man, “othering” does not 
appear to be a well-established and unique body of work in its own right. It is an 
area which deserves further investigation. The development of a new journal, 
Othering and Belonging (see www.otheringandbelonging.org), signals an 
increasing interest in exploring “othering” as an area of study.  
Specific practices of othering may operate differently for each “othered” 
group. However, these practices connect with the notion of the normative, 




Meyer (2016), who uses interviews to explore how able-bodied co-workers 
“other” colleagues with impairments. Respondents in the interviews repeatedly 
likened their colleagues with impairments to various groups considered “other”. 
The range of “others” is discussed in the following quote: 
Co-workers referred to people with a different ethnic background 
than Danish, homosexuals, drunk people, children, transvestites 
[sic], redheads, old women, pregnant women, blonds, people in 
grief, women in male [dominant] occupations, drunk drivers, 
Germans and Indians with poor English skills, immigrants, 
marginalized people in general (non-disabled), and people who 
were inadequate in their jobs. (Mik-Meyer, 2016, p. 1352) 
The commonality amongst these different groups of people was their “different” 
appearance (Mik-Meyer, 2016). The notion of the ideal human clearly played a 
powerful role in shaping co-workers perceptions of what is considered “normal” 
and what is considered “different” to normal – as “other”.  
Learning disabled people in particular have been one of the most 
profoundly othered groups in history. This problem is evident in the arguments 
presented by many disadvantaged groups, who have asserted their entitlement 
to full rights on the basis that they are not learning disabled. Reference to this 
issue can be found within the disability rights movement and disability literature. 
For instance, Oliver (1996) notes that “the approach of the Union of the 
Physically Impaired has clearly demonstrated that disabled people do not need 
to be talked down to in ‘lay terms’” (pp. 21-22). This statement implies that using 
“lay terms”, or simple language, is an insulting way to talk to a person, and that 
to assume someone is learning disabled is to insult them. Paul Hunt (1998) 
contends further: 
Those of us with unimpaired minds but severely disabled bodies 
[emphasis added], have a unique opportunity show other people 
not only that our big difference from them does not lessen our 




real, unpleasant and disturbing, does away with their right to be 
treated as fully human. (p. 13, emphasis in original) 
Statements such as this leave questionable implications as to where people with 
impaired minds sit in regard to their right to be treated as fully human.  
The issue of “othering” of learning disabled people in the disability rights 
movement parallels the difficulties experienced in the women’s rights 
movement. In this regard, Carlson (2001) highlights how “feebleminded women” 
were set apart from other women with respect to both motherhood and 
womanhood more generally. This practice resulted in a clear division between 
women who were suitable to be mothers (i.e., women who were of good genetic 
stock), and women who were not suitable. Eugenics-related ideas were used by 
many feminists at the turn of the twentieth century to bolster their cause for 
access to contraceptive options by arguing that ““voluntary motherhood” was 
essential to preventing feeblemindedness”(Carlson, 2001, p. 137, emphasis in 
original). Unwanted children, it was argued, would be at significant risk of being 
inferior, weak, deprived or defective (Carlson, 2001; L. Gordon, 1976). As L. 
Gordon (1976) states, “it would be near impossible to find discussions of 
voluntary motherhood between 1890 and 1910 which didn’t claim that 
unwanted children were likely to be morally and/or physically defective ” (p. 
121).   
The Real World Consequences of Inferior 
Positioning  
The positioning of disability as inferior and “other” to the notion of an 
ideal norm has significant real-world consequences for the people placed in this 
category. As Stainton (2008) argues, the assumption that reason is a necessary 
attribute of full personhood could be seen as being “at the heart of the exclusion 
and oppression” (p. 486) learning disabled people have faced throughout 
Western history. Scully (2016) notes further that when someone does not meet 
the criteria for full personhood, they do not have access to the same rights as 




The most profound and chilling impact of the inferiorisation of disability 
can be found in the Eugenics movement. The science of Eugenics, which is the 
practice of improving the genetic stock through selective breeding, was 
developed by Francis Galton (Locurto, 1991). Galton was one of the early 
instigators looking to measure intelligence. He took his cousin Darwin’s ideas 
regarding evolutionary fitness, based in the natural sciences, and applied them 
to the growing field of human sciences (Gould, 1996; Locurto, 1991). Under the 
guise of Eugenics, learning disabled people became seen as evolutionary 
“defectives” (Clapton, 2009). These ideas drove the impetus for the elimination 
of “defective” individuals, which ultimately culminated in the drive to eradicate 
disabled people under the Nazi regime (Campbell, 1999; Scior et al., 2015).  
Eugenic ideas regarding disabled people as evolutionary “defectives” not 
only played a powerful role in Nazi Germany, they also had a powerful impact in 
many countries around the world (Clapton, 2009). Numerous laws were passed 
in the United States of America in the early 20th century targeting the elimination 
of mental retardation (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). In Aotearoa New Zealand, 
the Science of Eugenics was validated by the publication of The Fertility of the 
Unfit (Chapple, 1903) and endorsed through the 1911 Mental Defectives Act 
(Hamilton, 2018). The desire to prevent “defective” individuals from procreating 
and contaminating the gene pool formed an important part of the argument for 
the institutionalisation of learning disabled people in this country (Hamilton, 
2018). 
Although practices of eugenics are often viewed as an unfortunate 
practice of the past, the ongoing effects of these ideas are still evident. In 
particular, Shakespeare (1998) highlights two forms of eugenics still in practice - 
“strong” and “weak” eugenics. Strong eugenics is the drive to improve 
populations via state intervention of reproductive control, such as the forced 
sterilisation of learning disabled women. Although strong eugenics is no longer 
widely utilised in many countries, weak eugenics, defined as “promoting 
technologies of reproductive selection via non-coercive individual choices” 
(Shakespeare, 1998, p. 669), remains prevalent in many countries, including 




abnormalities with the explicit purpose of providing parents with the option to 
terminate should an abnormality be detected. The difference between the 
outcomes of “strong” and “weak” eugenics is not always clear-cut. In Aotearoa 
New Zealand, women report being strongly encouraged by medical professionals 
to abort if they receive a positive diagnosis for disability (see for instance H. 
Jackson, 2017; Nyika, 2017)6. Furthermore, close to 100% of babies with Down 
Syndrome are selectively aborted in Iceland (MacLean, 2017).   
Underlying these ideas is the belief that the quality of life for “defective” 
individuals is reduced to the point that to end (or prevent) such lives is 
considered “mercy killing” (Morris, 1991; Scully, 2016). Scully (2016) provides a 
powerful link between seeing forms of identity7 as spoiled or incomplete (or as 
defective), and the devaluation of disabled lives. As she asserts, identities which 
are not viewed as fully legitimate “are the first to be marginalized socially, 
economically and politically” (np), and are often ignored, silenced and have 
claims to respect ignored. Scully (2016) argues further:  
[I]f to be disabled is to have a spoiled or incomplete identity, or 
indeed (in the case of learning disability) to have no real identity at 
all, that means a disabled life can never be a genuinely good life, 
or a flourishing one, in the way that those with unspoiled, 
undiminished identities can. (np) 
This belief regarding a diminished identity and life leads to the conclusion that 
such identities cannot and should not be endorsed, and further that those 
identities are less worthy of preserving (Scully, 2016). As Scully (2016) states, 
“[t]hese lives are worth less” (np). 
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This chapter has explored the emergence of the category of learning 
disability. Rather than viewing learning disability as essential pathology residing 
in nature, I have argued that the concept is an artefact of the political, spiritual, 
material and social structures which have emerged as powerful forces shaping 
Western society. This is particularly in relation to how humans are 
conceptualised. Modernity, with its focus on universal truths, logic and reason 
(Crotty, 1998), was discussed as the first key structure shaping how learning 
disability is conceptualised. The progression of statistical science during the 
period of modernity, with its focus on the normal distribution, has played a 
powerful role in shaping standards of the ideal, “normal” citizen, particularly in 
relation to ideas regarding “normal” intelligence. The second key structure 
shaping the emergence of the category of learning disability is capitalism. 
Notions of “desirable workers” and “desirable bodies” arose alongside their 
binary opposite concepts – unproductive, disabled workers. These workers 
became seen as a social problem, forming a “surplus population” (Erevelles, 
2000) who were often excluded from “mainstream” communities (Clapton, 
2009). Both modernity and capitalism have played a powerful role in positioning 
disability as individual pathology.  
This chapter also explored the concept of ableism. Ableism can be used as 
a conceptual tool to understand and critique the notion of the ideal human. The 
ableist binary necessarily positions disability as inferior, resulting in significant 
real-world consequences for the people placed in this category. These 
consequences include Eugenics, with a focus on the elimination of “defective” 
individuals, and reduced access to human rights. 
Lastly, this chapter explored the intersection between disability and 
broader processes of “othering”. I argue that the positioning of disability as 
“other” is imbricated within wider processes which place anyone who does not 
meet the expected, “normal” standards in this category. Learning disabled 
people in particular have been one of the most profoundly “othered” groups in 




those with physical and sensory impairments, have asserted their entitlement to 
full rights on the basis that they are not learning disabled.  
The rationale for this thesis is founded on the combination of these core 
ideas. First, that the terms “abled” and “disabled” are not essential, knowable 
entities, but are instead terms grafted upon each other. Second, disability is 
necessarily positioned as the descendent term within the ableist binary. Lastly, 
the positioning of inferiority plays a crucial role in the validation and 
perpetuation of disability oppression.  
In the next chapter, I outline the key conceptual frameworks which shape 
the way learning disability is viewed in the Aotearoa New Zealand context. 
Specifically, the chapter will focus on how these frameworks are embedded 
within strategy documents and disability support service practices in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. Key issues arising from these frameworks will be explored, 
including the ontological underpinning of the ideal human. The limitations these 







Learning Disability in Aotearoa New 
Zealand  
In this chapter, I explore key phenomena which serve to position learning 
disabled people on the margins of humanity. I came to the PhD seeking to find 
some answers about what we need to do differently in our support practices. 
Through the PhD, I have come to realise that support practices are driven by 
particular ways of thinking about humans and the world; these ways of thinking 
are profoundly shaped by conceptual frameworks related to disability. 
Furthermore, the Government policies and strategies related to disability which 
play a powerful role in shaping our support practices, are often driven by these 
frameworks. Although this chapter largely focuses on academic texts and 
Government policy documents, it is fundamentally grounded in my experiences 
in the disability support sector. I have witnessed first-hand the elements of 
policies and strategies which have had a real influence on people’s lives, such as 
the drive to ensure that residential homes look “normal”, and the unquestioned 
practice of making decisions on behalf of people in support services. I have also 
observed the policies and strategies which have been “nice ideas”, but which 
have proven ineffective in practice. One example is the assertion that learning 
disabled people have equal rights under the law, including the right to equal and 
“inclusive” education. It turns out that those “abstracted flights of fantasy” have 
real and profound consequences for people’s lives. 
 
What are the conceptual frameworks related to (learning) disability in 
Aotearoa New Zealand? What do they say about learning disability? And why 




of hard work from the disability rights movement, families and whānau8, 
legislators and support workers, among many others?  In order to answer these 
questions, I turned to key Government policies, strategies and reports. Although 
texts such as these only provide a limited snapshot of what is happening in an 
area, I believe they provide a tangible artefact which highlights the social 
currents in Aotearoa New Zealand. Through analysing the key Government 
policies, strategies and reports I have identified four major conceptual 
frameworks guiding policy and practice: the medical model, normalisation, the 
social model, and rights based-based perspectives. I also examined Māori 
perspectives on disability, which are less evident in Government documents.  
In this chapter, I explore how each of these frameworks provides 
different ways of conceptualising disability, assessment of where the “problem” 
lies, and strategies on how to address these problems. I examine how each of 
these perspectives has led to significant progress-gains for learning disabled 
people, including deinstitutionalisation and the establishment of “community-
based” living, the development of legislation ensuring equal rights in law, a 
recognition that relationships form an integral part of the disability experience, 
and legislation regarding (physically) accessible buildings.  
However, with the possible exception of Māori perspectives on disability, 
which do not appear to be widely-researched or well-known outside of Māori 
communities, each of these perspectives has flaws. These flaws are inherent in 
the ontological foundation of the frameworks, as well as how they are enacted in 
practice. Critically for this thesis, the ontological foundation of these frameworks 
is underpinned by the modernist notion of the ideal human, discussed in Chapter 
Two. I argued that the concepts of “disability” and “normal” form a binary, 
where each term serves to hold the other in place. In this regard, learning 
disability can be understood as the “other” to the notions of “rationality”, 
“abled-ness” and “normal IQ”. I asserted that much of the foundation of Western 
society is built upon the assumption of this ideal norm, including the education 
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system in Aotearoa New Zealand and the neoliberal economic system (Olssen & 
Peters, 2005). In this chapter, I investigate how the ontological conceptualisation 
of how humans ought to be has become particularised in these key conceptual 
frameworks. I will highlight how this conceptualisation has been a hindrance to 
the success of the disability rights movement (hereafter referred to as the DRM), 
and to the fight against disability oppression.  
Lastly, I review several key approaches adopted in the fight against 
disability oppression. These approaches highlight the material impact of the 
ontological underpinning of the ideal human. Impacts include an absence of 
challenge to the “natural” inferiority of learning disability, a fervent focus on 
individual’s “attitudes”, and an absence of challenge to discriminatory and 
exclusionary structures.  
It must be noted that the approaches and frameworks outlined in this 
chapter are not the summation of perspectives in the field of disability studies. 
Other approaches include critical disability studies (e.g., Goodley, 2012, 2017; 
Sullivan, 2011; Watson, 2012), feminist disability studies (e.g., Garland-Thomson, 
2002, 2005, 2016), the minority model of disability (e.g., Hahn, 1988; Zola, 1982), 
and the relational model (e.g., Bjarnason, 2008; Tøssebro, 2004). However, I 
have found little evidence of their impact in Aotearoa New Zealand, either in 
Government policy and strategy, or in my personal experience working in the 
support sector. Two other perspectives from the field of disability studies which I 
have found little evidence of in Aotearoa New Zealand, but which I believe do 
hold promise for the future are posthuman disability studies, and ableism, which 
falls under the category of the cultural model of disability (Goodley, 2011). 
Where ableism was discussed in Chapter Two, posthuman disability studies will 
be explored in detail in the Chapter Four.  
Medicalised Conceptualisations of Learning 
Disability  
Medicalised conceptualisations of disability are often referred to as the 




Goodley (2011), this model views disability as “a medical problem that resides in 
the individual – a defect in or a failure of a bodily system that is inherently 
abnormal and pathological” (p. 7, emphasis in original). Under this model, 
disability (or impairment) is understood as a pre-discursive, essential entity 
which is a deviation from the ableist corporeal norm (Tremain, 2001; 2005). It is 
thus a model founded in the modernist notion of the ideal human; disability is 
reduced to abnormality, and bodies and minds which do not conform to the 
expected norms of society are invalidated (Goering, 2010; Loja et al., 2013). This 
view of disability dates back to the mid-1800s (Goodley, 2011), around the time 
and the growth of modern, Western perspectives of the body and medicine.  
Medicalised conceptions of “normal bodies” and “impairment” have led 
to many medical advances, which in turn have resulted in improvements in many 
people’s lives (Goodley, 2011). However, there are many problems arising from 
this view of disability. In particular, the medicalised conception of disability 
places the locus of the problem squarely in the disabled individual.  The 
individualisation of the “problem” of disability is the subject of much criticism in 
the disability studies literature (Goodley, 2011; S. J. Hickey, 2008; Tremain, 
2005a). Oliver (1990) is particularly critical of this model, describing it as a grand 
theory of “the personal tragedy of disability” (p. 1), which underpinned almost all 
studies of disability prior to 1990. As discussed in Chapter Two, Oliver (1990) 
connects the individualisation of disability within the medical model back to the 
emergence of capitalism. Under capitalism, he argues, the Western world saw a 
shift from “collectivist notions of work as the product of family and group 
involvement”, to the requirement for “individuals to sell their labour in a free 
market” (p. 44). Individuals who were unable to contribute to expected levels 
became seen as “a particular kind of social problem” (Oliver, 1990, p. 78).   
Goodley (2011) notes that medicalised conceptions of learning disability 
are the dominant means of conceptualising disability. In Aotearoa New Zealand 
the medical model remains one of the most widely utilised means of 
understanding disability, including in Government policy documents (S. J. Hickey, 
2008; Sullivan, 2000). For instance, the 2013 Disability Survey defines disability as 




out daily activities” (Statistics New Zealand, 2013b, p. 13). The Ministry of Health 
(2016) notes that Ministry-funded support services are available to “people who 
have a physical, intellectual or sensory disability (or a combination of these) 
which: is likely to continue for at least 6 months, [and] limits their ability to 
function independently, to the extent that ongoing support is required” (para. 1). 
Both of these statements indicate that disability is viewed as a limitation 
inherent in individuals, in line with the medical model understanding of 
disability. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Two, access to learning disability 
support services is predicated on meeting the criteria as outlined in the 
Operational Guideline for the Assessment of Intellectual Disability to Access 
Disability Support Services Contracted for People with Intellectual Disability 
(Ministry of Health, 2012a). These criteria describe learning disability as a deficit 
which resides in individuals.  
One key issue emanating from this perspective is that, when the locus of 
the problem is placed squarely in the disabled individual, strategies to deal with 
this “problem” tend also to focus on individuals (Naidoo, 2009; Sullivan, 2000). 
This, as Abberley (1987) and Goodley (2011) note, presents disability as the 
consequence of a biological flaw, and does nothing to challenge exclusionary 
societal practices and structures. Furthermore, Oliver (1999) comments that 
medicalised perceptions present the notion of disability as a phenomenon which 
people could never be happy about. Sullivan (2000) backs this point up further, 
noting that the medical model “totally negates disability as a possibly positive 
state of being” (p. 38).  
In the following section I explore one of the most influential frameworks 
in relation to learning disability in Aotearoa New Zealand: normalisation.  
Normalisation 
One of the first conceptual frameworks which posited a non-medicalised 
view of learning disability is normalisation. Originating in Scandinavia in the 
1960s, the principle of normalisation was developed during a time when many 
learning disabled people in the Western world lived in institutions, a situation 




defined in multiple ways over the years, varying in definition, focus and practice 
as societies’ views regarding learning disability have evolved.  
The origins of the principle are credited to Nirje and Bank-Mikkelsen 
(Wolfensberger, Nirje, Brisenden, Perske, & Roos, 1972), both from Scandinavia. 
Nirje, who became one of the two most notable developers of the principle, 
defined normalisation as “making available to the mentally retarded patterns 
and conditions of everyday life which are as close as possible to the norms and 
patterns of the mainstream of society” (Nirje, 1976, p. 363). Nirje’s aim was to 
ensure that “mentally retarded” people enjoyed the same rights to quality of life 
as non-disabled people (H. Brown & Smith, 1992). 
The second notable developer of the principle is Wolfensberger, from the 
United States of America. Wolfensberger travelled to Denmark and Sweden in 
the spring of 1969 in order to visit Nirje and Bank Mikkelsen (Wolfensberger, 
1980). Deeply influenced by the work of these scholars, Wolfensberger returned 
to America to start developing his own adaptation of normalisation 
(Wolfensberger, 1980). He hoped to develop a more detailed and elaborate 
version of the principle which would be more applicable to a North American 
audience (Wolfensberger, 1980; Wolfensberger et al., 1972). Initially, 
Wolfensberger (1980) defined normalisation as the: 
Utilization of means which are as culturally normative as possible, 
in order to establish, enable, or support behaviors, appearances 
and interpretations which are as culturally normative as possible. 
(p. 80)  
Wolfensberger’s adaptation of normalisation signalled a move away from a focus 
on culturally normative environments, towards a focus on culturally normative 
behaviours and appearances in learning disabled people themselves. 
Wolfensberger’s work became the target of sustained and significant 
criticism over many years; most notably related to the requirement for learning 
disabled people to conform to culturally normative expectations (e.g., Briton, 
1979; Nirje & Perrin, 1985; Rhoades & Browning, 1977). Wolfensberger 




normalisation, and renamed the theory Social Role Valorisation (SRV) (Culham & 
Nind, 2003; Wolfensberger, 1983/2011). As Wolfensberger (1983/2011) states:  
 
[T]he most explicit and highest goal of normalization must be the 
creation, support and defense of valued social roles for people 
who are at risk of social devaluation. All other elements and 
objectives of the theory are really subservient to this end, because 
if a person’s social role were a societally valued one, then other 
desirable things would be accorded to that person almost 
automatically, at least within the resources and norms of his/her 
society. (p. 435-6, emphasis in original) 
Despite the shift in emphasis, the focus for change in SRV remained directed at 
learning disabled people themselves, who are expected to conform to pre-
established socially valued roles (H. Brown & Smith, 1992).  
Over the ensuing decades, normalisation went on to become one of the 
most internationally influential concepts in both the lives of learning disabled 
people, and in the conceptualisation of learning disability (Nirje, 1985). 
Normalisation was effectively endorsed by the New Zealand Government in 1988 
in the Guidelines for standards for services for people with intellectual handicaps 
(Department of Health, 1988). This guideline included Nirje’s (1969) definition of 
normalisation on the inside front cover, and outlined how services could best 
operate, based on the principle.  
It is difficult to understate the influence of normalisation in Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s disability policies, strategies and support practices. In particular, 
normalisation places great onus on the value of “normal”, “ordinary” and 
“everyday” lives for learning disabled people. The focus on “ordinary / everyday” 
lives and “ordinary / equal opportunities” is evident throughout numerous 
Government disability policies and strategies. For instance, in 2003 a strategy 
entitled To Have an ‘Ordinary’ Life was released (National Advisory Committee 
on Health and Disability, 2003). The use of the word “ordinary” throughout the 




“access the everyday things that others take for granted” (National Advisory 
Committee on Health and Disability, 2003, p. 5). In a 2011 report released by the 
Cabinet Social Policy Committee, the Choice in Community Living initiative was 
said to enable learning disabled people to have “ordinary house choices” and to 
“take more part in normal, everyday activities” (Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 
2011, p. 4). Other documents which discuss “ordinary / everyday” lives and 
“ordinary / equal opportunities” include the New Zealand Disability Strategies 
(Ministry of Health, 2001; Office for Disability Issues, 2016), Pathways to 
Inclusion (Department of Labour, 2001), Enabling Good Lives (Independent 
Working Group on ‘Day Options’, 2011), Disability Support Services Strategic Plan 
2014-2018 (Ministry of Health, 2015), and Faiva Ora: National Pasifika Disability 
Plan (Ministry of Health, 2017).  
Normalisation and Support Services 
One of the foremost achievements of normalisation is that it can be 
credited for providing much of the impetus for deinstitutionalisation (Nirje & 
Perrin, 1985). In Aotearoa New Zealand, a Government Consultative Committee 
was set up in 1952 to look into the role of psychopaedic institutions (Hamilton, 
2018). However, a policy of community living for learning disabled people was 
not formally adopted until 1985 (IHC, 2012), when normalisation was becoming 
widely known and utilised in Aotearoa New Zealand.  
One of the key reasons normalisation had such a powerful influence in 
learning disability support services was that it defined practical standards which 
could be used as a guide for support practice.  As Nirje (1985) states, the 
principle of normalisation: 
[I]mplies, when in doubt how to meet a problem, how to advise, 
how to plan actions, what to do... the normalization principle 
means that you act right when you let the handicapped person 
obtain the same or as close as possible to the same conditions of 




An example of this “practical advice” can be seen in the Guidelines for Standards 
for Services for People with Intellectual Handicaps (Department of Health, 1988). 
This guideline document states that group homes for learning disabled people 
were expected to have the appearance of typical homes in the surrounding 
neighbourhood, where:  
No features except for necessary physical access adaptations 
should be incorporated into the home which might distinguish the 
intellectually handicapped people living there from other people. 
(p. 10) 
Normalisation became widely accepted as the ideal model of service in 
learning disability support services in Aotearoa New Zealand. Hamilton (2008) 
notes that it became so firmly entrenched that support workers were regularly 
trained in a way that encouraged unquestioning acceptance of the principle; 
doubts regarding any aspect of normalisation or SRV were firmly discouraged (H. 
Brown & Smith, 1992; Hamilton, 2008).  
Wolfensberger’s adaptation of normalisation proved to be particularly 
useful in guiding learning disability support services through the process of 
deinstitutionalisation, including the establishment of community living for 
learning disabled people (Hamilton, 2008; A. Hunt, 2000). Wolfensberger 
developed numerous tools to guide these processes, including one which he 
developed with Linda Glenn: the Program Analysis of Service System: A Method 
for the Qualitative Evaluation of Human Services, more commonly known as the 
“PASSing” tool (Wolfensberger & Glenn, 1975). PASSing training was still being 
delivered in Aotearoa New Zealand in April 2018 (Synthia Dash9, Te Pou, personal 
communication October 4, 2018); however, less frequently than in the 1980s. 
The preference for Wolfensberger’s adaptation of normalisation over 
Nirje’s original definition made a significant difference to support practice and 
the lives of learning disabled people. As noted earlier, Wolfensberger placed a 
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much greater focus on “normalising” the learning disabled person themselves 
than on the environment (Anstey & Gaskin, 1985; Briton, 1979; H. Brown & 
Smith, 1992). Guided by Wolfensberger’s tools, including the “PASSing” training, 
support services focused on “helping” learning disabled people to look “as 
normal as possible”, in order to enhance individual’s social valuation. In effect, 
this served to encourage disabled people to assimilate into the dominant culture; 
that is, to “pass” for normal by hiding visible differences and downplaying 
disability (H. Brown & Smith, 1992). The significant impacts of “passing” and 
“achieving normal” faced by many learning disabled people were, regrettably, 
not taken into account (Hamilton, 2008). For instance, an adult would not be 
allowed to hold an anxiety-reducing toy truck in public, or partake in their 
favourite activity of playing on the swings in the park, because these are not 
activities that “normal” adults do. This situation undoubtedly had significant 
negative consequences for the well-being of many people.  
Normalisation, the Ideal Human and Devaluing Difference   
Normalisation is founded on deviancy theory, an idea which was popular 
during the 1960s (Walmsley, 2001; Wolfensberger et al., 1972). Drawing upon 
deviancy theory, Wolfensberger and Tullman (1982) argued that differences can 
lead to deviancy when the difference “becomes sufficiently negatively value-
charged in the minds of observers” (p. 132). Under normalisation, learning 
disabled people are considered sufficiently “different” from the unstated though 
presumed normative ideal, as to be considered deviant (Nirje, 1976; 
Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1982). Normalisation is thus founded on the idea that 
the modernist ideal human – the “normal” human – is the ideal state of being. 
Learning disability is then inescapably positioned as a devalued human trait.  
The continual stigmatisation, social exclusion, persecution and general 
poor treatment faced by learning disabled people was believed to be the fault of 
deviancy (Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1982). The ensuing idea was that reducing 
deviancy would reduce its consequences (Gilbert, 2004). Any visible markers of 
difference were thus viewed as having negative associations. One of the key 




strategies. Dispersal strategies advise deviant individuals to avoid congregating 
together (Wolfensberger, 1983/2011). As Wolfensberger (1983/2011) notes:  
When deviant persons socialize intensively and perhaps 
exclusively with each other, it is almost inevitable that a climate or 
subculture of deviancy is created which exacerbates rather than 
reverses the deviancy of those within this climate or subculture. 
(p. 3) 
Statements such as the one above highlight the inferior positioning of learning 
disability within normalisation and SRV. In order to achieve a socially valued 
status, learning disabled people are encouraged to buy into this devaluation by, 
for instance, disaffiliating from others who share their devalued status (H. Brown 
& Smith, 1992). The encouragement of dispersal strategies has led to the 
invidious consequence that many people are unable to form and value 
relationships with others who are like them (H. Brown & Smith, 1992). This 
situation was highlighted by a participant, Tamara, in the research conducted by 
Strnadová, Johnson, and Walmsley (2018). As she states: 
[S]o this is why there’s heaps of people with special needs that 
don’t have any friends: it’s because other people who don’t have a 
disability think that’s – I’m not being rude or anything, but this is 
what I got told, and this is what I know – that people think that 
people with disabilities are not good to be with. (p. 1098).  
Dispersal strategies further deny people the opportunity to access group spaces 
and processes which can enable the development of a collective consciousness, 
culture and identity (Campbell, 2008a).  
The devaluation of disability and the moral desirability of “normal” were 
not intended by either Wolfensberger or Nirje (Wolfensberger et al., 1972). As 
Wolfensberger et al. (1972) indicate, the use of the term “normative” was 
intended to have a statistical, rather than a moral connotation. However, as 
Culham and Nind (2003) note, normalisation and SRV have left “a legacy of 
attitudes towards normality, with “normal” thought of from a moral standpoint” 




become equated with what is good and morally desirable (Clapton, 2009). Under 
normalisation, it became entirely appropriate to “impose” normalising measures 
on a person, if this would be seen to enhance their social valuation (see 
Wolfensberger et al., 1972, p. 28). At its most extreme, Wolfensberger advised 
that cosmetic surgery could be used to reduce or eliminate a stigma 
(Wolfensberger et al., 1972). 
Because normalisation equates “normal” with what is good and morally 
desirable, it effectively forecloses the possibility of challenging societal power 
structures, relationships and norms which assert the preferability of the 
modernist ideal human, and which hold anyone designated as “different” in an 
inferior position (Gleeson, 1997; Shaddock & Zilber, 1991). As Culham and Nind 
(2003) state, “[t]he real legacy of the Normalisation movement can be seen to be 
a status quo that has been largely unchallenged” (p. 70). The result of 
normalisation is a situation where support workers, family, community members 
and learning disabled people work tirelessly to enhance individuals’ social 
valuation, whilst affirming oppressive norms and power structures which 
perpetuate the inferiorisation of learning disability. 
In the following section I outline a later development in the field of 
disability studies which went on to have a powerful impact on disability in 
Aotearoa New Zealand: the social model.  
The Social Model 
The second key conceptual theory which has been isolated as having a 
significant impact on the way disability is conceptualised in Aotearoa New 
Zealand is the social model. Known as the British disabled people’s movement’s 
“big idea” (Hasler, 1993), the origins of the social model are generally credited to 
a British Disabled Person’s Organisation, UPIAS (The Union of the Physically 
Impaired Against Segregation). Along with the Disability Alliance, UPIAS 
published a booklet The Fundamental Principles of Disability (1975), in which 
they were the first to define a distinction between impairment and disability. 




theoretical model by Michael Oliver in his book, The Politics of Disablement 
(1990). 
Drawing its origins from neo-Marxism, and beginning a long history of 
Marxism’s contribution to disability studies, the social model provides a 
materialist analysis of the capitalist foundations of disability oppression 
(Goodley, 2011; Oliver, 1990). In contrast to the individualising gaze of the 
medical model, the social model places the locus of the “problem” onto barriers 
in society that exclude people with perceived impairments (Barnes, 1998; Oliver, 
1990). It establishes a separation between the notions of impairment and 
disability; where impairment relates to the biological characteristics of a person’s 
body and mind, and disability relates to barriers in society (Oliver, 1990); for 
example, a person in a wheelchair has an impairment, but they are disabled by 
an unthinking society that, for instance, has stairs at the entrance to most 
buildings.  
Local and International Impacts of the Social Model  
The social model has had a profound impact on the way disability is 
conceptualised across the Western world, as well as on government policies, 
strategies, and the field of disability studies (McKenzie, 2008; Terzi, 2004; 
Watson, 2012). The shift in the locus of the “problem” away from individuals and 
onto wider society proved to be transformational for many disabled people. 
Many people began to appreciate that the exclusion they faced was not because 
of a fault located in themselves, but rather because of barriers in wider society 
(Oliver, 1990). As Crow (1996) states: 
It wasn't my body that was responsible for all my difficulties, it 
was external factors, the barriers constructed by the society in 
which I live. I was being dis-abled - my capabilities and 
opportunities were being restricted - by prejudice, discrimination, 
inaccessible environments and inadequate support. Even more 
important, if all the problems had been created by society, then 




Inspired by this revelation, the disability rights movement grew in strength, 
eventually making significant headway into changing Government policy and 
legislation around the world (McKenzie, 2008; Terzi, 2004; Watson, 2012). These 
changes included the development of legislation for accessible buildings (Terzi, 
2004) and changes to disability anti-discrimination legislation (Watson, 2012). 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) 
embraced the social model, defining disability as an evolving concept which:  
[R]esults from the interaction between persons with impairments 
and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full 
and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others. 
(p. 1)  
The adoption of the social model had a significant impact on government 
strategies and policies in Aotearoa New Zealand. Both of the New Zealand 
Disability Strategies (Ministry of Health, 2001; Office for Disability Issues, 2016) 
adhere to social model conceptualisations of disability. In the most recent 
strategy, disability is defined as “something that happens when people with 
impairments face barriers in society; it is society that disables us, not our 
impairments” (Office for Disability Issues, 2016, p. 12). Evidence of alignment 
with the social model is also apparent in the Social Services Select Committee 
Inquiry (2008), Enabling Good Lives (Independent Working Group on ‘Day 
Options’, 2011), To Have an ‘Ordinary’ Life (National Advisory Committee on 
Health and Disability, 2003), the Māori Disability Action Plan, Whāia Te Ao 
Mārama (Ministry of Health, 2012b), the National Pasifika Disability Plan, Faiva 
Ora (Ministry of Health, 2017), and the Disability Support Services Strategic Plan 
2014-2018 (Ministry of Health, 2015). In these reports, the need to remove 
barriers in society is frequently referred to, and the term “impairments” is often 
used when discussing individuals.  
The social model has also proved to be immensely important to the 
development of disability studies as an academic discipline (Oliver, 2009). From 
1990 until at least the late 2000s, the social model was the dominant paradigm in 




Sommerville, 2004). The field of inclusive education was also significantly 
influenced by the social model (Terzi, 2004), as the locus of the problem shifted 
from being located in children with impairments, to exclusionary classroom 
designs and practices.  
The Social Model, Impairment and the Ideal Human  
The split between impairment and disability also underpins one of the 
key criticisms levelled at the social model (e.g., Loja et al., 2013; Morris, 1991; 
Shakespeare, 1999; Watson, 1998). Critics argued that by splitting impairment 
and disability, the social model denies the personal experience of disability 
(Morris, 1991), including physical, sensory and emotional experiences. The 
bracketing of impairment from disability was viewed as similar to the denial of 
biological difference by feminists in the 1970s, with the divide between sex and 
gender (Goodley, 2011). Overboe (2012) and Inckle (2015) note similarly that the 
split reinforces the binary in which the mind is privileged over the body, and 
reason triumphs over emotion.  
One of the most significant issues with the split between impairment and 
disability is that it serves to relegate impairment to the medical model. Watson 
and Shakespeare, in particular, were critical of the lack of theorisation of 
impairment in the social model (e.g., Shakespeare, 2006; Shakespeare & Watson, 
2001b, 2001a; Watson, 2002). The absence of theorisation leaves unquestioned 
the understanding that impairment is a deviation from the ableist corporeal 
norm. The splitting of impairment and disability contributes to the maintenance 
of the medical model (Goodley, 2011; McKenzie, 2013; Tremain, 2005b), 
positioning people with impairments as “other” to the ideal human of 
modernism. As Tremain (2005) notes: 
Indeed, it would seem that the identity of the subject of the social 
model (“people with impairments”) is actually formed in large 
measure by the political arrangements that the model was 




Tremain (2001, 2005b) provides a compelling critique of the way in which 
impairment is viewed as a pre-discursive10 and essential entity within the social 
model. As she notes, viewing impairment as a natural lack or deficit conceals the 
power relations through which it is possible for discursive objects such as 
“impairments” and “normal bodies” to be materialised. This serves to extend the 
very arrangements viewed as being at the heart of disability exclusion and 
oppression (Tremain, 2001).  
The privileging of the modernist human within the social model has had 
some significant material consequences. In particular, I would like to highlight 
one of the most notable effects of this privileging, which has had a significant 
impact on the lives of many people: the independent living agenda. This agenda 
has been described as the linchpin of the disability rights movement in the 
United States (Charlton, 1998), and plays a significant role in the DRM in the 
United Kingdom (Blackmore & Hodgkins, 2012; Oliver, 1996). This agenda 
continues to play an important role in the international DRM, and was 
wholeheartedly supported in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (2006).  
The independent living movement has had several positive outcomes for 
disabled people. In particular, it has enabled a radical move away from viewing 
disabled people as passive recipients of services, towards a view of disabled 
people as highly agentic individuals who, given the right environment and 
supports, can be in control of their own lives and of the support they receive 
(Blackmore & Hodgkins, 2012). This shift was significant both for how disabled 
people viewed themselves, as well as the way disabled people were viewed by 
the wider community.  
However, the success of the independent living movement has come at 
the expense of a more radical challenge to the notion of the ideal human. For 
instance, Blackmore and Hodgkins (2012) note that the independent living 
movement challenges “the ideology of disabled people as dependent and 
repositions the boundaries of autonomy and human agency” (p. 80, emphasis 
added). The drive for disabled people to become more “independent” was thus 
                                                     




achieved through reaffirming the values which uphold the ableist norm as the 
ideal standard; that is, a person who is capable and not in need of care, and who 
is therefore in a superior position to what is upheld as its opposite (Reinders, 
2000).  
The Social Model and Learning Disability  
Another key critique of the social model pertinent to this thesis, is its lack 
of applicability to the lives of learning disabled people. Within the reasonably 
extensive body of social model literature that has developed since 1990, there is 
a notable lack of discussion in regard to learning disability (Chappell, 1998). This 
omission appears largely to be unintentional where, for instance, the opposite of 
disabled is defined as as able-bodied (e.g., Barnes, 1998; Finkelstein, 1998; Hyde, 
2000; Oliver, 1990). At other times, learning disability is simply omitted from the 
discussion, despite claims that the work has relevance for all disabilities 
(Chappell, 1998). As Chappell (1998) notes, “[i]t appears the best that people 
with learning difficulties can expect is an implicit inclusion in any writing about 
disability” (p. 213). The absence of discussion of inclusion of learning disability 
within the social model literature has resulted in the criticism that it is a theory 
which is largely ineffectual for learning disabled people (Chappell, 1998; 
McKenzie, 2008).  
One of the key reasons for this lack of applicability may be due to the 
relegation of impairment to the medical model. There is a tacit acceptance 
within the social model that learning disability is a pre-discursive biological and 
natural phenomenon (McKenzie, 2008; Tremain, 2001). Given the lack of 
theorisation of impairment in the social model, this view has some significant 
implications. For instance, although the Social Services Committee (2008) notes 
that the medical model of disability has been largely superseded by the social 
model in Aotearoa New Zealand, there is clear evidence that the medical model 
still holds great sway over learning disability support services. In order to access 
disability support services, funding agencies require evidence of a formal 
diagnosis of impairment (Ministry of Health, 2012a). This diagnosis must be 




of Health, 2012a, p. 12). The medical profession is thus granted full authorising 
power to certify whether a person is or is not disabled (Campbell, 2009a), and 
therefore whether they qualify for support services. Furthermore, in the New 
Zealand Certificate in Health & Wellbeing (Support Work) Level 3 (IHC New 
Zealand Incorporated, 2016), learning disability is defined as a phenomenon 
inherent in individuals who have an IQ lower than 70 and deficits in adaptive 
functioning, and who present with these challenges before the age of 18; that is, 
a medical model understanding of disability. Given the recent introduction of a 
qualification-based pay structure in the disability support sector (Ministry of 
Health, 2018), it can be expected that a vast number of support workers in 
Aotearoa New Zealand will complete this qualification. This raises a concern that 
a large number of support workers will continue to be trained in the medical 
model understanding of disability.  
The use of a medical model conceptualisation of disability in 
contemporary training materials highlights the challenge of applying the social 
model to learning disability.  The relegation of impairment to the medical model, 
and the focus for change being placed on barriers in the environment, results in a 
significant gap in tools to guide the practice of support workers. This absence is 
particularly evident when compared with the proliferation of tools and training 
models which emerged from the principle of normalisation. The issue is 
highlighted by McGregor, Bell and Wilson (2016), who note that the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  
[C]learly anticipates that people with disabilities will be 
accommodated so that they can enjoy the same rights as others, 
requiring States to take appropriate steps to ensure that this 
occurs. However, it is silent on how this will be achieved in 
practice. (p. 122, emphasis added)  
To provide a practical example of this issue, I have worked with numerous 
learning disabled people who struggle with numbers, and are therefore unable 
to manage their money independently. A limited number of adaptations can be 




payments on the day their benefit is received to ensure all bills are paid. 
However, what I have found is most necessary in this situation is to have 
someone, such as a support person, who can support the person to understand 
and budget their money. Yet, in order to know how to do this most effectively, 
support workers require training and resources to assist them in their work. I 
have yet to see a training resource grounded in the social model which provides 
this level of practical advice. Quite simply, the social model does not seem to 
have triggered the development of any tools or advice on how to support 
learning disabled people in practice.  
 
In the following section, I explore another key conceptual framework 
which has had a notable impact on disability policy and practice in Aotearoa New 
Zealand: the rights-based approach to disability.  
The Rights-Based Approach to Disability  
The third key conceptual idea identified as having a significant impact on 
policy and practice in Aotearoa New Zealand is the rights-based approach to 
disability. The rights-based approach recognises that all people, regardless of 
disability or impairment status, are equal legal citizens who should have access 
to equal rights (Hamilton, 2008). These rights include freedom from unlawful 
discrimination because of disability, access to equal employment and wages, 
access to public places and facilities, and equal access to education (Human 
Rights Act 1993, 2017). This approach differs to normalisation and the social 
model in that it does not connect back to seminal authors and texts, and does 
not have a particular framework delineating what the approach is. Instead, the 
approach has been formed from multiple practice-based perspectives, which 
work towards ensuring that mechanisms are in place to support the achievement 
of equal rights for disabled people.  
The importance of human rights in relation to learning disability is well-
recognised by many governments and international entities. For instance, the 




disability is a human rights issue because of many significant concerns; these 
concerns include being denied access to healthcare and education, experiences 
of multiple forms of violence, and denial of autonomy, for instance being 
subjected to involuntary sterilisation. Significant gains have been made in 
regards to the legal recognition of equal rights for learning disabled people over 
the past half-century, both locally and internationally. The first international legal 
mechanism for ensuring equal legal rights for learning disabled people was the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (1971). 
The most recent Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United 
Nations, 2006) states its purpose as:  
 [T]o promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with 
disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity. (p. 
4, emphasis added) 
Human rights underpin many Government disability strategies and 
policies in Aotearoa New Zealand. The focus on “choice and control”, a 
fundamental component of human rights, is the most notable way this 
underpinning is evidenced. For instance, the Disability Support Services Strategic 
Plan 2014-2018 (Ministry of Health, 2015) states “[w]e protect the human rights 
of all people with disabilities”, and that disabled people and their 
whānau11/families should “have choice, control and flexibility over the support in 
their lives” (p. 1). Equal rights, choice and control are also mentioned in 
Pathways to Inclusion (Department of Labour, 2001), the Disability Strategies 
(Ministry of Health, 2001; Office for Disability Issues, 2016), the Disability 
Support Services Workforce Action Plan 2013-2016 (Ministry of Health, 2013), the 
Enabling Good Lives report (Independent Working Group on ‘Day Options’, 2011) 
and the Disability Action Plan 2014 -2018 (Office for Disability Issues, 2015).  
                                                     




Human Rights as an Insufficient Tool  
Aotearoa New Zealand is renowned for its global human rights leadership 
(McGregor et al., 2016). It was the first country to grant women the vote, and, as 
McGregor et al. (2016) note, was one of the leaders in the development and 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1948) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(United Nations, 2006). The various legal instruments for pursuing human rights 
in Aotearoa New Zealand, such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (United Nations, 2006), have had a positive overall impact on 
legislation, policy and practice in regards to human rights (McGregor et al., 
2016).  
However, despite this progress and the sizable number of human rights 
instruments, Aotearoa New Zealand has been found to have “significant fault 
lines” in the human rights landscape (McGregor et al., 2016, p. 175). This 
situation is particularly evident in regards to equal access to human rights for 
disabled people (Hamilton, 2008; H. Hickey & Wilson, 2017; McGregor et al., 
2016). For instance, in 2011 the Independent Working Group on ‘Day Options’ 
noted:  
Despite service specifications and monitoring arrangements that 
seek to promote and protect the rights of residents many people 
consider that residential services unreasonably limit residents’ 
choice and control over the supports they receive and the lives 
they lead. (2011, p. 1) 
The information outlined in the first chapter of this thesis in The Big 
Picture of Disability Oppression section (pp. 4-9) underscores further the 
difficulties many learning disabled people experience in accessing equal rights in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. Of particular note is the lack of equal access to education 
for learning disabled children: a disparity which exists despite the right to 
education being enshrined in law (IHC New Zealand, 2017).  
A number of identified issues limit learning disabled people’s access to 




weaknesses within the existing human rights legislation (McGregor et al., 2016). 
Whilst the Human Rights Act 1993 (2017) and the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (2013) 
outline rights for all New Zealanders, McGregor et al. (2016) note that neither 
Act can be used to strike down proposed legislation which is inconsistent with 
the Acts. This results in a situation where legislation which breaches the rights 
accorded to all New Zealanders, as outlined in the Human Rights Act 1993 (2017) 
and Bill of Rights Act 1990 (2013), is able to be passed (McGregor et al., 2016). 
One such Act was passed in 2013, with the Government’s amendment to part 4A 
of the Public Health and Disability Act 2000 (New Zealand Public Health and 
Disability Act 2000, 2016). This amendment removed the ability of disabled 
family carers to use the Human Rights Act to make complaints to the Human 
Rights Commission on the grounds of unlawful discrimination (McGregor et al., 
2016). This change was enacted after family carers won several successive court 
cases using the Human Rights Act, regarding payment for the provision of 
support to their disabled adult children (Human Rights Commission, 2018a; 
McGregor et al., 2016).  
Another identified weakness which limits learning disabled people’s 
access to equal rights relates to the “startling lack of parliamentary scrutiny” 
(McGregor et al., 2016, p. 176) over human rights instruments in this country. 
For instance, there is no Parliamentary Select Committee for Human Rights, 
despite the recommendation for one being put forward by the Human Rights 
Commission in 2010 (McGregor et al., 2016, p. 176). As a past Disability Rights 
Commissioner, Paul Gibson, notes, this issue is exacerbated by the lack of 
ownership in Cabinet and the wider Parliament over human rights instruments, 
although a few passionate individuals within Parliament and Cabinet take these 
issues on board (McGregor et al., 2016, p. 134). The result of this situation, 
according to Clear and Gleeson (2001) is a scenario where “[a]ny benefits of 
supportive rights legislation depend on the goodwill of government and the 
politics of the court system” (p. 41).  
The weakness of human rights legislation to challenge exclusionary 
systems, structures and practices is not a phenomenon isolated to Aotearoa New 




Lawthom, Liddiard, & Runswick-Cole, 2017). As discussed in Chapter Two, many 
of these exclusionary systems and structures are underpinned by the notion of 
the ideal human. In the following section, the role of the ideal human within the 
rights-based approach will be explored, with a particular focus on how this 
ontological foundation underpins the lack of challenge to exclusionary systems 
and structures.  
Human Rights, Citizenship and the Ideal Human  
The notion of human rights is indelibly connected with ideas regarding 
citizenship, a concept which has been “a central axis of Western political 
philosophy” (Shafir, 2004, p. 12). The notions of citizenship and human rights 
each have their own unique genealogy, with citizenship relating back to Ancient 
Greece, and Human Rights connecting back to the period of the Enlightenment 
(Shafir, 2004). However, as Shafir (2004) notes, human rights was “predicated on 
the legacy of political citizenship” (p. 11). There is both a powerful and complex 
relationship between the two terms, particularly in relation to whether rights are 
apart from, or contingent on, membership of a political community or entity 
(Shafir, 2004).  Citizenship and human rights are often paired, as they have a 
similar focus on access to rights and resources (Shafir, 2004). For instance, great 
emphasis was placed on human rights for disabled people during the 
International year of Disabled Persons in 1981 (United Nations, 2003). During 
that year, Mrs. Leticia Shahani, United Nations Secretariat, is quoted as stating 
that “[p]ersons with disabilities shall be treated as true citizens of their 
respective countries, enjoying all the rights man [sic] is heir to” (Chapter V. A 
human rights approach: the 1970s, para. 5, emphasis added).  
The notion of citizenship is referred to in several Government strategies, 
policies and reports in Aotearoa New Zealand, often paired with the notion of 
rights. For instance the National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability 
(2003) states “New Zealand citizens enjoy a wide range of human rights” (p. 6), 
and the vision for the Disability Action Plan 2014-2018 is for “[a]ll New 
Zealanders to experience equal rights of citizenship” (Office for Disability Issues, 




(Independent Working Group on ‘Day Options’, 2011), the Disability Support 
Services Strategic Plan 2014-2018, (Ministry of Health, 2015) and the 
Government response to the Social Services Select Committee (New Zealand 
Government, 2009). However, the term citizenship is often referred to fleetingly 
in the documents, with no definition or elaboration of what is meant by the term 
provided.  
The notion of citizenship is widely used in relation to disability activism, 
policies and research (Sépulchre, 2017). In particular, the DRM utilises the 
concept in the fight for disabled people to be recognised as full citizens with 
equal rights, duties and responsibilities, rather than as dependent patients 
(Oliver, 1990; Sépulchre, 2017). Although the concept of citizenship has been 
used for some time in the field of disability studies, a dramatic increase in use 
has been observed from 1990 onwards (Sépulchre, 2017).  
However, Sépulchre (2017) notes that the increase in use has not been 
accompanied with an in-depth exploration of the relationship between disability 
and citizenship. This mirrors the lack of definition or deeper exploration evident 
in Government policy and strategy in Aotearoa New Zealand. A scoping review of 
research published on citizenship and disability from 1985 - 2015 found that, of 
the 295 articles in the study, 53% did not contain any explanation or definition of 
citizenship (Sépulchre, 2017). Where citizenship was defined, many studies 
utilised Marshall’s (1992) definition, which describes citizenship as: 
[A] status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to 
the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. (p. 18, 
emphasis added) 
It is this notion of full members of a community, otherwise known as full persons, 
which presents the key theoretical challenge for both citizenship and the rights-
based approach to disability. Critically, the rights and resources afforded through 
citizenship and the human rights approach were not viewed as inalienable, but 




The question of who was deserving of human rights and liberation 
depended in part on who was considered mature enough to 
accept the responsibilities of the citizen. In this sense, the 
Enlightenment did not tell us all people were human; it gave us 
universal standards for deciding who was human, and much of the 
history of Europe ever since has entailed a struggle to decide 
where to set the boundaries. (p. 83)  
It is at this point that the connection between human rights, citizenship 
and the ideal human becomes evident. This is because in order to be considered 
a citizen, or to fall within the parameters of what was defined as humanity, “one 
had to assume the mantle of rationality” (Shafir, 2004, p. 16). Rights and 
resources were afforded only to people who met the criteria for full 
membership; these rights were not inalienable. As was noted in the previous 
chapter, many learning disabled people fail to meet the requisite criteria to be 
considered as full persons (Scully, 2016). Many learning disabled people struggle 
to achieve competence in these criteria, which often include specific capacities 
such as rationality, independence and the ability to communicate (Scully, 2016); 
they are further very much connected with those of the ideal human.  
Further problems arise regarding the use of citizenship and disability 
when the disabled body is brought into the picture (Van Houten & Jacobs, 2005). 
As Mol (2002, cited in Van Houten & Jacobs, 2005) notes, citizens are not 
expected to be bothered by bodily experiences such as hunger, pain, lust and 
emotions; as a consequence of this underlying assumption, discussions regarding 
the body and care have been largely missing from the conversation on 
citizenship. Van Houten and Jacobs (2005) note furthermore that research on 
citizenship and disability tends to be individualising, viewing each person in 
isolation rather than as beings who are embedded within wider social and 
support networks. H. Hickey (2015) mirrors this point, noting that rights-based 
models tend to have an individualistic focus which favours independence over 
dependence. She is critical of this focus, pointing out that the discussion on rights 




humans; a concept which plays an integral role in te ao Māori (the Māori 
worldview).  
The problematic and underexplored ontological foundation of the human 
rights and citizenship approaches presents a significant challenge for research 
and activism in the disability sphere. In particular, the focus on individuals not 
only serves to uphold the individualisation of disability, but also hinders 
discussion on power relationships and struggles at a more structural level 
(Sépulchre, 2017). As with normalisation and the social model, the ontological 
underpinning of the ideal human leaves unquestioned and unchallenged the 
“natural” inferiority of disability. This underpinning presents an obstacle to the 
ability to challenge exclusion at a structural level, as this exclusion is based on 
systems and structures which are founded on the concept of the ideal human.  
However, as will be outlined in the next section, the existing problematic 
ontological foundations in the rights-based approach are not fixed and 
immutable. The Enabling Good Lives approach highlights how it is possible for 
citizenship and human rights-based approaches to move into a new and more 
promising direction that focuses on increasing rights, choice and control, without 
reaffirming the notion of the ideal human.   
Citizenship and the Promise of Enabling Good Lives 
There is a promising exception to the trend of the untouched notion of 
the ideal human within citizenship and rights-based approaches: Enabling Good 
Lives (EGL). Enabling Good Lives is an Aotearoa New Zealand-based initiative, 
founded on a partnership between disabled people, families and whānau12 of 
disabled people, service providers, Māori and Government officials (Were, 2016). 
This initiative is working to transform the way disability support is delivered, 
based on a set of eight principles: self-determination, beginning early, person-
centred, ordinary-life outcomes, mainstream first, mana13 enhancing, easy to use 
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and relationship building (Enabling Good Lives, 2018c). Two “demonstrations” of 
an Enabling Good Lives approach were held in the Christchurch and Waikato 
areas during the time that this thesis was written (Enabling Good Lives, 2018b). 
Based on the findings from these demonstrations, a prototype is currently being 
developed in order to implement an Enabling Good Lives approach across the 
whole of Aotearoa New Zealand (for more information see 
https://www.health.govt.nz/our-work/disability-services/disability-
projects/disability-support-system-transformation).  
Enabling Good Lives seeks to ensure that disabled people and their 
families have “greater choice and control over the supports they receive, so that 
they can plan for the lives they want” (Enabling Good Lives, 2018a, para. 1). With 
the focus on choice and control, self-determination and ensuring that disabled 
people can live the life that they want, it is evident that EGL is grounded in a 
human rights-based approach.  
Relationships form an integral part of the EGL approach. The partnership 
approach between disabled people and other groups is considered foundational 
to the initiative (Were, 2017) and, as noted, relationship building is one of the 
eight guiding principles. Where one of the criticisms directed at the citizenship 
approach is the focus on independent individuals, rather than interdependence 
(H. Hickey, 2015; van Houten & Jacobs, 2005), EGL recognises each person as a 
being who exists within wider family, community and/or support service 
networks (Were, 2016). Support plans are typically developed with input from 
family and whānau; although the degree of input is dependent on the wishes of 
the disabled person (Were, 2016). Family, whānau and wider communities are 
also often involved in the provision of support for the disabled person.  
Another criticism of the citizenship and rights-based approaches which is 
not inherent in the EGL approach is in the challenge to systemic barriers. Much 
emphasis is placed on capacity and capability building for disabled people, family 
and whānau  (Cabinet Social Policy Committee, 2017), including the need to 
support and invest in the development of leaders from both of these spheres 




Leadership by disabled people must be present, prominent, visible 
and invested in at all levels of the Demonstration. Disabled 
leadership is a key factor that contributed to the early success of 
the Demonstration. (p. 9) 
The focus on investing in leadership by disabled people indicates that power 
imbalances in society are acknowledged, and resources are put in place to 
redress the situation.  
The last significant difference between EGL and citizenship and rights-
based approaches is in the different views regarding who should have access to 
full rights. As noted earlier, much of the literature on citizenship is grounded in 
the modernist conception of the ideal human, which posits particular criteria 
which must be met in order to be considered a full person. These criteria include 
such things as rationality, independence and the ability to communicate (Scully, 
2016). In EGL, a person-by-person approach is adopted for planning and disability 
supports (Were, 2017).  This approach is founded on the assumption that each 
person is unique; an intentional contrast to the one-size-fits-most model of the 
existing disability support systems (Were, 2017). Whilst the EGL approach could 
be said to still rely on the modernist perception of humans as ontologically 
distinct beings, the criteria for full personhood are rendered inconsequential as 
the EGL initiative is unambiguously clear that no criteria need to be met before a 
person deserves full rights.  
In conclusion, the EGL initiative highlights how it is possible to challenge 
the problematic ontological foundations of the citizenship and the rights-based 
approaches. Rather than dismissing the approaches because of their problematic 
foundations, this strategy builds upon the hard-won achievements gained 
through the use of citizenship and rights-based approaches, such as the 
development of legislation and conventions asserting equal rights. Goodley 
(2017) believes that this strategy of building upon previous gains, rather than 
dismissing them, is crucial for any rights movement to progress. The EGL 
approach thus offers great promise for not only transforming the disability 




notions of citizenship so that, as van Houten and Jacobs (2005) assert, it can 
incorporate and embrace difference.  
An approach also not founded in the notion of the ideal human can be 
seen in Māori perspectives on disability. This will be explored in the following 
section.  
Māori Perspectives on Disability  
Before moving on to an overview of the core limitations of the medical 
model, normalisation, the social model, and rights-based perspectives, it is 
important to highlight another notable though less-known approach: Māori 
perspectives on disability. Māori perspectives on disability differ from the 
previous perspectives noted in this chapter, in that they are not founded in the 
notion of the ideal, individual and independent human. Instead, people are 
viewed as interdependent beings who exist as part of a wider collective, and who 
have powerful ancestral, relational, spiritual and environmental connections (H. 
Hickey, 2015). Furthermore, two core aspects of the collective identity of Māori 
play an integral role in Māori conceptualisations of disability. These aspects 
include the pivotal role of relationships, and the notion of manaaki, which 
relates to the responsibilities and obligations whānau14 members have of 
supporting each other (H. Hickey & Wilson, 2017). Significantly, Māori do not 
have a word for disability (H. Hickey & Wilson, 2017; Ministry of Health, 2012b). 
Instead, Māori commonly refer to “a person’s ability to flourish or function in 
relation to their ability to contribute to either their own, or others, wellbeing” 
(Ministry of Health, 2012b, p. 5).  
S. J. Hickey (2008) notes that despite the extensive array of health-related 
research in Aotearoa New Zealand, including Māori perspectives on health and 
well-being, little research has been done to explore Māori perspectives on 
disability. There are a variety of reasons for the absence of research. Firstly, as 
Tuhiwai Smith (2012) argues, scientific research is “inextricably linked to 
European imperialism and colonialism”, and is implicated in the worst excesses 
                                                     




of these practices.  Historically, research has functioned to advance the interests 
and concerns of colonial researchers (Bishop, 2013). Research has been seen in 
terms of its “absolute worthlessness” to Māori (Tuhiwai Smith, 2012), as it 
misrepresented Māori perspectives for the benefit of the colonisers, told Māori 
things they already knew, “suggested things that would not work, and made 
careers for people who already had jobs” (Tuhiwai Smith, p. 3), while not 
providing the same benefits to Māori. Tuhiwai Smith (2012) goes as far as to 
state that the term research is “probably one of the dirtiest words in the 
indigenous world’s vocabulary” (p. 1).  
Further to the problematic history of scientific research is Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s history of colonisation. These processes of colonisation have fostered 
the long-standing cultural dominance of colonial perspectives, power imbalances 
and systemic marginalisation of both Māori people and Māori perspectives 
(Bishop, 2013, p. 2013; Bishop, O’Sullivan & Berryman, as cited in Office of the 
Auditor-General, 2012; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012). The lingering effects of these 
inequities are evident in the invisibility of Māori within research on health, 
disability and identity (S. J. Hickey, 2008). The omission of Māori perspectives in 
disability is significant, particularly given the importance of culture for health and 
overall wellbeing (Ministry of Health, 2012b), and the impact of colonisation on 
Māori and on legislation related to disability (S. J. Hickey, 2008). The lack of 
published research furthermore makes it challenging to investigate potential 
weaknesses inherent in Māori perspectives on disability, and to explore how 
these perspectives could apply to this thesis.  
The lingering effects of these historical inequities are further evidenced 
by the absence of Māori perspectives in Government strategies and wider 
documents within the disability sector in Aotearoa New Zealand. For instance, 
the New Zealand Certificate in Health & Wellbeing (IHC New Zealand 
Incorporated, 2016) provides no Māori perspectives in relation to defining 
learning disability. This absence exists despite the numerous international 
definitions utilised in the document, including those from the ICD-11 (2018), the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006), the 




(2018), and the New Zealand Ministry of Health (2012a). Furthermore, although 
the importance of cultural identity is acknowledged in the most recent Disability 
Strategy (Office for Disability Issues, 2016) and the Disability Support Services 
Strategic Plan 2014-2018 (Ministry of Health, 2015), there is little detail beyond 
the recognition that this identity encompasses “language, whānau, cultural 
principles, practices and linkages to the land” (Office for Disability Issues, 2016, 
p. 13). The only exception to this situation is Whāia Te Ao Mārama (the Māori 
Disability Action Plan for Disability Support Service) (Ministry of Health, 2012b).  
Whāia Te Ao Mārama (2012b) developed a strategy for supporting Māori 
disabled and their whānau, based on a culturally anchored approach. A visual of 
an interconnected spiral is presented, which encompasses four core elements 
considered necessary for providing effective support for Māori disabled (Ministry 
of Health, 2012b). These elements are: 
 Te ao Māori, which relates to “a person’s ability to participate in 
their own whānau15, hapū [sub-tribe], iwi [tribe] and as a Māori 
New Zealander” (p. 6), 
 Te rangatira, which relates to the responsibility each person has 
for their own lives, along with the whakamana (authority / 
legitimacy) each person has to take up the various roles and 
responsibilities that are their right 
 Te ao hurihuri, which represents the various services, as well as 
the “political, economic, social and environmental trends that 
support, influence and affect Māori disabled” (p. 7), and 
 Tuhonohono, which represents “the point in a person’s life where 
both the spirals and the space between them must connect to 
provide balance and harmony.” (p. 7).  
Whāia Te Ao Mārama (2012b) focuses on the pivotal role of relationships within 
and between various groups, including Māori disabled, their whānau, hapū 
(subtribe), iwi (tribe), communities and the ministry.  
                                                     




While Whāia Te Ao Mārama (2012b) has adopted a culturally grounded 
approach to supporting Māori disabled, H. Hickey (2015) and H. Hickey and 
Wilson (2017) propose a more theoretical view, exploring a te ao Māori (the 
Māori worldview) perspective of disability. Rather than reaffirming Western 
individualistic perspectives by developing a specific Māori word for disability, H. 
Hickey (2015) and H. Hickey and Wilson (2017) draw upon the Māori worldview 
to provide a uniquely Māori, collectivist perspective on disability. They have 
named this approach Whānau Hauā. Whānau Hauā is defined as below:  
Metaphorically, whānau hauā signifies the wind that propels 
whānau with member(s) who have a disability. The term whānau 
means to be born or give birth and refers to the extended family 
network who may live within or outside of a home….The word 
“hau” means “wind”, “gale” or “breeze”, while “ā” refers to the 
drive or urge that propels this wind. Depending on the mood of 
Tāwhirimātea [the god of wind], the wind can quickly change the 
environment, making it unstable. (H. Hickey & Wilson, 2017, p. 86) 
H. Hickey and Wilson (2017) note that it can be a challenge for whānau hauā to 
achieve balance in their lives, particularly when facing unstable and unfriendly 
environments. Obtaining a sense of balance is not dependent on individuals 
alone, but on the collective efforts of whānau and other community members (H. 
Hickey, 2015). Whānau hauā is similar to the social model of disability, in that it 
views the barriers to daily life as originating in wider society rather than in the 
disabled person (H. Hickey & Wilson, 2017). However, the crucial point of 
difference for whānau hauā is the pivotal role of whānau in the lives of Māori 
disabled people (H. Hickey, 2015). Disability is not viewed as a trait inherent in 
individuals, but rather as a collective endeavour which involves many people (H. 
Hickey & Wilson, 2017). Furthermore, whānau hauā is not viewed as defining a 
person or whānau, but rather as something which is positioned in the 
background, moving in and out of focus depending on the situation at hand (H. 




The following section examines the material impact of the ontological 
underpinning of some of the frameworks and concepts discussed in this chapter.  
Ontological Underpinnings and the Material 
Impact 
As I have discussed throughout this chapter, the modernist notion of the 
ideal human is embedded within the ontological foundation of the key 
conceptual frameworks shaping policy and practice in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Although this notion does not underpin Māori perspectives on disability, these 
perspectives do not appear to have a significant impact in shaping Government 
policy and strategy. This notion of the ideal human is not a phenomenon 
confined to theory and conceptual frameworks, but an underpinning that has 
significant material consequences.  
The first impact noted is the absence of challenge to the ableist binary 
which positions learning disability as “naturally” inferior. This absence of 
challenge is evidenced in the frequent change of terminology to define what I 
currently name learning disability; “imbecile”, “idiot”, “retarded”, “mental 
handicap”, “special needs”, and “intellectual disability”, being some of the most 
commonly known terms. Many of these terms were once considered entirely 
acceptable names for “learning disability”, yet today they are considered a mark 
of great disrespect. As Sinason (1992) notes, the desire to change language in 
order to reflect a more respectful depiction of “learning disability” does nothing 
to challenge the subordination of the category. Instead, the frequent changes in 
terminology project a sense of “running away” from the ontological 
underpinning of the terms – that is, a denial of the “difference” inherent in 
learning disability, rather than a challenge to the inferiority of this positioning. 
The words may change, but the meaning behind them stays the same.  
Another impact of the ontological underpinning of the ideal human is the 
focus on intentionality (Barad, 2007). Barad is critical of the humanist notion of 
intentionality. Drawing on the work of Bohr, she notes that intentions cannot be 




(2007, pp. 22-23), nor as a phenomenon bound to individual human subjects. 
Instead, intentionality is viewed as:  
[A] complex network of human and nonhuman agents, including 
historically specific sets of material conditions that exceed the 
traditional notion of the individual. Or perhaps it is less that there 
is an assemblage of agents than there is an entangled state of 
agencies” (p. 23) 
With the ontological assumption that human thoughts, identities, feelings and 
actions are always intentional, comes the notion of attitudes. Although attitudes 
are not specifically addressed in any of the perspectives noted earlier in this 
chapter, the view that attitudes are a key barrier to inclusion is evident 
throughout many policy and strategy documents. For instance, in the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) disability is 
defined as an evolving concept which:  
[R]results from the interaction between persons with impairments 
and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full 
and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others. 
(p. 1, emphasis added)  
The World Report on Disability (World Health Organisation, 2011) 
furthermore states that “[r]aising awareness and challenging negative attitudes 
are often first steps towards creating more accessible environments for persons 
with disabilities” (p. 6). This focus is mirrored in Aotearoa New Zealand, with 
attitudes identified as a key barrier in both the 2001 and the 2016 Disability 
Strategies (Ministry of Health, 2001; Office for Disability Issues, 2016). In April 
2018, the Disability Rights Commissioner Paula Tesoriero noted that: 
“Attitudes towards disabled people remain at best indifferent, and 
at worst, discriminatory. These attitudes underpin how disabled 
New Zealanders are treated and valued for their contribution to 
society…Changing them is so much more than just a ‘nice to do’. 




However, there is a fundamental limitation in the focus on attitudes: the 
approach fails to take into account the role that discourses and other 
environmental factors have in shaping the possibilities for thought, emotions, 
attitudes and actions (Foucault, 1977). In this thesis I argue that the modernist 
conception of the ideal human plays a pivotal role in shaping the possibilities for 
how humans are conceptualised, including what is considered “normal”, what is 
“ideal” and what is “inferior”. The possibilities for “attitudes” towards disability 
are shaped by these processes, a practice which lies beyond the realm of 
intentionality and conscious action (Barad, 2007). The “problem” of disability is 
then not so much about disability itself, or about people’s “attitudes” towards 
disability, but is rather about the way in which humans are conceptualised in the 
Western world. A focus on “attitudes” proves insufficient to challenge these 
possibilities.  
Another fundamental limitation of the ontological underpinning of the 
ideal human is the absence of challenge to a world which has been built around 
this ideal norm. As noted in Chapter Two, much of the foundation of Western 
society is built upon the assumption of the ableist norm. Examples include the 
education system in Aotearoa New Zealand, the design of jobs, and the 
neoliberal economic system (Olssen & Peters, 2005). As learning disability is held 
as the “constitutive outside” to the ideal norm (Campbell, 2005), it could be said 
that much of the foundation of Western society, at least in part, is built upon the 
exclusion of learning disabled people.  
However, rather than challenging dominant structures in society which 
exclude learning disabled people, the focus for activism, policy and practice 
tends to concentrate on how disabled people can be included in society with a 
minimum level of change. As Sullivan (2000) notes, the disability movement is 
neither bold nor radical, but seeks approval and acceptance into the existing 
social order. Sullivan (2000) outlines this idea further: 
I think the disability movement has stopped doing the intellectual 
work it needs to do if it is to be a vibrant, challenging organisation 
for social change. Does it, for instance, have a vision of what a 




Has it started thinking about the implications a nondisabling 
society might have for all of its citizens? Or does it just want 
disabled people to be allowed to join the game as it is? (p. 44) 
Two key practices are evidence of the desire to “join the game as it is” (Sullivan, 
2000, p. 44): employment and wage schemes, and reasonable accommodation.  
The first approach, employment and wage schemes, connects to both the 
social model and a long standing fight in the feminist movement for equal pay for 
work of equal value. In the 2001 Disability Strategy, there is a goal to: 
Ensure disabled people have the same employment conditions, 
rights and entitlements as everyone else has, including minimum 
wage provisions for work of comparable productivity. (Ministry of 
Health, 2001, p. 17, emphasis added).  
However, in order to meet the medical criteria for a learning disability diagnosis, 
individuals must display deficits in adaptive functioning (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; World Health Organisation, 2010). Areas of deficit include 
communication skills, social and interpersonal skills, self-direction skills and work 
skills (Ministry of Health, 2012a). Thus, I would argue that individuals who have 
been diagnosed as having a learning disability, almost by definition of meeting 
the requirements of the diagnosis, have a reduced ability to ability perform 
equally under current economic and workforce arrangements. This is not to say 
that the situation could not be different given different economic and workforce 
arrangements. However, in the various Government strategies and policies 
outlined in this chapter, including the most recent Disability Strategy (Office for 
Disability Issues, 2016), the Workforce Action Plan 2013-2016 (Ministry of Health, 
2013), and comments from Disability Rights Commissioner Paula Tesoriero at a 
presentation to the People First AGM (personal communication, 9 November, 
2017), there is no evidence of a drive or strategy to challenge current 
exclusionary conditions. The only exception to this situation is a single sentence 
in the 2001 Disability Strategy, which has an action to “[e]ncourage the 
development of a range of employment options recognising the diverse needs of 




various strategies is principally focused on “helping” disabled people into existing 
workforce structures through training, upskilling, and tackling discriminatory 
attitudes which “incorrectly” assume a disabled person will not be equally 
productive.  
The second approach which demonstrates the desire to “join the game as 
it is” (Sullivan, 2000, p. 44) is reasonable accommodation. Reasonable 
accommodation is often used in line with the social model, and is defined in 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) as 
follows:  
“Reasonable accommodation” means necessary and appropriate 
modification and adjustment not imposing a disproportionate or 
undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to 
persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal 
basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
(P. 4, emphasis added). 
The first notable concern with this definition of reasonable accommodation is 
the focus on disproportionate or undue burden. In a situation where including a 
person would impose a disproportionate or undue burden, the “reasonable” 
course of action appears to be that the disabled person would not be included; 
that is, that they do not receive equal rights. This definition is mirrored in the 
New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993 (2017), which states under Section 60, 
titled Further exceptions in relation to disability: 
Nothing in section 57 [Educational establishments] applies to a 
person whose disability is such that that person requires special 
services or facilities in that in the circumstances cannot reasonably 
be made available.  
If achieving inclusion imposes a disproportionate or undue burden on an existing 
facility, such as an educational facility or employment facility (see sections 22/29, 
Human Rights Act 1993, 2017), there is no legal mandate to challenge exclusion. 
The second notable concern with reasonable accommodation is the focus 




works to further individualise the problem of disability. Under this definition, 
exclusions always relate to “individuals” in need of certain “accommodations”, 
rather than a systemic problem that emanates from the ableist assumption of 
“normal” bodies and minds (Guillaume, 2011). This focus furthermore 
individualises the response to disability oppression, as exclusions happen in 
particular cases, effectively foreclosing the ability to challenge structural-level 
discrimination. Disabled people are thus placed in a defensive position (Clear & 
Gleeson, 2001) which, as Shakespeare (2001, as cited in Clear & Gleeson, 2001) 
notes, offers disabled people “only piecemeal change through ‘long, slow and 
costly litigation’” that eventually wears down “even the best resourced and most 
committed activists” (p. 41). 
In the following section, I examine the need for a new way forward for 
disability studies.  
A New Way Forward? 
In this chapter I have explored part of a key question driving this thesis: 
Why do learning disabled people remain positioned on the margins of humanity, 
despite decades of hard work from the disability rights movement, legislators, 
families / whānau and support workers, among many others? I have argued that 
a key reason for this marginality is the maintenance of the notion of the ideal 
human; an idea upon which much of the foundation of Western society is built, 
and which is built upon the otherisation, inferiorisation and exclusion of learning 
disabled people. 
With the exception of Māori perspectives on disability, each of the 
conceptual frameworks noted in this chapter have the ideal human at the heart 
of their ontological foundation. Whilst each perspective has undoubtedly 
resulted in progress gains for learning disabled people, they appear to be 
unsuccessful in challenging the “otherisation” and “inferiorisation” of learning 
disability which, I argue, is at the heart of disability oppression. The ongoing 
proliferation of disability oppression and denial of rights, outlined in the first 
chapter of this thesis, is evidence that significant traction is still required in order 




April 19, 2018) notes, over the past several decades we have worked to “include” 
learning disabled people into society, without addressing the ideas and 
underlying ontological assumptions which placed learning disabled people into 
institutions in the first place. A new way of thinking about disability, which is able 
to more effectively capture the phenomena involved in disability oppression, and 
which does not reaffirm the ideal human, is thus needed. This new approach 
needs to build on the gains achieved through previous approaches, whilst 
working to understand and dismantle key barriers to full inclusion.  In Chapter 
Four I outline a new approach to conceptualising disability which I believe holds 
more promise, and which underpins the methodology for my own research.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored some of the key conceptual frameworks 
shaping policy and practice in the field of learning disability in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. Through examining key government strategies, policies and reports on 
disability, and guided by my experience in the disability support sector, I have 
identified four conceptual frameworks shaping policy and practice in Aotearoa 
New Zealand: the medical model, normalisation, the social model, and rights-
based approaches. Whilst these frameworks cannot be considered the sum total 
of influences shaping policy and practice in Aotearoa New Zealand, I believe that 
they play a powerful role in shaping the contemporary context.  I have also 
briefly explored Māori perspectives on disability, which do not appear to be well 
known in Aotearoa New Zealand outside of te ao Māori (the Māori worldview).  
It would be possible to argue that each of the frameworks has led to 
significant progress-gains for learning disabled people. Where normalisation 
helped provide the impetus for deinstitutionalisation, the social model was 
utilised to drive the development of legislation related to (physically) accessible 
buildings. Rights-based models were utilised in the fight for the inclusion of 
disability in rights-based legislation, and Māori perspectives, while not well-
known, have helped to shape the understanding that relationships form an 
integral part of the disability experience.  However, with the exception of Māori 




modernist notion of the ideal human. In the medical model and normalisation, 
this ontological underpinning is reified as ideal, and the onus for change is placed 
onto learning disabled people who are “helped” to be “as normal as possible”. In 
the social model, an attempt is made to challenge medicalised notions of ideal 
bodies through the separation of the notions of impairment and disability. 
However, this separation of impairment and disability has served to relegate 
impairment to the individualised medical model, ultimately reaffirming the very 
notion that the social model was designed to contest (Tremain, 2001). Both the 
rights-based perspective and citizenship approach are also founded in the notion 
of the ideal human, where only those who meet the criteria for “full persons” 
have access to full rights (Scully, 2016). As many learning disabled people do not 
meet the requisite criteria in order to be considered “full persons”, such as the 
capacity for reason, full rights are unable to be achieved in practice.  
This ontological underpinning of the ideal human affects not only the 
theorisation of disability, where learning disability is held in a perpetual state of 
“otherness”, but also has significant material impacts. One of the most profound 
impacts for this thesis is the absence of challenge to the “natural” inferiority of 
learning disability. This absence of challenge is evidenced in the frequent 
changes in terminology to describe what I now define as learning disability. 
Other material impacts of the ontological underpinning of the ideal human are 
evidenced in the approaches employed by the DRM and in the Aotearoa New 
Zealand Government strategy and policy, designed to tackle disability 
oppression. Examples of the practices I have outlined include a focus on 
attitudes, and an absence of challenge to dominant structures in society which 
have been built around the ableist ideal norm. One of the most significant 
barriers to challenging exclusionary structures and processes is the focus on 
reasonable accommodation. This focus stipulates that inclusion is only 
mandatory in cases where it does not impose a disproportionate or undue 
burden on existing structures, foreclosing the potential for radical 
transformation.  
The critique provided in this chapter highlights the need for a new way of 




ontological underpinning. In the next chapter, I will explore a new set of 
conceptual frameworks which could offer a more productive conceptualisation 
of learning disability, and thus enable more substantive progress towards the 






Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framing for this thesis took me somewhat by surprise. 
Driven by my desire to do research which could enact real change for learning 
disabled people, I sought to do something “practical” and “useful” when I first 
enrolled in the PhD programme. Theory appeared to me to be the antithesis of 
this goal. However, the more I delved into my research, the more I discovered 
the pivotal role of theory in shaping the materiality of people’s lives. I was also 
surprised to discover that the tools which showed the most potential were not 
found in my field of interest: disability studies. Instead, they have come from 
further afield in other areas of the humanities. 
In the initial development of my conceptual framing, I was looking for 
something which would help shape my methodology. As my research area is 
learning disability, it was essential that the thesis did not focus solely on 
discourse, language and cognitive reasoning – areas which my participants 
(people assigned the label of learning disabled) are not strong in. I was mindful 
that focusing exclusively on these phenomena might limit my data collection.  
I sought to apply ideas regarding power / knowledge, problematizing the 
notions of “normal” and “disability as a problem”. In particular, I drew on 
Foucault’s work looking at how discourse both transmits power, and holds the 
potential to destabilise and to thwart it (Foucault, 1978). However, there were 
limitations in Foucault’s work which presented a challenge. I wanted to work 
with the notion of pride, which is as much an emotion as an idea. Foucault’s 
work provided nothing in the realm of emotions, and so I turned to Wetherell’s 
work on affect. I also wanted to combine these ideas with Campbell’s work on 
ableism.  
Despite my reservations about the limitations of the Foucauldian 
approach, I persisted with this framework in shaping the data generation, and I 




data generation, when I thought further about how to analyse the data, that I 
was introduced to the concepts of new materialism. New materialist 
perspectives seemed to capture exactly what I was trying to do, only much 
better; Foucauldian ideas are extended to incorporate the body and emotions. 
Furthermore, new materialism looks far beyond the realm of discourse, in a way 
which seemed to fit perfectly with the pragmatic and theoretical challenges of 
my research area.  
What I have found has shown the most potential to answer my research 
questions is a complex array of theoretical perspectives. These perspectives are 
agential realism (Barad), citational chains and lines of flight (Bergson / Butler, as 
used by Davies), performativity (Butler), affect (Wetherell), and desiring silence 
(Jackson and Mazzei). In this chapter, I outline a theoretical framework which I 
believe enables a new and more promising conceptualisation of learning 
disability. Furthermore, I introduce the concept of disability pride as an under-
theorised idea which holds great potential.  
Posthuman Disability Studies  
The conceptual framing for this thesis falls under the umbrella of 
posthuman disability studies. In this section, I explore what a posthuman 
approach to disability studies means, and how it sits within the wider realm of 
new materialist theory. I will briefly explain my reasoning for moving along a 
different path than the burgeoning field of work in the area of learning disability 
research. 
Posthuman disability studies is founded in the belief that the disability 
identity holds disruptive potential for troubling, reshaping and re-fashioning the 
human (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2016; Watson, 2012). As Goodley and 
Runswick-Cole (2016) note: 
Disability has the radical potential to trouble the normative, 
rational, independent, autonomous subject that is so often 




social and human sciences are developed and forms of activism 
are enacted” (p. 2).  
This emerging field of work builds upon key knowledges gained through the work 
of critical disability studies. These knowledges emanate from the challenge to the 
binary categories of “abled” (or “non-disabled”) and “disabled”, and an 
exploration of the political, ontological and theoretical complexities that align 
with the disability category (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2016; Watson, 2012). 
One of the core tenets of a posthuman approach to disability studies is 
that it contests the notion of the rational and independent human of modernism. 
The work of Rosi Braidotti (e.g., 2013) has proven particularly influential in this 
area. In her writings, she provides a robust critique of “Western Man”, an idea 
which she asserts has been revealed as a fiction. As she states:  
The starting point for me is the anti-humanist death of Wo/Man 
which marks the decline of some of the fundamental premises of 
the Enlightenment, namely the progress of mankind through a 
self-regulatory and teleological ordained use of reason and secular 
scientific rationality allegedly aimed at the perfectibility of ‘Man’. 
(p. 31) 
Theorists such as Dan Goodley, Katherine Runswick-Cole, Sharon Snyder and 
David Mitchell have drawn upon Braidotti’s work to also contest the notion of 
the ideal human (e.g., Goodley et al., 2014; Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2016; D. 
Mitchell & Snyder, 2017). Furthermore, posthuman disability studies contests 
the positioning of the “human” above “all other species and the environment” 
(Goodley et al., 2014, p. 346). 
A particular point of difference posthuman disability studies has from the 
social model and critical disability studies is in the view of disability. Rather than 
continuing to view disability primarily as a form of social oppression, posthuman 
disability studies perceives the notion of disability as productive. For instance, 
Goodley and Runswick-Cole (2016) argue that disability can disrupt, disturb and 
disarm the “normative, taken-for-granted, deeply societally ingrained 




6). Goodley et al. (2014) contend that disability challenges us to rethink what the 
“human” is, as well as how “humans” live in relationship with each other, the 
wider environment and other non-human beings. The view of disability as 
productive steps away from the view of disability as ontologically negative. As 
Goodley et al. (2014) state: 
Being disabled is not a tragedy but a possibility, an affirmation, a 
‘queer’ or ‘crip’ space for rethinking what it means to be human, 
to live a quality life and a life with quality. (p. 356) 
This thesis aligns with posthuman disability studies. In particular, the 
notion of the ideal, bounded human is called into question, and the notion of 
disability is viewed as a possibility. Much of the writing produced thus far in the 
field has been grounded in the work of Braidottti, with a focus on the 
“posthuman”. As Braidotti (2013) notes: 
[T]he proper study of the posthuman condition is the posthuman 
itself. This new knowing subject is a complex assemblage of 
human and non-human, planetary and cosmic, given and 
manufactured, which requires major re-adjustments in our way of 
thinking. (p. 159) 
However, I have chosen to take a Baradian approach to this thesis. The 
key reason is that I saw great potential for utilising Barad’s work on Agential 
Realism, something which I did not see with Braidotti’s work. In particular, I was 
inspired by the use of Barad’s work by authors such as Davies, Jackson and 
Mazzei, Søndergaard, and Lenz Taguchi and Palmer (e.g., Davies, 2014b; Jackson 
& Mazzei, 2011; Lenz Taguchi & Palmer, 2013; Søndergaard, 2016). Although 
these writings sit outside the field of disability studies, I saw much congruency 
with my own project. For instance, Søndergaard (2016) explores the distributed, 
multi-directional flow of phenomenon related to violence in children’s lives; 
these phenomena are not always proximate in space and time, and entangle 
with children’s subjectivities and the actions of violence which they perpetuate. 
In this article, the notion of “violence” could easily be replaced by many other 




and “actions” do not precede, but rather are produced within these 
entanglements.  Yet, interestingly, at the time that I was developing my 
conceptual framing and applying this to my analysis, I could find no examples 
from the field of disability studies that drew upon a Baradian approach.  
Below, I detail Barad’s theory of agential realism. Thereafter I will 
propose a different means of conceptualising disability using agential realism; 
disability as an entanglement.  
Agential Realism  
Agential realism is a conceptual framework put forward by Karan Barad, 
which proposes a new understanding of the materialisation of the world and all 
“beings” in it. The concept falls under the rubric of new materialism, a new 
theoretical approach which constitutes a fundamental rethinking of how the 
world and every “thing” in it comes to be. (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012). This 
theory includes a rethinking of the materialisation of the “human” and the 
“nonhuman”, as well as material, discursive, social, scientific and cultural 
practices (Barad, 2007). Agential realism moves on from well-worn debates 
which “pit constructivism against realism, agency against structure, and idealism 
against materialism” (Barad, 2007, p. 26). Instead, Barad’s work rethinks the 
concepts which enable such binary thinking, including the notions of discourse, 
matter, agency, objectivity, embodiment, space and time.  
Barad has drawn on a wide field of influences in the development of 
agential realism. These influences include poststructuralism, queer theory, 
feminist theory, antiracist theory, Marxism, and science studies (Barad, 2003). In 
particular, Barad builds on important insights from Michel Foucault, Donna 
Haraway, Judith Butler, Vicki Kirby and Joseph Rouse, among many others (see 
Barad, 2007). However, it is the work of Niels Bohr, a Nobel Prize winning 
quantum physicist, which has had a unique influence on Barad.  
Bohr (1885-1962) is credited for being one of the founders of quantum 
physics. However, Bohr’s interests were not confined to the realm of physics; he 
was also interested in the intersection between physics and philosophy (e.g., 




(2007) notes, “shook the very foundation of Western epistemology” (p. 97). In 
the traditional view of physics, the world consists of discrete bounded entities 
which are each made up of individual atoms (Barad, 2007; Bohr, 1958). A clear 
distinction is made between object and apparatus, or the phenomenon being 
measured and the tools to measure it (Bohr, 1963). Many social and scientific 
theories are founded and shaped on this epistemological perspective; that is, 
that there is a clear separation between object and subject (Bohr, 1958).  
Quantum physics steps away from the view that Bohr terms “classical 
physics”, otherwise known as Newtonian physics or atomistic metaphysics. In 
quantum physics, the interaction between object and subject is viewed as 
forming “an inseparable part of the phenomenon” (Bohr, 1963, p. 4). Bohr’s 
writing has a strong alignment with elements of poststructuralism and 
phenomenology, both of which reject the idea that “nature and culture, or 
biology and society, occupy separate metaphysical spaces” (Hughes, 2005, p. 78).  
One of the key sources of Bohr’s insights comes from his “thought 
experiment”, in which he entered into the long-standing debate regarding 
whether light is a particle or a wave. The experiment used a two-slit interference 
device, first proposed by Einstein and later adapted by Bohr (Barad, 2007). Light 
is passed through a two-slit diffraction grating which, according to Bohr, could be 
manipulated in such a way that the light can be shown to exhibit both wave-like 
and particle-like behaviour (Bohr, 1958). In the mid-1990s, the technology had 
been developed to conduct Bohr’s thought experiment, and his hypothesis was 
confirmed (Barad, 2007).  
As classical physics rests on the understanding that everything in the 
world can be separated into particles and waves, the experiment produced a 
seemingly contradictory result. What is the true ontological nature of light, if it 
can be shown to be both a particle and a wave? Bohr resolves this paradox by 
explaining that there are no “independently existing objects with inherent 
characteristics” (Barad, 2003, p. 816, emphasis in original);  that is, the notions of 
“wave” and “particle” are not independently existing phenomena with inherent 
characteristics which precede the experiment. What the two-slit light experiment 




independently existing entities with intrinsic boundaries in the world; everything 
is interconnected. Whilst this idea likely comes as no surprise to many non-
Westerners, including those from Te Ao Māori (the Māori worldview), this 
conclusion has significant implications for Western social and scientific theories. 
In particular, it poses a challenge to the “Cartesian belief in the inherent 
distinction between subject and object, and knower and the known” (Barad, 
2003, p. 813); that is, it is not possible to draw a definitive boundary between 
light, the two-slit apparatus, the result, and the “humans” conducting the 
experiment.  
Barad builds on this insight of interconnectivity from Bohr, applying it to 
the nature of matter, meaning, ontology and epistemology:  
The separation of epistemology from ontology is a reverberation 
of a metaphysics that assumes an inherent difference between 
human and nonhuman, subject and object, mind and body, matter 
and discourse. (Barad, 2007, p. 185)  
Developing the notion of ontological inseparability further, Barad proposes that 
ethics, knowing and being are indivisibly intertwined. She proposes the term 
ethico- onto-epistem-ology, to indicate that being, ethics, ontology and 
epistemology are mutually implicated. As Barad (2007) notes, “[w]e don’t obtain 
knowledge by standing outside the world, we know because we are of the 
world” (p. 185, emphasis in original). As such, Barad proposes a new term to 
express her thoughts on how knowing, being and ethics are intertwined: intra-
action.  
Intra-action  
Intra-action signifies a profound conceptual shift in the realm of social 
theory. The term is used in contrast to the more commonly used “inter-action” 
which draws on the atomistic metaphysics’ presumption of separate entities 
which precede their inter-action. Intra-action recognises that individual entities 
and agencies “do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action” 




materialise through intra-action as individual entities with apparently 
determinate boundaries, properties and meanings (Barad, 2007). One integral 
component of this process is that particular exclusions must happen in order for 
a phenomenon to emerge as a seemingly bounded entity (Barad, 2007). This is to 
say that no entity is considered to be an inherently bounded and propertied 
phenomenon prior to intra-action. Instead, phenomena “acquire specific 
boundaries and properties through the open-ended dynamics of intra-activity” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 172) 
Given the significant conceptual shift inherent in agential realism, there 
are many important concepts to reconsider. Over the following pages I will detail 
three elements which are most pertinent to this thesis. These are the way that 
the human is conceptualised, the notion of agency, and the ethical implications 
of an agential realist perspective.   
Conceptualising the Human, Agency and Ethics   
The notion of the human is radically rethought in agential realism. In 
Chapters Two and Three, I provided a critique of the modernist conception of the 
human. This notion, which continues to play a powerful role in shaping how 
humans are conceptualised, splits people into the binary categories of “normal” 
and “disabled”. According to Barad (2007), this view of the human is founded in 
the assumption that humans are discrete and bounded beings; a belief stemming 
from atomistic metaphysics.  However, in a framework grounded in quantum 
physics, all beings and entities are viewed as intertwined; the modernist notion 
of the human cannot be sustained.  
Barad’s work on agential realism is further enhanced by the long history 
of poststructuralism on which she draws. The notion of “discourse” is particularly 
important in this realm. Barad (2003) notes that according to Foucault, discursive 
practices are:  
[T]he local sociohistorical material conditions that enable and 




writing, thinking, calculating, measuring, filtering, and 
concentrating. (p. 819) 
Discourse accounts for much more than language. As Barad (2003) notes, 
“[d]iscourse is not what is said; it is that which constrains and enables what can 
be said” (p. 819). In agential realism, discursive practices are viewed as 
boundary-making practices which produce, rather than merely describe, entities 
such as “subjects” and “objects” (Barad 2007). The modernist human as a 
“subject” is thus radically decentred and disassembled (MacLure, 2013). Human 
identities, thoughts and actions, including those related to learning disability, are 
not understood to be the result of “rational” thought by reasoned individuals. 
Instead, they are seen as phenomena which are shaped by the discourses in 
which people are embedded (Barad, 2007; Foucault, 1980). 
Barad sees a key weakness in the poststructuralist conception of the 
human, in that a lack of attention is paid to the role of the body’s materiality in 
the workings of power (Barad, 2007; Davies, 2016). In particular, Barad is critical 
of the way in which Foucault implicitly reinscribes matter as passive. As she 
asserts, this limitation forestalls “an understanding of precisely how discursive 
practices produce material bodies” (Barad, 2003, p. 808, emphasis in original). 
Butler, in turn, draws heavily on Foucault in the development of her work in 
performativity. Barad finds that Butler’s work mitigates some of the weaknesses 
inherent in the work of Foucault, as she provides “an insightful and powerful 
analysis of some discursive dimensions of the materialization of real flesh-and-
blood bodies” (Barad, 2007, p. 192, emphasis in original), such as those related 
to the formation of gender identity. However, Butler’s work is limited to the 
materialisation of human bodies; she does not look to phenomena outside the 
body, nor the material effects which humans have on each other (Barad, 2003; 
Davies, 2016). As a result of this, Barad finds that Butler “ultimately reinscribes 
matter as a passive product of discursive practices rather than as an active agent 
participating in the very process of materialization” (Barad, 2003, p. 821).  In 
agential realism, Barad steps away from the view of matter as passive to focus on 





Another key point of difference between agential realism and 
poststructuralism is in the main point of focus. As Zembylas and Bozalek (2014) 
state, Barad takes issue with human exceptionalism and the “assumption that 
humans are unique and should be the main focus of our concern” (p. 39). 
Instead, Barad views the “human” (and the “nonhuman”) as phenomena which 
are produced through the iterative boundary-making practices of intra-activity 
(Barad, 2007). As she states: 
Bodies are not objects with inherent boundaries and properties; 
they are material-discursive phenomena. “Human” bodies are not 
inherently different from “nonhuman” ones. What constitutes the 
“human” (and the “nonhuman”) is not a fixed or pregiven notion, 
but nor is it a free-floating ideality. (Barad, 2003, p. 823).  
These boundary-making practices, which constitute the “human” and the 
“nonhuman”, of necessity involve particular exclusions, and are always open to 
contestation (Barad, 2003). Furthermore, the notions of “bodies” and 
“environments” are always intra-actively co-constituted; humans do not stand 
separate from the world in which they are constituted (Barad, 2007).  
The second important element of agential realism for this thesis is the 
notion of agency. Rather than viewing agency in the traditional humanist sense, 
that is, as something which is an attribute of humans, Barad takes a much wider 
perspective. In her view, all phenomena – humans, discourses, affect and matter 
included, are viewed as agentic. As Barad (as interviewed in Dolphijn & van der 
Tuin, 2012) notes, agency is an enactment; it is about the possibilities for worldly 
reconfigurings – as doing / being in its intra-activity. Agency is an integral 
component of what forms the ongoing intra-activity of life, but also emerges 
through this intra-activity (Barad, 2007).  
The view that agency is located both within and beyond the human is 
highlighted by Jackson and Mazzei (2011), where they discuss an incident with an 
emerging academic, Sera.  In this scenario, Sera purchases a suit after being 
asked to look after a registration table, and after wearing the suit at the 




And I remember putting on the suit feeling like I am so powerful. I 
couldn’t get over how different I felt in the suit about answering 
questions and talking with people at the registration table. She 
didn’t say wear a suit, but I figured I should. And so I bought one. 
And then I experienced that. (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011, p. 128) 
As Jackson and Mazzei (2011) highlight, the various phenomenon present 
in this scenario, including Sera, the suit and positioning of Sera behind the 
registration table, “intra-act to both introduce and produce a topology of power 
relations and a subject position not previously experienced” (p. 133). In this 
scenario, agency is distributed over the suit, the registration table, Sera’s 
position behind the table, institutional discourses relating to the possibilities for 
power at a registration table, and Sera herself.  
The third important component of agential realism for this thesis is in 
relation to ethics. Barad is clear in her writing that human accountability is not 
lessened by the view that agency is distributed beyond the human (Barad, 2007). 
Humans, she asserts, have a constitutive role to play in the ongoing intra-active 
materialisation of life (Barad, 2007). Crucially, this means that much more 
attentiveness must be paid to existing power asymmetries (Barad, 2007). As I 
highlight in the box below, interactions between me and the people I supported 
whilst employed in a residential support service were profoundly shaped by 
existing power asymmetries.  
 
I am on a sleepover shift at the house where I work and I hear a noise in 
the kitchen. It’s late and everyone I support is meant to be in bed, so I go and 
investigate. In the kitchen I find Carl16, a 20-something year old gentleman, 
holding a muesli bar. It’s obvious he is about to have a midnight snack.  However, 
after bed-time snacks aren’t provided for in the household cupboards; if Carl eats 
the muesli bar then there won’t be enough for lunches for the week.  
I feel it is my duty as a staff person to take the muesli bar off Carl, so we 
do not run out of food in the house. But I also want to ensure that Carl is in 
                                                     




control of his own life. I work really, really hard to not act like I hold all the power 
as a staff person; a position which I come to learn is inescapable in a residential 
support service.  
            I imagine the typical response of a staff person is to “tell Carl off” for 
“stealing” food, but I decide to try a different tactic. I talk to Carl about his desire 
to go flatting, and how he needs to show us he is responsible if he wants to move 
away from the controlling residential support service. He needs to perform 
himself as a responsible and rational person if he wants to not have staff 
controlling his life. At that moment I am not conscious of the irony in telling Carl 
that he has to submit to the powers over him, in order to not have to submit to 
the powers over him. After some conversation Carl accepts my explanation, puts 
the muesli bar back and heads to bed.  
I feel torn about this moment. On the one hand, I have adequately 
fulfilled my role as a staff person in maintaining the order of the house, and the 
situation is resolved. Yet, I believe that people should have the right to have 
night-time snacks. People should also have the right to choose how they live 
without having to prove that they are capable of not “sneaking” into their own 
kitchen and eating their own food outside of somebody else’s imposed meal 
times.  
Looking at this scenario through the lens of agential realism, I can see 
multiple performative agencies at play. Each of these performative agencies 
intra-acted in this scenario, shaping my “self”, my response and the scenario. For 
instance, I felt that I would be shirking my responsibilities by not intervening. 
This conflicted with the image I hold of myself as a “good” staff person who 
doesn’t let the team down. Shopping only happens once per week with a cheque 
which is co-signed by the service manager and the team leader, and as there is 
no petty cash in the house, buying more food is incredibly difficult. We also have 
a duty of care to ensure the people we support have adequate food, so “tough 
luck you’ll go hungry tomorrow” seems out of the question. Carl is supported 
under the Residential Support Contract, a contract over which he has no say, and 
probably doesn’t even know exists. This contract dictates that Carl must live in 




agreement. There are strict rules about how a residential “facility” is to be run, 
including how the food purchasing works. As an employee of the organisation, it 
is my duty to enforce the rules. Although my job is to support Carl, I feel like my 
first priority is always to maintain order in the house, and ensure that everything 
runs as it is “supposed” to. If Carl has any say over his life, it is within the pre-
determined boundaries of “acceptable” choice set by the organisation. I am 
constantly frustrated by my lack of ability to “let” Carl choose what happens in 
his own home.   
Despite my attempts to not participate in what I see as oppressive 
support practices and to have the right “attitude”, I felt compelled to intervene. 
In that moment neither Carl nor I could see a path to harnessing the agency 
necessary to challenge these oppressive conditions. The intra-active forces in the 
residential service were shaping my actions and who I became as a person, even 
as I consciously tried to resist them.  
 
A focus on the ethical implications of power asymmetries, such as those 
evident in the scenario above, forms an important part of an agential realist 
analysis. Rather than viewing these power asymmetries and the wider world as 
fixed and stable phenomena, Barad sees the world as constantly being made 
anew. In particular, there is a quote from Barad which expresses this idea clearly, 
and which proved itself important throughout the analysis: “[t]he world and its 
possibilities for becoming are remade with each moment” (Barad, 2007, p. 396). 
The ongoing oppression which any marginalised group faces, including disabled 
people, non-white people, and queer people, is not a stable and fixed 
phenomenon. Instead, it is something which is constantly being remade anew, 
and thus has the potential to be radically reconfigured at each moment.  
In the next section, I utilise agential realism as a tool to reconceptualise 




Disability as an Entanglement  
 How different ethics looks from the vantage point of constitutive 
entanglements. What would it mean to acknowledge that the 
“able-bodied” depend on the “disabled” for their very existence? 
What would it mean to take on that responsibility? What would it 
mean to deny one’s responsibility to the other once there is a 
recognition that one’s very embodiment is integrally entangled 
with the other? (Barad, 2007, p. 158)  
In this thesis I propose a different way of conceptualising disability – 
disability as an entanglement. From an agential realist view, entanglements are 
seen as specific iterative configurations of phenomena (Barad, 2007). This is not 
to say that iterative entanglements are formed from exactly the same 
phenomena twice over; instead, Barad (2007) argues that each entanglement 
changes with each intra-action. As she notes:  
In fact it is not so much that they [entanglements] change from 
one moment to the next or from one place to another, but that 
space, time, and matter do not exist prior to the intra-actions that 
reconstitute entanglements. (Barad, 2007, p. 74) 
What is more commonly known as “context”, including the time and place of 
each intra-action, has a powerful impact on the iterative reconfiguring of each 
entanglement (Renold & Ivinson, 2014).  
It is important to note that, in this view, phenomena do not need to be 
proximate in space and time within entanglements (Barad, 2007). Non-proximate 
phenomena can have powerful agency within intra-actions, including memories, 
legislation, theories and historical practices. As Barad (2007) notes, we are 
entangled in many more forces than we can possibly be aware of. As Lenz 
Taguchi and Palmer (2013) explain this concept in their exploration of  the 
phenomenon of Swedish school girls ill- and well-being:  
[I]n what ways do reported scientific findings … become co-




school girls’ ill- or well-being together with other performative 
agents? Such agents are here understood to be entanglements of 
discourses, places, materialities and embodied practices in or 
connected to the school environment. All of these involve socio-
historical aspects of gender, ethnicity, class, age, etc. in various 
situated ways. (Lenz Taguchi & Palmer, 2013, pp. 671–672)   
Lenz Taguchi and Palmer (2013) describe the phenomena in question as “an 
entanglement of multiple performative agencies” (p. 673). Applying this idea to 
this research, I can see that the entanglements of disability are constituted from 
multiple performative agencies. Some of the performative agencies already 
discussed in the thesis include the modernist conception of the ideal human, 
capitalism with its focus on individuals, normative discourses, buildings with 
stairs / ramps, legislation and diagnostic practices. I will be exploring other 
performative agencies which arose as agentic during the data collection and 
analysis phases of the research.   
Whilst I am naming the concept “disability as an entanglement”, it is 
perhaps more accurate to call it an ongoing series of entanglements. These 
entanglements continually materialise in such a way that they hold disability “in 
a static place of otherness” (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et 
al., 2017, p. 8). Through the materialisation of these entanglements, disability 
oppression is enabled, fostered and reiterated. However, this is not to say that 
this emergence is a state of finality, or that it must continue along this vein. To 
repeat an earlier cited quote from Barad (2007), “[t]he world and its possibilities 
for becoming are remade with each moment” (p. 396). The possibilities for the 
entanglements of disability are remade with each moment, and herein lies the 
ever-present possibility of change.  
Difference within Entanglements  
The notion of difference is an important concept within agential realism. 




from (Davies et al., 2013; Hein, 2016). Instead difference is seen as a 
phenomenon which emerges through intra-activity. As Barad (2014) notes:  
Differences are within; differences are formed through intra-
activity, in the making of ‘this’ and ‘that’ within the phenomenon 
that is constituted in their inseparability (entanglement). (p. 175, 
emphasis in original)  
Differences emerge and become salient through intra-activity. Thus, any ideas 
relating to “norms” and “different to the norm” are the difference effects of 
intra-active entanglements. This idea is highlighted well by Jackson and Mazzei 
(2011) when they discuss a black academic, Cassandra, whose blackness sets her 
apart as an “other” in her predominantly white institution. As Jackson and 
Mazzei (2011) state, “[i]t is not Cassandra’s “blackness” that produces her 
differently, it is the intra-action of bodies, discourses, and institutions that do so” 
(p. 125). These differences are not mere artefacts of human consciousness led 
astray (Barad, 2007). As Barad (2007) notes, “[d]ifference cannot be taken for 
granted; it matters – indeed it is what matters” (p. 136, emphasis added). These 
emergent differences have profound material consequences for people’s lives.  
Disability is a difference which has come to matter in our world. This 
difference is an effect of the boundary-making practices which both form and 
emerge through intra-activity. Performative agencies such as diagnostic practices 
and discourses of the ideal human intra-act together through the entanglements 
of disability to create this difference. The frequent debates which rage about 
where the boundary should sit – can Asperger’s have its own diagnosis, or is it a 
form of autism? Is mental illness a form of disability? – evidence the permeability 
of this practice. Furthermore, different differences become salient in different 
contexts. As the social model highlights, using a wheelchair is a difference which 
becomes much more salient when buildings have no ramps, and deafness is a 
more salient difference when there are no subtitles available on TV.  
The point of seeing disability as an entanglement is then to explore the 
entanglements of disability. What are they, what are the agentic entanglements, 





For me, disability is a difference which very much matters. When I am 
talking with a learning disabled person I do a lot of mental filtering and adapting 
of myself - I try not to use big words, or talk too fast, or talk about complex 
abstract topics. When I talk with a blind person I try to remember to introduce 
myself each time we meet so the person doesn’t have to play “guess the voice”. 
When I talk with a Deaf person who lip reads I need to make sure I am facing the 
person when I speak. These are differences which very much do matter in our 
interactions. What matters, and how it comes to matter, can never be separated 
from the context in which these things are happening. In a different world, in a 
different place and time, these differences will matter in different ways.  
 
In the following sections, I explore two more concepts which I will be 
drawing upon for this thesis. These concepts will be combined with agential 
realism in order to provide greater insight into how the entanglements of 
disability are maintained, and how they can be ruptured.  
Citational Chains and Lines of Flight 
The next key conceptual idea shaping this thesis is a combination of two 
concepts – citational chains and lines of flight. See in particular Davies (e.g., 
2008, 2011, 2015), and De Schauwer and Davies (2015) who draw on the work of 
Judith Butler, Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In this thesis I 
combine these two ideas with agential realism, in order to explore how the 
entanglements of disability are maintained and reiterated. I draw upon these 
concepts to consider how the entanglements of disability hold the potential for 
change.  
Citational chains give life its sense of continuity and stability (Davies, 
2015). They are comforting, and they help us to navigate the world (Davies, 
2015). Judith Butler utilises the notions of citation and repetition in her work on 
performativity, particularly in relation to how gender norms become intelligible. 




[Every girl is] compelled to ‘cite’ the norm in order to qualify and 
remain a viable subject. Femininity is thus not the product of a 
choice, but the forcible citation of a norm. (Butler, 1993, p. 232)  
Davies draws upon the work of Butler in her use of citational chains (e.g., Davies, 
2008, 2011).  Davies defines citational chains as “a repetition, with slight 
variations, of the same – the same identity, the same relations of power, the 
same categorizations, the same patterns of meaning-making” (Davies, 2015, np). 
These citational chains form a crucial foundation of our world, as they “enable 
the chaos of the world to be reduced to discrete categories of meaning and 
structure” (Malins, 2007, p. 153). This understanding of citational chains is 
similar to Barad’s conceptualisations of discourse. In agential realism, discursive 
practices are understood to be a boundary-making practice which enable and 
constrain particular patterns of meaning-making. As Barad (2003) claims: 
“discursive practices are specific material (re)configurings of the world through 
which local determinations of boundaries, properties, and meanings are 
differentially enacted” (p. 820-1, emphasis in original). 
They key to understanding the power of citational chains is that 
repetition is agentic. It is a crucial part of the establishment and reinforcement of 
meaning (Højgaard & Søndergaard, 2011). Entanglements with prominent 
iterations hold great potential for profoundly shaping the world. This notion of 
agentic repetition is the central concept being harnessed when I traverse 
between the terms “iterative intra-activity”, “iterative entanglements” and 
“citational chains”.  
Davies (2015) combines the notion of citational chains with Henri 
Bergson’s lines of flight. In doing this, she highlights the radical potential for 
opening up the everyday world for examination, through rupturing the taken-for-
granted ordinariness of life-as-usual. De Schauwer and Davies (2015) define lines 
of flight as “two contrary movements in which we are all continually caught up” 
(p. 91) – lines of ascent and lines of descent. In discussing Bergson’s (1911) work 




Lines of descent are made up out of automated repetitions of 
those citational chains that Butler analyses, while lines of ascent 
take off into the not-yet-known. (np) 
Lines of descent create the familiar, liveable world through repetition (Bergson, 
1911; Davies, 2015).  They are a normalising and territorialising force which work 
to hold the continuity and stability of our world, and which are dependent on 
repeated citations (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017).  
In connecting these concepts with agential realism, lines of descent can be 
understood as the iterative entanglements of everyday life. Drawing on Deleuze 
(Deleuze, 1968/2004) and Butler (1997a), Davies (2008) contend that “that the 
ordinary everyday world is sedimented in repeated citations of the way the 
world is (and, it is believed, ought to be)” (p. 173). This unreflexive ordinariness 
plays a pivotal role in depriving many of “a reasonable or viable existence” (p. 
173).  
Lines of ascent, in contrast, are what generate the creative evolution of 
life (Davies, 2015). As De Schauwer et al. (2017) assert, they are a “de-
territorializing force that opens up the new, the not-yet-known, and the 
emergent possibility of becoming different (p. 2). Lines of ascent, can be 
understood as the possibilities for becoming, which are remade with each 
moment (Barad, 2007). Lines of ascent present disruptive potential to the 
ongoing iterative entanglements of life-as-usual; they are, as De Schauwer and 
Davies (2015) state, a “space of movement, of the threshold, where everything is 
open to change” (p. 91). These two lines of flight are constantly at play, as they 
necessarily affect and depend on each other (Davies, 2015; De Schauwer, Van de 
Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017).  
Extending on from Bergson’s thinking on lines of flight, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) introduce the concepts of de- and re-territorialisation. This 
concept helps to explain the processes of continuity and change within the 
ongoing intra-activity of life (Feely, 2016): 
Reterritorialisation refers to the ways in which continuity, 




assemblage. Meanwhile, deterritorialisation refers to the ways in 
which the assemblage’s borders and boundaries are 
simultaneously blurred, subverted or escaped, allowing for 
change, the proliferation of difference and processes of becoming. 
(pp. 877-878) 
Yet, these forces of de- and re-territorialisation should not be thought of as a 
binary. Every intra-active entanglement contains within it forces which work to 
deterritorialise and take off in a new direction (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Feely, 
2016). At the same time, each intra-action also contains within it forces which 
reterritorialise and work to maintain the lines of descent (Feely, 2016). These 
forces continually pull elements of intra-activity back to the same repetitions,  
into the ordinariness of life as usual. As Davies (2015) maintains, lines of ascent  
are “always subject to being re-territorialized and thus re-incorporated back into 
lines of descent and habitual repetitions and re-citations” (np).  
Disruptions to the repetitive citations of the known order are also an 
ethical necessity of life (Davies, 2008). They are a foundational component of the 
challenge to the ongoing oppression faced by many marginalised groups, 
including learning disabled people. As Davies (2008) attests, it is in the “always-
present possibility of rupture” (np) that revolutionary potential for change, or for 
a new line of flight, lies.  
These two concepts of citational chains and lines of flight form an 
important component of the conceptual framing for this thesis. In my analysis I 
examine the iterative entanglements of disability which came to the fore during 
data collection. These entanglements provide insight into the forces which 
enable the flourishing of disability oppression, and which continue to position 
learning disability on the margins of humanity.  
In the next section, I outline the key problem statement that data the 




Research Aim and Questions 
Due to the iterative nature of the research, the research aim and 
questions shifted substantially during the analysis. For this reason, I have split 
the research questions into two sections. The first research question was 
developed prior to the data generation phase: 
1. Does the notion of pride present potential for a positive re-
imagination of disability?  
This question is explored in the first analysis chapter (Chapter Seven). The results 
from this question lay the foundation for the conceptual framing outlined in this 
chapter, including the view of disability as an entanglement. The research aim 
and questions which form the remainder of the analysis, emerged as a 
consequence of the findings from addressing this question. 
Rather than focusing the research around a research aim, I found it more 
useful to engage with a problem statement, which emerged in the middle of the 
analysis: 
The entanglements of disability materialise in such a way that they 
reiterate disability oppression.  
Once I had developed this problem statement, I started to look at the separate 
components in order to gain a greater understanding – entanglements, 
entanglements of disability, disability oppression, entanglements of disability 
oppression.  The aim of the research and the research questions thus became to 
explore each of these components:  
2. What constitutes the entanglements of disability? 
3. What are the performative agencies within these 
entanglements?  
4. What is happening within these entanglements that 




5. What do these entanglements foreclose and present 
potential for? 
These questions are not designed to be answered in their entirety. The 
entanglements of disability differ with each intra-action, and as such it would not 
be possible to provide a definitive answer to any of these questions. In the 
analysis chapters I explore the entanglements of disability which arose during the 
data collection and analysis phases, with an understanding that these results will 
always be partial and incomplete, and yet still valuable.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I outline the conceptual frameworks 
which I draw upon in order to gain greater insight into the ongoing 
entanglements of disability. Each of these concepts will be drawn into the fray at 
different times; they are tools which, when read together with the data, help to 
illuminate agentic phenomenon within the entanglements of disability. At times 
the theories will be utilised on their own, whilst at other times they will be 
combined. However, at all times these theories sit alongside agential realism.  
As a note on the writing style, the frameworks outlined in this chapter are 
used to think with particular concepts and theorists, in the vein of Jackson and 
Mazzei’s (2011) book Thinking with Theory in Qualitative Research. Thus, I will 
refer to statements such as “thinking with the notion of pride” throughout the 
remainder of the thesis.  
Performativity  
Butler’s theory of performativity explores how subjects are both 
formulated and reformulated through “social performatives” (Butler, 1997b). 
Butler is particularly focused on the notion of gender, arguing that gender is not 
a pre-existing attribute of individuals which is merely described in language 
(Butler, 1997b). Instead, she argues that gender is an iterative doing – a 
performative, through which the subject emerges (Butler, 1997b). The 
performative should not be likened to a “performance”, and should not be 




Social performatives, Butler argues, enable subjects to be recognisable; 
that is, to be recognised as a man or a woman. This recognition is crucial, as it is 
required for social existence (Butler, 1997b). As Davies (2015) contends, “our 
very sense of personhood is linked to the desire for recognition” (np).  Because 
of this, we are orientated to desiring the social categories through which we 
become recognisable (female/male, abled/disabled, white/coloured etc.), and 
we desire to preserve these categories. Davies et al. (2013) state that this desire 
for recognition happens even when the terms of recognition “exclude us, or 
make us less than human, offering a life that is not viable” (682-683). As Laws 
(2011) notes:  
 [I]f there were an option of being or not being, then 
overwhelmingly the desire would be to survive. Existing, even in 
subordination, is considered by most as preferable to not existing 
at all. (p. 119)  
This desire to be recognised is both powerful and pervasively exploitable (Butler, 
1997b). 
Social performatives are an ongoing part of our everyday lives, and they 
are of fundamental importance if we are to “exist” as socially viable beings 
(Butler, 1997b). However, although performatives form an important part of our 
daily existence, they not generally executed on a conscious level (Butler, 1997b). 
Part of the power of performatives is in their “everydayness” which renders 
them naturalized and difficult to see (Butler, 1990). It is often only when a 
performative is not repeated as usual, that such a repetition becomes apparent. 
Performativity and Agential Realism  
Throughout this thesis, I draw upon Butler’s theory of performativity, 
with an agential realist extension.  Barad herself draws on Butler’s theory of 
performativity in her development of agential realism (see Barad, 2007). Whilst 
Barad acknowledges the fundamental importance of Butler’s work, particularly in 
regards to “the psychic dimension of regulatory practices” (2007, p. 209), she 




Foucault’s account of power, in which he links discursive practices to the 
materiality of the body, but forestalls “an understanding of precisely how 
discursive practices produce material bodies”(Barad, 2003, p. 807).  
Barad takes Butler’s account of performativity and extends it, embracing 
the link between the material and the discursive.  Barad proposes a 
posthumanist formulation of performativity, by replacing the concept of 
‘iterative citationality’ with ‘iterative intra-activity’. Barad suggests a 
posthumanist account of performativity, which does not incorporate 
“anthropocentric values in its foundations” (Barad, 2003, p. 828). This means 
that performativity involves much more than “human” bodies, and does not 
necessarily hold the “human” at its centre.  
However, Butler’s work on performativity has strengths which are not as 
developed in Barad’s account. As Højgaard and Søndergaard (2011) note, Barad’s 
work on the material-discursive apparatuses of power is “strikingly 
underdeveloped” (p. 347). This is particularly so when compared with her 
elaborate descriptions of the technical apparatuses of agential realism (Højgaard 
& Søndergaard, 2011). Furthermore, Butler’s work on performativity has been 
developed and applied not only by herself but, significantly, also by a number of 
other authors (e.g., Davies, 2011, 2016; Davies et al., 2013; Jackson & Mazzei, 
2011; Zabrodska, Linnell, Laws, & Davies, 2011). Having a more developed 
account of performativity, alongside numerous other examples using Butler’s 
work, thus provided a greater understanding of how the concept of 
performativity can be put to work an analysis.  
Utilising Butler’s account of performativity with an agential realist 
extension in this thesis means to utilise Butler’s ideas on performativity, 
recognition and viable lives, whilst not losing sight of the wider intra-active 
phenomena within intra-activity. Taking this perspective does not entail 
reasserting the anthropocentric foundations within Butler’s work, or viewing 
humans as individual subjects with contained and identifiable boundaries. 
Instead, I will be taking the view that we are continually becoming subjects, and 




of intra-action. This means that performative acts, as well as the desire to be 
recognised, form an integral part of disability as an entanglement.   
In the following section, I outline another key concept being utilised for 
the conceptual framing and analysis: Wetherell’s work on affect.  
Affect  
Affect theory is an area of research which has been lacking in the field of 
disability studies until quite recently17 (Donaldson & Prendergast, 2011; Orlando, 
2013). Cheyne (2016) argues that some work in the field of disability studies 
demonstrates suspicion towards “any kind of emotional response to disability” 
(27:14). This view sees any depiction of disability which is used to generate 
emotion in the viewer or reader as inherently problematic and exploitative 
(Cheyne, 2016). There has been a small increase in literature in this area since 
the turn of the millennium, such as the special themed issue of the Journal of 
Literary & Cultural Disability Studies (see Donaldson & Prendergast, 2011), but is 
an area in need of further exploration.   
Despite the limited theorisation of affect in the disability studies 
literature, there are undoubtedly some profound affective challenges for many 
people with learning disabilities. Blackman (2003), for instance, highlights the 
lingering effects of the eugenics era, which reinforces the view that it is “a 
tragedy and a personal burden to have a child with a disability” (p. 25). As she 
asserts, this view is bound to take a toll on the emotional life of a child or young 
person. Building upon Blackman’s (2003) work, Rolph and Atkinson (2010) argue 
that these young people “may feel they are a disappointment to their families, 
who had hoped for a ‘perfect child’” (p. 58). Furthermore, being continually seen 
and treated as “different” and segregated from peers, such as in “special 
education” classroom settings, “must have an effect on the psyche of the 
individual with a learning disability and also on their family, influencing how 
members of the family relate to one another” (N. Blackman, 2003, p. 21). 
                                                     
17  For recent examples see Cheyne, 2016; Fritsch, 2013; Heeney, 2016; Price, 2016; Sheppard, 
2017. See also (Goodley, Liddiard, & Runswick-Cole, 2018) for an excellent example which I 




The limited research on affect and disability may be due in part to 
modernist underpinning of much disability literature to date, as outlined in 
Chapter Three. According to Laws (2011), the ideal human is expected to be 
always rational, and not disrupted by emotions. She notes further:  
In the dominant rationalist discourses, the reasonable person does 
not have an excess of feelings and emotions… To be read as 
reasonable within the terms of the dominant discourses, we must 
detach ourselves from an excess of emotions/feelings. (p.51)  
Donaldson and Prendergast (2011) argue this point, noting that emotions have 
historically been devalued and dismissed in the Western world (Donaldson & 
Prendergast, 2011). As they state, assumptions of the mind have discouraged “a 
more robust consideration of emotion” (Donaldson & Prendergast, 2011, p. 130). 
This absence has left a silence waiting to be filled (Orlando, 2013). 
Defining Affect  
Affect is a tricky subject to define, in part because it is so hard to capture 
or point to. Pre-posthumanist scholars such as Blackman and Venn (2010; Venn, 
2010), and Clough and Halley (2007), as well as post-humanist scholars such as 
Fritsch (2013), V. Mitchell (2016), and Zembylas and Bozalek (2014) provide 
some insights. However, it is Wetherell’s work on affective practice which I 
believe contributes most to the conceptual framework for this research.  
In this thesis I will be using Wetherell’s work on affective practice with a 
Baradian extension. Wetherell is a social psychologist and, like Butler, with her 
work on performativity, Wetherell has a different ontological conceptualisation 
of the human to Barad. However, in the following section I outline how I believe 
that, despite the differing ontological foundations, Barad and Wetherell’s work 
can be productively drawn together.  
Wetherell defines affect as “embodied meaning-making” (Wetherell, 
2012, p. 4). This is alternatively understood as “human emotion” (Wetherell, 
2012). Affect is always ongoing, continually coming in and out of focus, unfurling 




have a beginning or an end point; as Wetherell (2013) notes, affective body hits 
are “always already occurring within an ongoing stream of meaning-making or 
semiosis” (p. 355). 
Pile (2010) notes that there is a key issue one encounters when trying to 
study affect - that is, affects “cannot be grasped, made known, or represented” 
(Pile, 2010, p. 9). This leaves affect research without an object of study; a not 
insignificant problem. Because of this, Wetherell (2012) suggests that the point 
of focus in any analysis of affect should be directed towards affective practice.  
Practices, according to Wetherell (2012), are defined as routinized 
assemblages or “ways of doing things”. This includes ways of working, moving 
bodies, cooking, consuming and feeling. These assemblages are sites of 
repetition which “provide the basic intelligibility of the world” (Wetherell, 2014, 
p. 12). Practices and routines are not often consciously chosen, but instead 
emerge unbidden and unfold “relatively automatically with little conscious 
monitoring” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 129). With the focus on repetition and absence 
of conscious choice, this understanding of practice has a strong alignment with 
the notions of citational chains and lines of flight outlined earlier in this chapter.  
In connecting the notions of practice and affect, Wetherell (2012) 
describes affective practice as:  
 [A] figuration where body possibilities and routines become 
recruited or entangled together with meaning-making and with 
other social and material configurations. It is an organic complex 
in which all the parts relationally constitute each other. 
(Wetherell, 2012, p. 19).  
This means that rather than looking at affect per se, researchers should look to 
patterns and routines – at assemblages of phenomena which are repeated again 
and again. However, it is important to note that these assemblages are never 
quite the same. As with Barad’s understanding of intra-action, each time a 
routinized practice is enacted, different elements will come into play.   
Affective practices can have different durations; some are short-lived, 




what can be identified as patterns over time (Wetherell, McCreanor, McConville, 
Moewaka Barnes, & le Grice, 2015). These patterns can be bound to specific 
contexts and times and can be cyclical, recurring over days, weeks and months, 
or even years (Wetherell, 2012). One example is the cycle of New Year’s 
resolutions, which Wetherell 2012 calls “work on the self”,  “as good intentions 
lead to determined resolutions, to failures” (p. 12). These cycles can be short-
lived, or “they may last, and be reworked, over many hundreds of years” (p. 12).  
Connecting Affect with Agential Realism 
Barad does not specifically discuss affect in her work on agential realism. 
However, she does place a great deal of focus on materiality. In particular, Barad 
questions why matter has not been granted its own agency and historicity, most 
notably within poststructuralism. She argues:  
Language matters. Discourse Matters. Culture matters. There is an 
important sense in which the only thing that does not seem to 
matter anymore is matter. (2003, p. 801) 
I believe that affect can be understood as a material phenomenon within 
agential realism, one which is not bound to the “human” body. This 
understanding is presented much in the same way that Deleuze and Guattari see 
desire as a material phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Dolphijn & van der 
Tuin, 2012). Furthermore, Barad (2003) views materiality as inseparable from 
discursive practices. As she states, “[d]iscursive practices and material 
phenomena do not stand in a relationship of externality to one another; rather, 
the material and the discursive are mutually implicated in the dynamics of intra-
activity” (Barad, 2003, p. 822). Barad’s view of embodiment is thus one of 
material-discursivity; as a phenomenon which is “the provisional effect of 
agential cuts that constitute material configurations of body and boundaries” 
(Juelskjaer, 2013, p. 756). 
This view of embodiment as material-discursive aligns well with 
Wetherell’s view of affective-discursive practices. Wetherell is critical of the way 




as that from Massumi and Thrift (e.g., Massumi, 2002; Thrift, 2008).  As she 
states, key authors emphasise “processes beyond, below and past discourse” 
(Wetherell, 2013, p. 350, emphasis in original). When viewed through this lens, 
affect is seen as a mysterious force which hits the body, bypassing sense making, 
cognition and discourse (Wetherell et al., 2015). Wetherell (2012) is clear in her 
belief that affect is inextricably intertwined with discourse, as well as wider 
meaning-making processes. As she states, “[i]t is futile to try pull them apart” 
(Wetherell, 2012, p. 20). Affect and discourse emerge with and through each 
other, she argues, granting each other power (Wetherell, 2012).  
Both Barad and Wetherell are interested in meaning-making processes, 
and their connection to discourse and affect (for Wetherell), or materiality (for 
Barad). Barad, for instance, is particularly interested in how matter comes to 
matter; that is, in the boundary-making practices which are “fully implicated in 
the dynamics of intra-activity through which phenomena come to matter” 
(Barad, 2003, p. 822). Both Barad and Wetherell discuss these processes of 
meaning-making as being formed through entanglements; however, Barad’s 
view of what constitutes an entanglement is somewhat broader than 
Wetherell’s. In the definition of affective practice noted earlier, Wetherell (2012) 
describes practices as “a figuration where body possibilities and routines become 
recruited or entangled together with meaning-making and other social and 
material configurations” (p. 19, emphasis added). Furthermore, Wetherell 
discusses the pivotal role of context in shaping the mobilisation of affective-
discursive practices. As she states, “[a]ffect is embedded in situated practice” 
(Wetherell, 2012, p. 160), and can be “very densely knotted in with connected 
social practices where the degree of knitting reinforces the affect and can make 
it resistant and durable, sometimes unbearably so” (p. 14). 
Conceptualising the (Affective) Human  
As a social psychologist, Wetherell’s work on affect could be read as 
being tethered to the classical physics notion of the atomistically bounded 
human. For instance, Wetherell et al. (2015) state that they view “the patterning 




affect and emotion” (p. 58-59, emphasis added). However, much of Wetherell’s 
work steps outside the bounds of humanism, particularly in regards to how affect 
is conceptualised. Wetherell does not view affect as bound to the human body or 
to particular subjects. As she states: 
Like theories of affect without a subject, notions of affective 
practice also stress what could be called the ‘impersonal personal’. 
Affective practice resembles discursive practice in this respect…. 
Affective performances, like words and language, are personally 
owned (and can feel intensely so) but are also trans-individual and 
collective. (2012 p. 122) 
Wetherell views affect as relational, in a sense which extends beyond the 
human. The relational component of affect includes phenomena such as places, 
objects, sounds (such as music), events (such as national holidays), and much 
more (Wetherell, 2012). For instance, Wetherell analyses a game of hopscotch 
between some young girls, noting the “[l]ines drawn on pavements to represent 
hopscotch squares are crucial to the unfolding interaction, as are the social, 
institutional and spatial arrangements of play and playgrounds” (p. 88). 
Furthermore, Wetherell is critical of the humanist notion of reason, and the idea 
that affective practices are the result of rational and intentional processes which 
emanate from inside an individual’s body. As she states, “[t]o attend to affect is 
to stress the limits of reason and the limits of the immediately knowable and 
communicable” (2013, p. 351).   
This idea connects with the Baradian understanding of the human, as 
outlined earlier in this chapter. Barad draws upon key insights from 
poststructuralism, which asserts that human identities, thoughts and actions are 
shaped by the discourses in which people are embedded (Barad, 2007; Foucault, 
1980). Building upon this idea, Barad’s (2007) work on agential realism asserts 
that “humans”, as well as their identities, thoughts and actions, emerge and are 
shaped by a wide array of intra-active phenomena. Affect can be understood as 
one of these phenomena. In particular, it can be viewed as one of the means by 




body as the locus of productive forces, the site where the large-scale 
organization of power links up with local practices” (p. 809). Power, Foucault 
(1976) asserts, is directly connected to the body – to “functions, physiological 
processes, sensations, and pleasures; (1980a, 152)” (Barad 2003 p. 809). 
Extending on from the work of Foucault, Barad (2003) states: 
 [I]t would seem that any robust theory of the materialization of 
bodies would necessarily take account of how the body’s 
materiality – for example, its anatomy and physiology- and other 
material forces actively matter to the process of materialization. 
(p. 809, emphasis in original) 
In order to understand the workings of power, Barad (2003) asserts, we 
must form “understanding of the nature of power in the fullness of its 
materiality” (p. 810). Affect plays a powerful role in the ongoing formation of the 
“subject”. This includes the formation of identities and subjectivities (Wetherell, 
2012), whereby particular ways of being and knowing the self and the world are 
made possible. In this sense, notions of “ideal humans” and inferior “others” are 
as much an affective register as a cognitive one. As Zembylas and Bozalek (2014) 
state, “[c]ritical posthumanism claims that all knowledge is embodied, political, 
partial, situated and accountable” (p. 38). 
Affect as Agentic 
Crucial for this thesis is the view that affect plays a powerfully agentic 
role in the ongoing entanglements of disability. Whilst Wetherell does not 
specifically utilise the term agency when outlining her theory of affect, I believe 
her view does portray affect as agentic. As she insists:  
[T]he fact that affect does circulate, and that affective practice can 
be communal, is crucial to the very possibility of collective action 
and to sociality and polity. (Wetherell 2012, p. 142-3) 
In speaking of materiality, Barad (2007) points out that “the dynamics of intra-




In this vein, affect forms an integral part of the ongoing entanglements of life. It 
is both a constitutive force within, and effect of, the ongoing entanglements of 
disability; that is, affect intra-acts within the meaning-making processes of 
disability. This includes the conceptualisation of what disability is, and how 
people identify with the identity category. In this thesis, I am interested in 
exploring the affective practices with the most prominent iteration and, in 
particular, the practices which hold “taken-for-granted” power in shaping the 
ordinariness of life-as-usual.  
In the following section, I outline the third conceptual framework being 
drawn into the fray of the analysis: desiring silence.  
Desiring Silence 
Another framework which is utilised to explore the ongoing 
entanglements of disability in this thesis is desiring silence. Desiring silence is a 
term first coined by Alecia Jackson (2008), and developed further by Jackson and 
Mazzei (2011), and Mazzei (2011). Desiring silence draws upon the Deleuzian 
notion of desire. Deleuze does not view desire as something which emanates 
from the desire to fill a need or a lack, as in the Lacanian understanding (Jackson 
& Mazzei, 2011; Mazzei, 2011). Instead, desire is viewed as a productive force, “a 
coming together of forces/drives/intensities that produce something” (Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2011, p. 92). As Jackson and Mazzei (2011) explain:  
Desire’s production is active, becoming, transformative. It 
produces out of a multiplicity of forces which form the 
assemblage. We desire, not because we lack something that we 
do not have, but because of the productive forces of intensities 
and connections of desire. (p. 86)  
Desire produces many other forces and phenomena, including privilege, power 
and voice (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011).    
This view of desire does not emanate from the rational, intentional 
subject. Nor does this view see desire as something which indicates an 




2011).  Instead, desire is viewed as a force formed in assemblages, or 
entanglements, which are shaped by collective narratives, images, and 
metaphors, and by our experiences over time (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011; Laws, 
2011). As Renold and Ivonson (2014) assert, these assemblages are “always 
located in their socio-historical places” (p. 364). In short, desire is a phenomenon 
which is performed and constructed through the ongoing intra-activity of life 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2011). 
When analysing data, the focus should not be on seeking an 
understanding of what  desire means, or to try to define it (Jackson & Mazzei, 
2011). Instead, it means to ask how desire functions, what is producing this 
desire, and what the desire in turn produces (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011). As 
Jackson and Mazzei (2011) state, working with this understanding of desire 
means “to consider the forces of desire that are acting through and with our 
research participants, and to make sense of what results from such interaction” 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2011, p. 91).  
Connecting this notion of desire with silence means to seek an 
understanding of how desire functions to produce silence, and what this desiring 
silence in turn produces. In this thesis, I demonstrate how desiring silence acts as 
an agentic and productive force within the ongoing entanglements of disability.  
In the following section I examine the last concept brought into the fold 
of the analysis framework, pride. I present this idea as a concept which holds 
potential to shift the ongoing problematic entanglements of disability. 
Pride  
Pride, defined by Parsons (1999) includes: 
“[R]refusing to accept the values of society which says – with its 
words, its attitudes, its practices – that some human identities are 
less valuable than others” (p. 3) 
However, Carol Hamilton (personal communication, May 23, 2014) would take 
this definition a step further and assert that an identity of pride is not only 




society could embody moving forward. Disability pride is about the acceptance 
and celebration of difference; as Shakespeare (1996) notes, “it is about 
subverting negative valuation and reclaiming disability” (p. 106).  
Parsons (1999) argues that pride is an important landmark which must be 
passed in order to achieve human rights. Crucially, Parsons (1999) notes that 
disability pride needs to be about pride because of disability.  This stands in 
contrast to pride being in spite of disability or in the common humanity of 
disabled people (Parsons, 1999).  
Thinking with the notion of disability pride does not mean to deny the 
challenges and pains associated with disability, or to deny that disability can be 
problematic (Scully, 2016). As Morris (1991) states, disabled people need the 
courage to say that “there are awful things about being disabled, as well as the 
positive things in which we take pride” (p. 71, emphasis in original). However, as 
Scully (2016) argues, the view of disability as purely negative ontology has major 
limitations.  These limitations include lost possibilities in the attempt to regulate 
human diversity, and a loss of agency when we impose certain expectations onto 
bodies and minds. As Bunch (2017) highlights:  
Disavowal and denial of heterogeneous embodiment also limits 
possible ways to imagine the good life, understand what it means 
to be human in all our diversity, design the kinds of social 
institutions that would allow all people to flourish, value different 
kinds of social contributions, and organize human life to engage in 
relationships of interdependence and care for each other. (p. 138)  
Thinking with the notion of disability pride means to understand that 
there are innumerable ways to view disability, many of which “can offer 
profound and often practically useful insights” (Scully, 2016, np). For instance, 
Goodley (2017) argues that the notion of disability “urges a reconsideration of 
what it means to be human, the category through which to investigate the ways 
in which biopolitics are created and an entry point for contemplations about 
human nature in globalised times” (p. 208, emphasis in original). Thinking with 




colours our lives (Campbell, 2017b). This view furthermore means to recognise, 
as McRuer and Wilkerson (2003) argue, that “another world can exist in which an 
incredible variety of bodies and minds are valued and identities are shaped” (p. 
14). 
The Limitations of Pride 
Disability pride is not a new concept to the field of disability studies. Gill 
(1997) for instance notes that “through the disability rights and independent 
living movements, people with disabilities have… begun to proclaim their distinct 
value because of disabilities, claiming the potential of disability to bring unique 
perspectives and enriching experiences into their lives” (p. 44). More recently, S. 
Brown (2009) argues that disabled people need to embrace and celebrate their 
disabilities. He notes that there are many aspects of his disability which have 
been “enormously positive” in his life, and argues that, for many people, 
disability has led to more positive outcomes in their lives than negative ones. 
Discussion of disability pride can also be found in the work of Shakespeare 
(1996), Corbett (1994), Dunn and Burcaw (2013), and Clare (2015).  
However, it is in the Deaf community that disability pride is most 
apparent. Scholars such as Garland-Thomson (2005), Samaha (2007), Barnartt 
(1996) and Dolnick (1993) emphasise the large number of Deaf people who do 
not consider deafness to be a deficit. Many from the Deaf community do not 
support the use of cochlear implants, for instance, because they are perceived as 
“an unhealthy urge to “fix” people who are not broken” (Samaha, 2007, p. 22). 
Instead, focus is placed upon Deaf community and culture which, through the 
use of sign language, is able to produce its own cultural works such as Deaf 
poetry (Garland-Thomson, 2005). 
There is further evidence in the disability studies literature of a call to 
embrace disability which uses different terms than “pride”. For instance, the 
notion of “desiring disability” was explored in a special issue of GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies (McRuer & Wilkerson, 2003), and examined further by 
Fritsch (2015). Bunch (2017) discusses the work of Julia Kristeva, who “proposes 




disability” (p. 136, emphasis in original). Michalko (2017), furthermore, tells the 
story of a performer who made many “wondrous discoveries” about the 
experience of blindness after losing his sight. 
Despite these promising pieces of work, however, the idea of a positive 
ontology of disability remains on the margins of disability studies. As Bogart, 
Lund and Rottenstein (2017) note, disability pride “is still a rare phenomenon” 
(p. 4). In the instances where pride is discussed in the scholarly literature it is 
primarily conceptual (Bogart et al., 2017), providing frustratingly little detail 
regarding how disability can be seen in more positive terms, or how pride can be 
developed. 
Furthermore, Parsons (1999) and Hahn and Belt (2004) point out that 
pride is also a phenomenon yet to be seen in the wider disability rights 
movement, known only to a select group of scholars and activists. Instead of 
embracing and celebrating the difference of disability, the disability rights 
movement has largely focused on the sameness of disabled people. This is 
evident in the oft-cited mantra to “focus on abilities”, and the drive to focus on 
the common humanity of disabled people. As Parsons (1999) states:  
The women’s movement does not primarily emphasise the 
“maleness” of women. The aboriginal movement does not 
primarily emphasise the “whiteness” of aborigines. The gay and 
lesbian movement does not primarily emphasise the 
“heterosexualness” of gay men and lesbians. But the disability 
movement does, very much emphasise the “ableness” of people 
with disabilities. p. 13  
Parsons (1999) and Slater (2015) highlight how the strategy of focusing on 
sameness will ultimately never lead to the change that is necessary in society. A 
focus on sameness encourages assimilation into exclusionary structures which, 
as Slater (2015) states, reinforce “the normate’s privilege, making ‘reasonable 
the marginalization and oppression of those who do not/cannot/will not 





Interestingly, in the field of psychology, there is a significant body of 
literature about pride. These authors suggest that pride can be a useful emotion, 
for instance by leading to lower levels of depression and higher levels of 
relationship satisfaction (Bogart et al., 2017; Tracy, Shariff, & Chent, 2010; 
Weiner, 2000). Yet, in this literature, pride is often positioned as the binary 
opposite to shame, and is viewed in an individualistic rather than collectivist 
sense. For instance, many articles discussed pride being connected to individuals’ 
self-esteem (e.g., Tracy et al., 2010; Weiner, 2000). Furthermore, pride is often 
discussed as a universal human emotion which can be measured quantitatively 
(e.g., Bogart et al., 2017; Weiner, 2000), and categorised into discrete types such 
as “authentic pride” and “hubristic pride” (Tracy et al., 2010). The incompatible 
conceptual framing of this field of literature means that it was not able to be 
drawn upon for this thesis.  
The Agentic Potential of Pride  
Butler (1997a) argues that social performatives form an essential 
component of the formation of ourselves as viable subjects. As she asserts: 
[T]he social performative is a crucial part not only of subject 
formation, but of the ongoing political contestation and 
reformulation of the subject as well. The performative is not only a 
ritual practice: it is one of the influential rituals by which subjects 
are formed and reformulated. (pp. 159-160) 
Many intra-active forces are involved in this constitution, some of which 
will be explored further in the analysis. One key phenomenon shaping this 
constitution is that of the ableist binary. As discussed in Chapter Two, this binary 
serves as a well-established truth-claim in Western society. When someone is 
constituted as a disabled subject, it is often not possible to stand outside of the 
powerfully constitutive force of the ableist binary; that is, in rejecting the 
disabled subject positioning, we risk stepping outside of the terms through which 
we are constituted and being rendered unintelligible. In this thesis I argue that, 




level of agency can be harnessed through embracing this constitution. Jackson 
and Mazzei (2011) speak of the agentic potential of stepping within the terms of 
constitution in relation to the black academic woman, Sera. As they note: 
Sera cannot stand outside the discourse that constitutes her, but 
agency emerges from within discourse. To rework categories is to 
challenge the historicity of them, to expose the falsehood of their 
origins. (p. 82) 
As Jackson and Mazzei (2011) highlight, a greater agentic potential lies in 
working within the discourses (and other intra-active phenomena) which 
constitute us. I argue that taking the disability identity on with pride holds 
agentic potential. This is particularly in relation to challenging the terms of 
constitution which render the disabled subject position inferior.  
Importantly, challenging the terms of constitution of the disability 
category means to work with the notion of disability identity. Using the notion of 
identity can present some problems for new materialist and poststructuralist 
research, where identity is often viewed as a construct tethered to the stable, 
rational, humanist subject. However, Butler (1990) asserts that identity can be 
understood as a doing, rather than a fixed essence. As she states, gender is "a 
kind of becoming or activity… an incessant and repeated action of some sort” 
(Butler, 1990, p. 112). These identities are neither stable, fixed nor singular. 
Instead, they are viewed as fluid, ever-emergent and multiple (Kittelsaa, 2014); 
as a phenomenon whereby a sense of self – an “I”- emerges through the ongoing 
intra-activity of life. Furthermore, identity does not need to be tethered to the 
individual. As Clare (2001) notes:  
Identity…can live in many places all at once – in the communities 
we make home, the food we eat, the music we play and dance to, 
the work we do, the people we feel wild and passionate about, the 
languages we speak, the clothes we wear. (p. 362) 
Taking on the disability identity does not mean one needs to accept the identity 
as “naturally” inferior. Instead, embracing disability can be seen as a refusal to 




challenge to the ableist binary itself; a challenge which, I believe, holds greater 
agentic potential for change than a rejection of the disability identity. Embracing 
the disability identity is a reconfiguration of the material-discursive apparatus of 
bodily production over which we can have agency. 
In particular, there are two facets of the agentic potential of pride which 
are important in the formulation of my conceptual framework. Firstly, as Parsons 
(1999) and Davies (2014a) highlight, there is a critical link between identity and 
action. As Davies (2014a) states, “[t]hought and action are mutually entangled, 
just as individual beings, who know and who act, are mutually entangled” (p. 11). 
The way in which groups of people think and feel about themselves has a 
profound effect on what actions the group chooses to engage in, if any (Parsons, 
1999). Without pride, Clare (2015) argues, “disabled people are much more likely 
to accept unquestioningly the daily material conditions of ableism: 
unemployment, poverty, segregated and substandard education, years spent 
locked up in nursing homes, violence perpetrated by caregivers, lack of access” 
(p. 107). Clare (2015) goes as far as to suggest that collective and individual 
resistance to oppression becomes nearly impossible without pride.  
Secondly, pride holds agentic potential when it is viewed as a collective 
phenomenon. This view of pride as collective is particularly evident in the work 
of Parsons (1999), van Houten and Jacobs (2005), and Shakespeare (1996), who 
assert the paramount importance of a collective context in which to form a 
collective identity and discourse. As Morris (1991) notes:  
One of the most important features of our prejudice is that we 
generally experience it as isolated individuals. Many of us spend 
most of our lives in the company of non-disabled people, whether 
in our families, with friends, in the workplace, at school and so on. 
Most of the people we have dealings with, including our most 
intimate relationships, are not like us. It is therefore very difficult 
for us to recognise and challenge the values and judgements that 
are applied to us and our lives. Our ideas about disability and 
about ourselves are generally formed by those who are not 




Barnartt (1996) and Oliver (1996) argue that the view of the “problem” of 
disability is able to be reconceptualised within a collective context. This is 
particularly so when people assigned the label of disabled come to view 
themselves as an oppressed group, rather than as “isolated individuals with 
individual problems” (Barnartt, 1996, p. 6). Being connected to a disability 
community is considered central to the formation of a disability identity 
(Caldwell, 2011). As Parsons (1999) notes, “pride can begin to be transformed 
into power when the people who share that pride begin to organise together” (p. 
5). 
Taking an agential realist view, collectives can be seen as a tool to 
harness greater agency in the ongoing intra-activity of life. This is one of the key 
lessons learnt from other human rights movements, such as the civil rights 
movement and the queer / gay and lesbian rights movement: collectives are 
much more powerful than individuals alone. Put another way, collectives have 
much greater capacity to harness the agency necessary to produce the change 
that is sought. For instance, the search for employment for learning disabled 
people on an individualised case-by-case basis has proven to be highly 
ineffective, as evidenced by the statistics related to employment presented in 
Chapter One. However, when problems are perceived as and dealt with on a 
collective level – such as discrimination against women in the workforce, much 
greater traction is found.  
In order for a collective to form, people have to be able to see themselves 
as collective. This means that people must accept the label of disabled as an 
identity which relates to them. As Feely (2016) notes, “[o]nce a subject has 
accepted their ‘impaired’ identity, participating in identity politics becomes 
possible. Thus a group of people who have been labelled as ‘impaired’ can come 
together as a political group” (p. 865). However, collective action is impossible 
when people reject the label necessary for the formation of a collective identity.  
Conclusion  
The conceptual framework for this thesis is grounded in agential realism. 




quantum physics, and poststructuralism. Under an agential realist framework, all 
entities are viewed as entangled, inseparable phenomena. In sharp contrast to 
classical physics, agential realism does not view “humans” as independent, 
bounded individuals. Instead, humans are viewed as an effect of boundary-
making practices: as beings which are profoundly shaped by the ongoing intra-
activity of life. Furthermore, the notion of agency is not tethered to the human. 
Discourses, the material world, historical practices and memories are all viewed 
as agentic - as phenomena which shape the possibilities for the world’s 
becoming. This includes the possibilities for how disability is conceptualised, and 
the lives of learning disabled people.   
Thinking with the lens of agential realism, I propose a different way of 
conceptualising disability: disability as an ongoing series of entanglements. These 
entanglements are formed from multiple performative agencies, which include 
the modernist conception of the ideal human, in/accessible buildings and 
diagnostic practices. In their current state, the entanglements of disability 
materialise in such a way that disability is held in a state of “otherness”, and in a 
state of inferiority. Crucially, disability is viewed as a difference which has come 
to matter through these entanglements.  
Drawing on the concepts of citational chains and lines of flight provides 
greater insight into the maintenance of, and potential for rupture within, the 
ongoing entanglements of disability. Citational chains can be understood as 
iterative entanglements; that is, repetitions of particular phenomena, which 
coalesce together to form patterns. Citational chains can be understood as the 
lines of descent within Henri Bergson’s (1911) lines of flight. These are the lines 
which give life its sense of continuity and familiarity. However, these can be the 
lines which enable disability oppression to flourish. Lines of ascent, on the other 
hand, present disruptive potential to the problematic iterative entanglements of 
disability. I draw on both of these insights to explore key citational chains within 
the entanglements of disability. I utilise the notion of lines of flight to explore 
whether disability pride presents the potential to disrupt the problematic 




Driven by this conceptual framing, I shaped the analysis around a 
problem statement, rather than a research aim: the entanglements of disability 
materialise in such a way that they reiterate disability oppression. The research 
questions stemming from this problem statement include an investigation of 
what constitutes the entanglements of disability, and an investigation of what 
the entanglements foreclose and present potential for.  
In order to explore these questions in more detail, I draw upon three 
conceptual frameworks: Butler’s work on performativity, Wetherell’s work on 
affect, and Jackson and Mazzei’s (2011) work on desiring silence. Butler’s theory 
of performativity explores how people come to be recognised as particular types 
of subjects, such as men and women. This recognition is linked to our sense of 
personhood and is crucial for social existence.  We come to desire the social 
categories through which we become recognisable, even when the terms of 
recognition offer a life that is less viable (Davies et al., 2013). In this thesis, I draw 
upon Butler’s theory of performativity and add an agential realist extension.  
Butler’s insights into how we come to be recognised as particular types of 
subjects are explored as an agentic phenomenon within the entanglements of 
disability.  
Wetherell’s work on affective practice is further drawn upon in order to 
explore the ongoing entanglements of disability. Like citational chains, affective 
practices are viewed as routinized assemblages which are not often consciously 
chosen. Whilst Barad and Wetherell hold different ontological conceptualisations 
of the human, I believe their work has a high level of alignment and can be 
utilised together. Both theorists stress the limits of reason, are interested in 
meaning-making practices, and view these practices as inhering within 
entanglements. Furthermore, I believe that Wetherell’s work on affect helps to 
illuminate the affective component of the intra-active production of subjects.   
Desiring silence, as developed by Jackson and Mazzei (2011), is viewed as 
a productive phenomenon within the ongoing entanglements of disability. This 
view of desire is not seen to emanate from the rational individual, nor indicate 
an individual’s true self, wants and needs. Instead, desire is seen as a force which 




privilege, power and voice. Thinking with the notion of desiring silence means to 
seek an understanding of how desire functions to produce silence, and what this 
silence in turn produces.  
Lastly, disability pride can be used as a tool to seek a disruption in the 
problematic entanglements of disability. Disability pride is about the acceptance 
and celebration of disability – of the difference inherent in disability. Asserting 
pride in disability because of disability and not in spite of disability, stands in 
contrast to many of the strategies currently employed by the disability rights 
movement. Thinking with the notion of pride means to question the ways in 
which our lives have been limited by the imposition of certain expectations onto 
bodies and minds, and to explore how disability productively colours our lives. By 
stepping within the terms which constitute us and embracing the disability 
identity, it is my belief that we can grasp the agency necessary to shift the 





Chapter 5:  
Methodology and Methods of Data 
Collection 
The methodology used for this thesis is formed from an entanglement of 
four methodological perspectives. The perspectives were chosen for their 
emphasis on collaboration with the research community, power-sharing, and on 
enacting change, rather than simply investigating an existing situation.  
These perspectives include inclusive research, a methodology which 
emphasises the role of learning disabled people as active co-researchers or 
participants within the research (Strnadová & Walmsley, 2018; Walmsley, 2004; 
Walmsley, Strnadová, & Johnson, 2017), and participatory action research, a 
methodology with a commitment to the participation of marginalised 
communities, and a focus on action oriented to enacting change (Baum, 
MacDougall, & Smith, 2006; Cocks & Cockram, 1995). The perspectives in this 
methodological entanglement also include: community based participatory 
research, a blanket term for a wide range of research approaches which are 
inherently inclusive of the research communities (Israel, Eng, Schulz, & Parker, 
2012); decolonizing methodologies, an approach with a commitment to ensuring 
that research does not contribute to the othering of marginalised communities, 
and which subverts the more traditional top-down approach inherent in much 
research (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2012); as well as culturally responsive 
methodologies, an approach which focuses on collaborative research involving 
researchers and the research community, with an emphasis on power-sharing 
between these two groups (Berryman, SooHoo, & Nevin, 2013b, 2013a).  
Other important elements are entangled in the methodological approach, 
most notably the role of ethics and the drive to avoid the harms visited on 




Rather than sticking to a “pure” form of any of the methodological 
perspectives, this project was crafted from the elements which best fitted the 
aims of the research, as there is no “correct” way to approach any of these 
methodologies in practice (Berryman et al., 2013b; Israel et al., 2012; Strnadová 
& Walmsley, 2018). As Walmsley (2004) states:  
[T]here is no one right way to approach inclusive research. 
Adjustments are needed according to the topic, the methodology 
and the skills of those involved. (p. 69) 
In this chapter, I outline the elements from the entangled methodological 
perspectives which shaped the methodology and method. Thereafter, I outline 
the methods of data collection. 
Ethics as Agentic: Addressing Issues of 
Marginalisation  
 
Ethics played an agentic role in shaping the methodology and methods of 
data collection for this research. Barad (2007) notes that in agential realism, 
ethics, ontology and epistemology are viewed as inseparable; what it is possible 
to know, and how we know what we know, are intertwined with ethics. Intra-
acting responsibly means to take account of “the entangled phenomena that are 
intrinsic to the world’s vitality” and to be “responsive to the possibilities that 
might help us and it flourish” (Barad, 2007, p. 396). In this vein, research can be 
viewed as an entanglement of phenomena in the ongoing intra-activity of life; a 
practice which reconfigures the world. Conducting ethical research means being 
responsive to the possibilities that can enable the world and the people that are 
part of it to flourish, but it also means being responsive to the possibilities that 
can inhibit this flourishing. This is the position that I take in this research.  
Learning disabled people are often viewed as a vulnerable population 
(Nind, 2008); as such, it is important to be responsive to the possibilities which 




Research involving this population group has in the past caused great harm. As 
Mertens, Sullivan and Stace (2011) note, disabled people have been “surgically 
mutilated, lobotomized, euthanased, shocked into passivity, and placed in 
chemical and physical straightjackets” (p. 227) in the name of scientific research. 
Disabled people join the ranks of many other marginalised groups who have 
been subject to research which colonises (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2012). As 
Bishop (2013) points out, this type of research not only positions marginalised 
groups as “other”, it also perpetuates an ideology of cultural superiority which 
prioritises the wants and needs of Western man. This further delegitimises 
perspectives which do not fit with this world view.  
One of the key means by which colonising research was oppressive was in 
the positioning of research “subjects” as passive (Kiernan, 1999). Research was 
conducted on people, rather than with them, and research subjects were viewed 
as data sources to be investigated (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2012; Kiernan, 
1999). Learning disabled people in particular were viewed as objects and as 
“conditions, categories, and examples to be cured, ameliorated, or cared for in 
institutions” (Mertens et al., 2011, p. 227). Through this process, researchers’ 
positions as elites and decisive knowers were enhanced (Traina, 2016). 
Researchers had control over the entire research process, while disabled people 
were denied any form of agency, including choosing what was researched and 
how it was researched (Sullivan, 2006; Traina, 2016). 
The silencing of disabled people was one of the key effects of the 
othering process. As Walmsley (2001) notes, “[t]here is no evidence that, before 
the work of Robert Edgerton in the 1960s, anyone had tried to access or 
represent the voices of people with learning difficulties in research terms” (p. 
188). Because of this silencing, Goodley and Runswick-Cole (2012) note that 
disabled people have frequently had their life worlds misrepresented and 
exploited through research. Furthermore, the voices of parents and professionals 
were viewed as more valid and reliable than the disabled person’s voice, and 
were thus foregrounded over the voices of disabled people themselves (Goodley 
& Runswick-Cole, 2012, citing Watson et al. 1998).  This situation furthered the 




Butler, 2009)18. Today, there is a wide array of methodological approaches to 
draw upon, both from within disability studies and further afield, which actively 
seek to challenge this history of harm and to build upon what has been done 
well.   
Despite the many decades of research involving marginalised populations 
as equal partners, research involving learning disabled people in a partnership 
approach is a relatively recent phenomenon. Nind (2008) and Walmsley (2001) 
note that it was not until the late twentieth century that this type of research 
featured in the field of disability studies. It has been largely driven by the 
disability rights movement, and self-advocacy organisations in particular, who, as 
Tuffrey-Wijne and G. Butler (2009) state, “began to demand inclusion not only as 
research participants but also as researchers who contribute to both the design 
and the execution of research” (p. 175). What is now known as the field of 
“inclusive research”, sought to embody the ‘call to arms’ of the disability rights 
movement – “nothing about us without us” (Aspis, 2000; Charlton, 1998). This 
partnership approach has enabled researchers to gain a greater understanding of 
the life-worlds of learning disabled people, and to conduct research which 
empowers, rather than alienates, this population group.  
Core Elements of the Methodological 
Entanglement 
Two important considerations drove the methodological choice for this 
thesis. Firstly, I wanted a method that would enable learning disabled people to 
fully participate without them needing to enhance their cognitive abilities. This 
meant that I wanted a method that did not rely on cognitive abilities alone, but 
also enabled sensory, emotional and experiential abilities to come to the fore. 
This stands in contrast to researchers such as Gilbert (2004), who suggests that 
                                                     
18 Please note that there are two authors named “Butler” in this thesis. For ease of reading, I 
have chosen to keep this reference as “G. Butler”, as it is only referenced in Chapter Five. In 
contrast, “Judith Butler” is referenced many times throughout multiple chapters, and is simply 




“a considerable investment is needed if people are to develop the skills needed 
to participate in the research process” (p. 307).   
The second important consideration was that I wanted data generation to 
be conducted with a group. Parsons (1999) discusses the importance of collective 
strength in rights movements. He argues that an identity of pride can only 
develop when people from marginalised communities come together; pride is 
not an individual affair, it is collective. One of the key pieces of research which 
helped shape my methodology was conducted by Cook and Inglis (2009, 2012; 
Inglis & Cook, 2011). They worked with a group of men with learning disabilities 
to gain a greater understanding of the best ways to inform learning disabled 
people about research and informed consent. Working together with other 
learning disabled people was highlighted as being one of the most important 
factors supporting participant understanding. It was thus my hope that 
participants’ understanding of ableism and disability pride would be enhanced 
through working as a group.  
These two key considerations, along with the desire to conduct ethical 
research, are what shaped the methodology for this project. In the following 
sections, I discuss the core elements of the methodological approaches used in 
this project.  
Partnerships between Researchers and the Research 
Community   
One of the core elements inherent in all of the methodological 
perspectives is a focus on collaboration and co-creation. Research is viewed as a 
partnership between researchers and their research community, where 
participants are viewed as active doers in the project, rather than as passive 
subjects to be investigated (Baum et al., 2006; Israel et al., 2012; Walmsley, 
2001). The inherent power imbalance which often exists between researchers 
and the research communities is openly acknowledged (Israel et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, there is a commitment to power sharing amongst researchers and 




on the specific details of the project (see for instance Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 
2012; Israel et al., 2012).  
One of the most important aspects of the power-sharing process is the 
relationship between researchers and participants (Baum et al., 2006; Israel et 
al., 2012; in New Zealand see Munford et al., 2008). In the more traditional 
research approach, researchers stand at a distance from participants in order to 
produce “objective” knowledge which has not been tainted by the researcher 
(Schneider et al., 2004). In contrast, the methodological approaches utilised in 
this thesis assert that researchers should develop strong, equitable and trusting 
relationships with participants (Israel et al., 2012; Nind, 2008). This relationship is 
considered essential if researchers are to fully engage with participants in the 
processes of co-creation (Munford et al., 2008), and is the approach I took in my 
methodology.  
Research that is Change-Focused 
This research began with a desire to instigate change which would help 
learning disabled people, rather than investigating the existing situation of 
people’s lives.  After such a profound shift in my own thinking when I 
encountered the notions of ableism and disability pride, I wanted to work with 
these concepts with learning disabled people, and see if these concepts 
presented potential for reimagining disability in a new and more positive way. 
The methodologies which are drawn upon focus on challenging social inequality 
through working in action with groups, movements and/or individuals (Cocks & 
Cockram, 1995; Gilbert, 2004). Walmsley et al. (2017) for instance state that 
inclusive research is:   
Research that aims to contribute to social change, that helps to 
create a society, in which excluded groups belong, and which aims 
to improve the quality of their lives. (p. 8) 
One of the key means by which change is achieved is through the focus 
on action. Within participatory action research in particular, the view is taken 




action, and the empowerment of oppressed people” (Cocks & Cockram, 1995, p. 
31). Action is achieved through a cyclical process whereby researchers and 
participants generate data, reflect upon it and determine what action should 
follow. This then leads to further data generation, reflection and action in what 
has been described as an iterative or corkscrew style approach (Baum et al., 
2006; Cocks & Cockram, 1995).  
This notion of reflection on reality aligns well with the Foucauldian ideas 
underpinning the conceptual framing for this research. Baum et al. (2006) 
illustrate one particular technique that can be used to help with participatory 
reflection. They note that the transformative power of participatory action 
research comes to the fore when researchers see the “inherited tradition and 
prevailing culture” (Baum et al., 2006, p. 856) within the “authentic” accounts of 
lived experience.  Through highlighting the inherited tradition and prevailing 
culture with participants, Baum et al. (2006) note researchers and participants 
can be empowered to view their reality as something which is susceptible to 
transformation. By drawing attention to the inherited traditions and prevailing 
culture, such as the taken-for-granted notions of “disability”, “ability” and 
“normal”, participants in my research thus have an opportunity to view their 
reality as something which is open to transformation.  
Researcher Embeddedness  
In the methodological perspectives that inform this research, researchers 
are seen as an integral, influential and embedded part of the entire research 
process (Baum et al., 2006; Berryman et al., 2013a). At the time I was developing 
the methodology and generating data with participants, I focused on the notion 
of reflexivity (see particularly Cunliffe, 2004; Cunliffe & Karunanayake, 2013; 
Fine, 1994). However, after the data generation phase of the research I 
encountered the work of Barad, who is critical of the notions of reflexivity and 
reflectivity. Drawing on Donna Haraway (1997), Barad (2007) notes that 
“reflexivity mirrors the geometrical optics of reflection” (p. 72). She argues that 
the idea that the mirror can be turned back on oneself, as in “reflexive” 




positions researchers and participants at a distance from each other; as 
ontologically separate beings (Barad, 2007). Instead, Barad (2007) argues that 
researchers and participants are not fully formed, pre-existing subjects, but are 
rather beings who are intra-actively co-constituted through the processes of the 
research. This is the view that I have utilised throughout this thesis. Cunliffe’s 
more recent work also places much greater emphasis on intersubjectivity (2011). 
She argues that what is considered “thinkable” is profoundly shaped by the 
interrelationships between people and their surroundings, and argues that we 
“are inherently embedded & embodied in historical, cultural & linguistic 
communities” (Cunliffe, 2011, p. 654).  
 
Ongoing Informed Consent 
Another crucial element of the methodological approach was ongoing, 
informed consent. Informed consent is considered to be a basic tenet of ethical 
research (Cook & Inglis, 2009; Gilbert, 2004). In Aotearoa New Zealand, the 
notion of informed consent is enshrined in the Health and Disability Code (Health 
& Disability Commissioner, 2012), which extends rights to all New Zealanders 
who are receiving a health and disability service, or who are participating in 
research. Right 6 in the code is the “Right to be Fully Informed”, and Right 7.1 
states:  
Services [including research] may be provided to a consumer only 
if that consumer makes an informed choice and gives informed 
consent. (np) 
Ongoing informed consent is the practice of ensuring that consent is continually 
established throughout the research, rather than a once-off event which 
happens when participants sign a consent form (Knox, Mok, & Parmenter, 2000).  
Several factors are involved in ensuring informed consent is obtained. 
Firstly, participants need to understand what research is, and what the 
particularities of the project are (Cook & Inglis, 2009; Strnadová, Cumming, Knox, 




understand the implications of joining or not joining, and understand how any 
information they provide might be used (Cook & Inglis, 2012). A number of 
social, environmental and informational factors can enhance participants’ 
understanding of research. These include: providing information in an easy-to-
understand format, providing information through multiple means, repeating the 
information over several occasions, using concrete visual-aids, real-life examples 
from participants and role-play scenarios, and giving participants time to process 
information (Inglis & Cook, 2011; National Institutes of Health, 2009; Nind, 
2008). 
One of the most important elements in ensuring consent is the capacity 
participants have to decline (Dye, Hendy, Hare, & Burton, 2004; Inglis & Cook, 
2011). The National Institutes of Health (2009) argues that understanding that 
participation in research is voluntary is more important than other aspects of 
consent. Furthermore, consent pertains to more than choosing whether to join 
the research or not (Dye et al., 2004). For consent to be ongoing and informed, 
participants must have the opportunity to decline to join in any aspect of the 
research at any time.  
A culture of “constructive dissent” was also sought, in order to ensure 
participants were not acquiescing to someone they believed to be in a position of 
authority, a well-reported tendency in the learning disability population (Gilbert, 
2004; Kiernan, 1999; Knox et al., 2000). This culture helped to ensure that 
participants understood that it was OK to say no, and to disagree with me and 
with each other. In the study conducted by Inglis and Cook (2009), participants 
tended to view disagreement as a form of criticism. This served to inhibit the 
exploration of divergent ideas amongst participants, a situation which I wished to 
avoid.  
Methodological Limitations  
Due to the pre-determined aim of the research, it was not able to be 
conducted utilising a full co-creation approach. Participants had no opportunity 
to set the research questions or design, nor did they have any opportunity to 




However, a co-creation approach was utilised during the data generation phase 
as much as possible.  
This methodological approach requires a significant investment of time if 
it is to be meaningfully conducted (Walmsley et al., 2017); the data generation 
phase for this project lasted eight months. The approach furthermore requires a 
significant personal commitment from the researcher (Cocks and Cockram, 
1995); I found the data generation process physically and emotionally 
exhausting, particularly because of the powerful sense of ethical responsibility I 
felt towards to the participants.  
There were no formal mechanisms holding the research project or 
researcher accountable to the research community, as advised in the literature 
(Baum et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2004). Although the research was approved 
by an ethics panel at the university, there was no panel or group from the 
disability community whom I could run the research past. The absence of formal 
accountability measures is something I remain uncomfortable with; I believe 
such a panel would be a great asset in Aotearoa New Zealand.   
The last notable limitation is a reliance on the participants’ ability to talk. 
This is a frequently occurring problem in the field; Walmsley et al. (2017) and 
Kiernan (1999) note that people with profound disabilities and high support 
needs have largely been excluded from research. With the heavy reliance on the 
intellectual skills of participants noted as a key reason for this exclusion (Kiernan, 
1999). In this project, the desire to discuss ableism and disability pride meant 
that I also largely relied on the intellectual and verbal abilities of participants.  
In the following section I outline the methods of data collection used for 
this research.  
Methods of Data Generation 
This section begins with a discussion regarding the method: the 
participants, the co-facilitator, the support that I provided, and the role of 
advocates. Thereafter, specific details regarding the content of the data 




The data for this research were generated through a series of nine “hui” 
with seven participants and one co-facilitator. The term hui is a Māori word, 
generally referring to a meeting, seminar, conference or large gathering which is 
“held within Māori cultural protocols or ways of engagement” (Berryman & 
Bateman, 2008, p. 2). Hui differ from English concepts such as a “meeting”, in 
that there is a much greater focus on developing, maintaining and/or restoring 
relationships (Berryman & Bateman, 2008). Hui are generally designed with a 
focus on conversation and co-creation, with a commitment for all voices to be 
heard. Whilst we did not follow specific Māori protocols during the hui, many 
Māori cultural aspects were embedded within the group culture. For instance, 
emphasis was placed on relationships and co-creation, we had rituals for opening 
and closing each hui, and we shared kai (food) at every hui. The term hui thus 
seemed the most fitting for the approach taken in this research.  
A pilot hui was conducted in September 2015 with four participants and 
the co-facilitator, in order to test the suitability of the methodological approach 
and materials to be used. The approach and materials proved to be highly 
suitable, and only minor amendments were needed to the hui content; however, 
two hours proved an insufficient amount of time for the pilot hui, and 
subsequent hui were increased to three hours.   
The full hui were conducted between the end of October 2015 and the 
middle of April 2016, and were generally held two weeks apart. However, there 
was a six week break over the Christmas period as many participants went away 
on holiday.  
In the next section of the chapter I provide detailed information regarding 
the participants.  
Participants  
The pre-established relationships I hold with the local learning disability 
community and support services made it possible for me to find participants 
easily. For the pilot hui, I approached a local advisory group with whom I had 
previously worked, and attended one of the regular monthly meetings. This 




indicated interest in the project and were provided with an information sheet at 
the meeting (see Appendix 1). I subsequently contacted and met with the 
interested members to discuss the details of the pilot hui. Participants were 
provided with a more detailed information sheet at this stage (see Appendix 2). 
Four of the six agreed to be pilot participants. These participants signed a 
consent form prior to attending the hui (see Appendix 3).  
At the end of the pilot hui, several participants asked when the next hui 
would be. Although I had informed participants that this would be a one-off hui, 
all indicated that they would like to be involved for the full hui. Ethics approval 
was sought and was granted from the university ethics committee for this to 
happen. I had planned to have 7-8 participants, and this meant I had already 
found half of my proposed cohort. After this I used a purposive sampling 
technique. This is defined by Tongco (2007) as “the deliberate choice of an 
informant due to the qualities the informant possesses” (p. 147). This technique 
is described as a practical and efficient tool which helps to ensure that 
participants have the knowledge or experience required to participate in the 
project (Tongco, 2007). I contacted three people I knew who had interest in 
joining the research. These are people I knew through local advocacy 
organisations, or people I had previously supported. All three indicated they 
wanted to join the project, and were provided with an information sheet (see 
Appendix 4). Subsequently, all three agreed to join the research and signed a 
consent form (See Appendix 5) The last potential participant lived in another city, 
and her mother had heard about my research when it was discussed in a 
disability newsletter. She contacted me indicating her daughter was interested, 
and that they would be willing to fly her to Hamilton for the research. I visited 
them to discuss the research; however, it turned out that the first hui clashed 
with an important event for the daughter. I felt strongly that it was important all 
participants attended the first hui, as this was the hui which outlined informed 
consent. I was not comfortable having someone at the remaining hui when I 
could not be assured that adequate informed consent had been obtained. In 




Over the following pages I present detailed information regarding all hui 
attendees in alphabetical order, including myself and the co-facilitator. This 
information pertains to our circumstances at the time of the hui, and is provided 
to help paint a picture of the participants. Information includes employment 
status and level of contact with disability support services. In the drive not to 
position participants as “other” to myself, I have chosen to include myself in this 
table. All participant names are pseudonyms.  
 
Hui Attendees  
Name Age Living and Support Situation Attendance at Hui  
Carl Mid 20s Lived in a residential group 
home, attended day services 
and had a part-time 
voluntary job   
Missed hui 9 due to 
illness 
Gary Early 50s Lived in a residential group 
home and attended day 
services 
Attended all hui 
Glen  
(co-facilitator)  
Mid 20s  Lived in a flat with friends, 
where staff visited on a daily 
basis. Attended day services 
and had a paid part-time job 
Attended all hui 
Ingrid (principal 
researcher) 
Early 30s Lived in a flat with friends 
and partner. Studied full-time 
at university and had two 
part-time paid jobs.  
Attended all hui 
Jonathan Mid 20s Lived in a flat with friends, 
where staff visited on a daily 
basis. Attended day services 
and had a paid part-time job 
Attended all hui  
Karissa Early 30s Lived at home with family. 
Attended a day service and 
had a part-time voluntary job 




Luke Early 30s  Lived in a residential group 
home, attended day services 
and obtained a part-time 
paid job during the hui   
Missed hui 6, 7 and 8 
due to choosing to 
work for two hui, and 
having an important 
medical appointment 
which was difficult to 
reschedule.  
Natalie Early 20s Lived in a flat with a friend, 
where staff visited several 
days per week. Had casual 
voluntary work.  
Missed hui 9 due to 
illness 
Taylor Early 20s Lived with her family. Had a 
paid job with almost full-time 
hours. She took time off work 
to attend the hui.  
Attended all hui 
 
All participants received support from learning disability support services, 
indicating that all have had a formal diagnosis of learning disability. All were able 
to communicate using a reasonably high degree of language, and live in Hamilton 
or within a 30 minute drive of Hamilton.  
G. Butler, Cresswell, Giatras, and Tuffrey-Wijne (2012) note that paying 
research participants for their time and effort is good practice. I received a 
$4,500 grant from Trust Waikato (www.trustwaikato.co.nz), which paid for all 
research expenses and made providing a koha (in Māori, a donation, gift or 
offering) to participants practicable. All participants were given a koha for each 
hui attended, which was a $20 voucher for a local store which participants chose 
at hui one. Providing koha symbolised to participants that their experience as 
disabled people and role in the project was greatly valued. Participants who took 
public transport to get to and from the hui were also reimbursed for the cost of 





I spent some time considering whether to call the participants 
“participants”, or “co-researchers”, both during the hui and in the written thesis. 
The term “co-researchers” is used frequently within participatory action research 
and inclusive research (Kiernan, 1999; Strnadová & Walmsley, 2018; Tuffrey-
Wijne & G. Butler, 2009). Walmsley et al. (2017) note that learning disabled 
people and academic researchers each have a distinctive role in research, and 
using the term “co-researchers” suggests an equal and collaborative contribution 
from both parties. However, after careful consideration I concluded that 
“participants” was a more fitting term for this research. Participants were not 
involved in deciding the topic of the research, the methodological approach, or 
the method of analysis, and using the term “co-researchers” felt somewhat 
contrived. I did not want to utilise the term simply to enhance the image of 
participants, or to suggest they have a “socially valued role” in line with SRV, 
something which Walmsley (2004) suggests is what happens  in much learning 
disability research.  
The Role of the Co-Facilitator 
Researchers such as Tuffrey-Wijne and G. Butler (2009), and G. Butler, 
Cresswell, Giatras, and Tuffrey-Wijne  (2012) highlight the value of having a 
learning disabled co-facilitator. Benefits include helping to mitigate the power 
imbalance between researchers and participants, and enabling more robust 
processes of collaboration and co-creation. Involving a co-facilitator in my 
research thus helped to embed the co-creation approach I sought. It ensured 
someone from the research community was involved in making decisions around 
the format and content of the hui, as well as running the hui.  
I was fortunate to know a man, Glen Terry, who had proven himself to be 
a skilled facilitator, and is also comfortable in identifying as having a learning 
disability. I had been supporting Glen to participate in paid and voluntary work 
for a few years prior to the hui, and we had established a good working 
relationship. Glen was provided with an information sheet (see Appendix 6), and 




Glen initially chose to use a pseudonym for the thesis, in order to 
maintain confidentiality. However, I felt uncomfortable that Glen was not able to 
receive any of the credit for the work he did; work which made a significant 
impact on the thesis. Close to the submission date we had a conversation about 
this, and Glen informed me that he could not remember why he had chosen to 
use a pseudonym, and that he was interested in discussing the matter further. 
We read through everything that was written about him in the thesis, and Glen 
informed me that he was happy for his name to be used. However, I wanted to 
ensure that Glen was providing informed consent, and was not acquiescing in 
order to please me. I wrote a document which outlined everything that was 
written about Glen, and included some information about the implications of 
giving consent or not giving consent. Glen and his key advocate read through the 
document together without me present, and his advocate informed me that Glen 
was indeed providing informed consent for his name to be used.   
Throughout the data generation phase, Glen supported me in planning 
and conducting the hui, whilst I continued to support him with his work.  Our 
relationship thus became more reciprocal than it had been previously; although, 
I also supported Glen in supporting me during the research. For instance, I 
ensured that the meeting dates were in his diary, that his component of the 
written material we used for facilitation was in a large, coloured font with 
sequential numbers, and I supported him in reading through the materials I had 
prepared, which he then supported me to modify. Glen was firm about stating 
his ideas and what he wanted to do during our discussions, ensuring we worked 
together to find solutions when we disagreed, rather than acquiescing to each 
other. The agenda for each meeting and discussions were largely led by me, 
based on what I felt needed to be done to prepare for the upcoming hui. The 
inequitable leadership during these discussions highlights the challenge I 
encountered in fully enacting a co-creation approach in the project. Glen 
received an hourly rate for his role, funded through the Trust Waikato grant. As 
Tuffrey-Wijne and G. Butler (2009) note, very few learning disabled are paid for 
their work as researchers. Being paid signalled to Glen that his role was viewed 




Having Glen involved as a co-facilitator turned out to the pivotal to the 
success of the project. Glen was able to point out when my plans for conducting 
the hui would not work, and when the words I used were confusing or 
misleading. For instance, he pointed out that the term “fighting oppression” 
seemed violent, and that “data” could be understood as what you use for 
internet on your phone. Glen also helped to think up different terms that could 
be used instead, such as “research data”. Together, we came up with many 
resources and activities that were highly effective. I also found that talking ideas 
over with Glen helped to clarify them in my mind; at times this proved more 
helpful than discussing ideas with my supervisors. 
Glen proved himself to be an excellent facilitator for the project. He 
reminded us to only have one person at a time speaking, worked to ensure each 
participant had a fair chance to contribute, explained questions to participants 
when they were unsure, and helped keep me to time. Glen also acted as a 
participant, often contributing equally to conversations unless we had agreed 
otherwise prior to the hui. This was done intentionally, as learning disabled 
facilitators have been found to be most effective when they are not seen as 
impartial. As G. Butler et al. (2012) state, having a learning disabled co-facilitator 
contribute as an equal helps them to connect with participants on a more 
equitable level, and helps participants to feel confident to contribute. Because 
Glen often contributed as a participant, he is generally included in my description 
of participant’s thoughts and actions throughout this thesis. In situations where 
this is not the case it will be specified.  
In the following section, I outline the details for the hui.  
Supporting Participants  
Walmsley (2004) notes that supporting participants in any form of 
inclusive research is a vital and skilled activity. However, she notes further that 
remarkably few details are published regarding what non-disabled researchers 
and advocates do to support disabled participants. This has led to a mystification 
of the processes, whereby the idea is upheld that some researchers are able to 




This makes it difficult to train other researchers seeking to work in this field, and 
inhibits the ability of researchers to learn from each other (Walmsley, 2004). It is 
partly for this reason that I have included such a high level of detail regarding the 
specifics of activities, resources and support provided throughout this chapter.  
I began the hui by explaining to participants that I was there as a 
“researcher”, rather than a “support person”, and I used different hats with 
logos on them to help explain this concept. However, I found this positioning was 
not entirely accurate, as my position as a support worker was often entangled 
with my position as a researcher. For instance, participants would periodically 
come to the hui upset about something that had happened at home. This meant 
I needed to support participants to talk through what was upsetting them, offer 
helpful comments, and make sure they were able to get into the right emotional 
space to participate in the hui. One participant has diabetes and Prader Willie 
syndrome, and needed to take medication during the hui. This meant I needed to 
watch how much food he ate, ensure all food was packed away after morning 
tea, and sign-off that his medication had been taken.  
Knowing the participants, and their communication styles in particular, 
was an important part of being able to work well with them during the hui. It 
took some time to learn the particularities of some participants’ communication 
styles; one had a speech impediment, and another frequently used the word 
“not” when she meant the opposite. The pre-established relationships I held 
with participants, and which the participants had between themselves, proved 
immensely helpful in this domain.  
The Role of Advocates 
Working with someone who knows participants well is identified as 
important by many researchers, including Inglis and Cook (2011), Kittelsaa (2014) 
and Walmsley (2004). As Walmsley (2004) states, “there is unlikely to be a 
substitute for working alongside people who know the individual well and can 
draw on the experience of what works with him or her” (p. 60). This advice was 
well-founded, as advocates turned out to be one of the most helpful forms of 




Glen was asked to identify one key advocate, and the participants were 
asked to identify a first and second advocate whom I could maintain contact with 
throughout the hui, should it be necessary. Advocates provided support in 
numerous ways. One example is providing pragmatic support such as ensuring 
participants had transport to and from the hui, and had the dates of the hui in 
their diaries. Advocates were tasked with supporting participant safety 
throughout the duration of the hui, and were asked to contact me if they had 
any concerns. They also supported participants to provide information on 
personal safety, such as whether there were any food allergies, how I would 
know if a participant was upset, and how I could best respond to this (see 
Appendix 8). I kept in periodic contact with advocates throughout the hui, 
particularly after hui six where there had been some tough conversations which 
highlighted the challenging emotions associated with disability.  
Participants and the co-facilitator signed a consent form prior to 
attending the hui (see Appendices 8 and 9). Although it was the participants who 
consented to the research, advocates were also involved in the consent process 
in order to ensure informed consent was obtained. Advocates helped to explain 
information in a way participants understood, and helped to ensure participants 
were not consenting on the basis of misunderstanding, or simply acquiescing to 
someone they viewed as being in a position of power. Auckland Disability Law 
(2016) defines this process as Supported Decision Making, something which they 
assert is consistent with Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006).  
Details of the Hui 
I went into the data generation phase with a general outline of what I 
wanted to do, and the activities and resources we would need to do it. However, 
the full detail of the content, activities and resources were developed in 
collaboration with Glen. Glen’s input throughout the planning phase was 
invaluable. For instance, he helped me to see that my initial plan, which involved 
connecting disability pride with gay pride, would not be successful. Glen and I 




open and honest with each other, and respect each other’s ideas, which included 
being able to disagree with each other. 
The hui were conducted at a small building in central Hamilton, in a space 
designated for youth. This space was chosen because I was able to utilise it at no 
cost thanks to a friend, and because its central location made it easy for 
participants to get to with public transport. The room was filled with a collection 
of miss-matched couches, and there were many posters on the wall for the 
youth, which were often referred to by participants during the hui.  
All hui were filmed using a camera and stand provided by the university. 
In hui two I used the wrong camera settings and subsequently missed thirty 
minutes of content. The remainder of the hui was filmed on my personal tablet. 
After this incident I started using a dictaphone as well as the camera. The 
dictaphone was positioned much closer to participants, and turned out to be 
useful for transcription as the sound quality was better.  
The camera was set up in an obvious location and participants were 
always aware it was there. This placement helped to ensure that there was no 
element of deception, and that participants were therefore continually 
consenting to be on film. The camera placement was one of the means by which 
participants were engaged in co-creation, as participants regularly helped to 
ensure that no one was standing in front of the camera and blocking the view of 
the room.  
The hui can best be described as a combination of an action-research 
meeting, a focus group, and a conversation. Focus groups are defined by 
Kitzinger (1995) as “a form of group interview that capitalises on communication 
between research participants in order to generate data” (p. 299). As well as 
enabling researchers to gain greater insight into the topic under consideration, 
focus groups have the added benefit of working well for people who cannot read 
or write (Kitzinger, 1995). Kitzinger and Barbour (1999) note that focus groups 
can be conducted in different ways, which do not necessarily need to follow a 
formulaic approach. In this sense, all nine hui could be considered a form of 
focus group. However, as I shall outline in the table over the following pages, 




facilitators. I have chosen to utilise the term “focus group” to describe the hui in 
which Glen and I had a set of questions we wished to discuss with participants. 
These hui stand in contrast to the other hui, which had a much greater emphasis 
on co-creation.  
 
Hui Details 
Hui 1: Informed consent and culture setting. Approach utilised 
The focus for this hui was for the group to get to 
know each other, decide how we wanted to work 
together, and ensure participants gave informed 
consent. We discussed what research is, the 
particularities of this project, and how participants 
can consent or decline to join in the research at any 
point.  
This hui was largely 
directed by myself and 
Glen to ensure informed 
consent processes were 
established. Participants 
were invited to co-
create the working 
culture of the group.  
Hui 2 and 3: Focus group – perceptions of 
disability  
Approach utilised 
In these hui, participants were asked for their 
thoughts on what disability is and whether they 
identify as disabled. This was intended to last for 
one hui, however participants were eager to 
discuss the questions and we ended up needing 
two hui.  
These hui were called a 
“focus group” because 
they followed a more 
directed approach than 
in later hui.  




In these hui participants explored the concepts of 
ableism and disability pride. Participants were 
introduced to the notions of ableism and disability 
pride in hui four, and ideas were further developed 
in hui five. Some participants showed a high level of 
discomfort regarding disability pride in hui five 
after watching a video, and indicated they did not 
wish to continue discussions. Following the 
iterative approach, in hui six I gave a “speech” 
which outlined the dilemma I faced. On the one 
hand, it was important I listened to participants 
when they said they did not want to do something. 
However, the discomfort participants felt indicated 
an underlying issue I was wanting to address with 
the research, a topic I felt needed further 
discussion in order to enact change for disabled 
people19. This speech enabled the hui to progress, 
and participants indicated they would like to 
continue with whatever Glen and I had planned, 
rather than choosing an activity or topic for 
themselves. Glen and I conducted a role play about 
showing pride in the face of bullying, a topic which 
had emerged as a key issue for participants during 
our discussions on ableism. This role play then led 
to further discussion and drawing on the 
whiteboard. In hui seven, participants indicated 
they were interested in participating in role plays 
themselves. Various role plays emerged, 
particularly related to the subject of bullying. These 
These hui placed a much 
greater emphasis on a 
co-creation approach. 
Whilst Glen and I had 
some activities 
prepared, participants 
were invited to take 
more control over the 
direction of the 
activities, and were 
invited to choose 
activities of their own 
volition.  
                                                     




role plays led to further discussions and drawing on 
the whiteboard. 
Hui 8-9: Focus group, feedback and closing. Approach utilised 
In these hui, participants were again asked about 
their ideas related to disability and their own 
identity. This was done in order to establish 
whether their thoughts had changed over the 
course of the research. Preliminary findings were 
discussed in order to elicit participant’s 
perspectives, as was done by Inglis and Cook 
(2012). This process helped to explore whether the 
findings made sense to participants, and provided a 
small means by which participants could contribute 
to the analysis. Participants were also invited to 
discuss which aspects of the hui they enjoyed most, 
what made the hui work well, why participants 
chose to join the research and why they chose to 
continue coming.  
These hui were similar 
to hui 2 and 3, in that 
they followed a more 
directed approach than 




Hui Activities  
Glen and I prepared a range of different activities, each designed to help 
establish a particular way of working, or present an idea related to ableism or 
pride. Over the following pages, I detail each of the activities.  
Ongoing informed consent. 
In order to ensure participants gave informed consent, I dedicated a 
significant portion of hui one to this subject. We had a conversation with 
participants about what research is and why people do research, and watched a 
video on YouTube to help explain this further (hsu, 2013). We discussed the 
implications of joining the research, such as needing to give up Friday mornings 
to come, as well as learning and hopefully having fun. We also discussed the 
implications of not giving consent, which included life continuing as normal and 
not being able to join in, and the types of questions participants would need to 
ask when deciding whether to give consent or not.  
In order to further the participants’ understanding of research we 
conducted a practice piece of research on the topic “what is the best way to 
make a hot drink”. Participants were asked to suggest different ways information 
could be gathered, in order to discuss the different possible ways research can 
be conducted (Inglis & Cook, 2011). We asked what sorts of questions would 
need to be asked for the research, and I wrote the questions down on the 
whiteboard. We then conducted the research as per the participants’ questions, 
and discussed what we meant by “research data” once we had the results.  
As noted earlier, one integral component of informed consent is ensuring 
that participants understand the different ways they can refuse consent (Inglis & 
Cook, 2011).  During the course of the first hui we had several conversations 
about what participants could say or do if they did not want to join in an activity, 
answer a question, or join in the research. Participants practised different ways 
that consent could be declined, such as saying “I don’t want to answer that 
question”, and role-played leaving the room. Glen and I reiterated several times 
that participants were under no obligation to join in the research. These 




participants declined to answer questions and join in activities at different 
points, and one participant left the room when he was uncomfortable with a 
conversation. Participants re-joined the activities when they felt ready.  
All participants and their advocates were given my cell phone number 
and email address, so I could be contacted at any point during the hui. I also set 
up a second facebook account so that participants would be able to contact me 
there if that was their preferred means of communication. After the first hui I 
phoned each participant to check if they were still interested in being part of the 
research, and all said they were. Through following these processes, each 
participant was provided with information in a variety of ways over many 
occasions, and were given numerous opportunities to say if they wanted to join 
the research, as is advised by the National Institutes of Health (2009). 
Constructive dissent activities.  
In order to establish the desired culture of “constructive dissent”, 
whereby participants understood that it was ok to “think differently” from each 
other and myself, Glen and I developed the Yes/No Game. In this activity we 
would stand in a circle and throw a ball to each other, asking a question that 
required a yes or no answer. It was hard for some participants to ask questions 
that required a yes/no answer, and some participants tried to ask questions that 
the other person would say yes to, at times changing the question once the 
person had answered so they would get a yes answer. However, this game 
proved to be effective, as participants appeared comfortable disagreeing with 
each other and sharing different ideas. Because the group showed a high level of 
enthusiasm for this game, it was utilised at every hui. The group also developed a 
mantra in hui one which was written on the whiteboard at every hui: “Everyone’s 
got different opinions and that’s OK”.  
Initially, Glen and I also came up with various “thinking different” 
activities for the hui. Activities included picking a favourite item from the “bag of 
things”, and picking a lego person and giving them a name. However, after a few 
hui it became challenging to think of different activities, and I realised that the 
yes/no game served the purpose adequately so we dropped the “thinking 





Iterative, reflexive practices form an integral component of the 
methodological approach (Baum et al., 2006; Israel et al., 2012).  After hui one 
we started every hui by saying what our favourite part of the previous hui was 
whilst doing a stretch with a ball. At the end of every hui we would do another 
stretch and say what we thought was important about the hui, what our 
favourite part of the hui was, and what we thought we could do better. Glen and 
I worked further reflexive practice into the process, as we had a debrief directly 
after each hui. We would discuss how we thought the hui went, and what we 
had learnt or observed.  
Confidentiality. 
Confidentiality was important for two key reasons; it helped trusting 
relationships to develop, and helped to ensure participants’ personal information 
would not be shared outside of the hui. At the end of every hui we held a brief 
conversation about confidentiality. One of the signs on the wall at the venue said 
“what happens in this room stays in this room”, and participants would always 
point to it during this conversation. Both the participants and I considered this 
discussion important, and it was thus used consistently throughout the hui.  
In the final hui, participants were given two options for confidentiality 
(see Appendix 10); full, which meant that I would do everything possible to 
ensure that people were not identifiable; and limited, which meant I would make 
some information unidentifiable, but that participants would be able to help 
share the information we had learnt. Four participants chose limited 
confidentiality, however in the end no opportunities arose for us to co-present.  
Hui Resources  
Glen and I developed a range of resources to utilise in the hui. These 
resources each held their own agency, intra-acting on and through the hui by 
helping to facilitate interaction, discussion, and the possibilities for action. The 
resources served two purposes; first, I felt it was important that we utilised our 




resources helped enable sensory, emotional and experiential abilities to come to 
the fore, which helped to lessen the need for cognitive skills. Over the following 
pages, I detail each of the resources we used.  
The “squishy” ball.  
I purchased a “squishy” ball from the $2 shop. This ball was introduced  
into hui one as part of the “thinking different” activity, and participants quickly 
named it the “squishy”. Because participants showed a high level of enthusiasm 
for the “squishy”, it continued to be used at the beginning and end of every hui 
for the reflective activities, as well as for some other activities during the hui.  
The whiteboard. 
I brought a 1.5m x 1.5m whiteboard to the hui. This was used to write 
down participants’ ideas, for participants to draw as part of the discussion, and 
for me to draw to help illustrate what we were talking about. Participants 
enjoyed drawing and writing on the whiteboard for various activities, and it was 
used throughout the duration of the hui.  
The “how we will work together” poster. 
In hui one we talked about how we wanted to work together as a group. 
This served as a power-sharing activity at the outset, and helped to ensure a 
culturally responsive methodology as we worked together to establish the 
culture of the hui (Berryman et al., 2013b). Participants were asked to share 
stories about times when they were in a group and enjoyed it, and from this 
discussion, we came up with a list of ways we wanted to work together. I 
developed this into an easy-read poster (see Appendix 11). This poster was 
introduced in hui two and placed onto the whiteboard at every hui thereafter, 
although it was never discussed again.  
The pride wall.  
I put together a “pride wall” on one side of the whiteboard. This wall was 
made up of A4 pieces of paper, each of which had a photo of one person in the 




something we are proud of about ourselves, or something we were proud of 
about someone else in the room. We would then write what was said on the 
person’s pride wall poster. Many participants described this as a favourite 
activity and something they considered important, and it was thus a resource we 
dedicated time to at every hui after it was introduced.   
The bag of things. 
Following the example of Munford et al. (2008), I took a “bag of things” 
into the research. This bag included a variety of paraphernalia from around my 
house including a bandana, pipe cleaners, bandages, an eye patch and a walking 
stick. This bag was used during the hui for various activities, and helped in my 
preparations with Glen. For instance, the bag of things was used to help play 
around with various ideas when Glen and I developed the role play on bullying.   
The “feelings cards” and “traffic light”. 
I wanted to develop some resources which would ensure emotions were 
acknowledged during the hui. This was done to enable non-cognitive abilities to 
come to the fore, and to support participant safety by providing participants with 
a tool to let us know if they were not OK.  
The first tool we developed was the “traffic light” (see Appendix 12), an 
A3 piece of paper with a colour picture of a traffic light. This was designed so 
that participants could let us know if they were “orange”, which meant not really 
OK, or “red” which meant we needed to stop what we were doing. The traffic 
light remained in use throughout the entire hui, although it was not used 
frequently by participants.   
The second resource we developed was the “feelings cards” (see 
Appendix 13). In order to develop these I came up with a list of 15 basic 
emotions. These were discussed with Glen and he narrowed them down to nine: 
happy, upset, sad, angry, scared, nervous, stressed, tired, and relaxed. I took 
photos of Glen displaying each of the emotions; he chose to use a toy dog to aid 
him in several of the photos. At the request of a participant a “sore” card was 
also added. The cards were greatly appreciated by participants and proved an 




thus used at the beginning and end of every hui to help participants and me 
share how we were feeling. They were also used for some discussions during the 
hui.  
Ableism resources.  
To introduce the concept of ableism I used a large piece of paper with the 
word “disabled” on it, a smaller piece of paper with the word “normal” on it, and 
a pipe cleaner which had been fashioned into a circle. I demonstrated how the 
small piece of paper fits easily into the circle because society has been built 
assuming everyone should be “normal”. I demonstrated the large piece of paper 
not fitting, and talked about how we tend to think there is something wrong with 
the paper, rather than the shape of the pipe cleaner. Because participants did 
not engage well with this resource, it was not used again.  
The second tool I developed was a set of “ableism cards”. These were a 
series of cards (see Appendix 14) which had cartoon images of people with a 
name next to them. I sought to have a diversity of genders, disabilities, ages and 
skin colours in the cards, so that participants had a wide variety of pictures to 
draw upon. The cards were used for participants to tell stories about when their 
life has been hard because of their disability. Because participants enjoyed the 
cards, they were used in several activities.  
The script.  
At each hui I developed a “script” with an outline of the plan and what 
Glen and I were going to say. This meant that I wrote down what Glen would say 
when introducing activities or asking questions, then read it through with him 
and made changes based on his feedback. Glen would point out mistakes I had 
made and suggest ways he would like something worded. He liked his words to 
be numbered, in a large font and in a different colour to the rest of the script. I 
am conscious that by writing Glen’s component of the script I was not following 
proper co-creation processes. However, I was concerned that it would have 
taken considerably more time to develop the script with Glen, and there was 
only a short time-frame between each hui. Glen and I both greatly appreciated 





I found an array of videos on YouTube to help explore the notions of 
ableism and disability pride. A number of videos were shown to Glen, who chose 
the ones he thought best suited the hui. Due to participants’ negative responses 
to the videos, only a small portion ended up being used.  
Lessons Learnt  
Many factors contributed to the success of the hui. These include the 
enthusiasm of both Glen and the participants, the strength of relationships, and 
the trust that developed from these strong relationships. This trust enabled us to 
have more open, honest, and challenging conversations with each other. 
Participants were supportive and patient with each other, and with me and Glen. 
Glen and I also had a positive working relationship, and were able to set the tone 
for how the group worked. For instance we intentionally worked on being open 
and honest, and respectfully disagreeing with each other. 
Asking participants to help proved to be one of the most effective tools 
for engaging them, particularly during challenging conversations. I found that 
some of the richest sources of data came from times when I opened myself up to 
being vulnerable, and invited participants to help me. Berryman et al. (2013a) 
note that reciprocity is at the core of co-creation; it seems to me that asking 
participants to help can be a tool to enable reciprocity.  
There were also many limiting factors in the research. I worked hard to 
develop a co-creation approach, and share power with participants as equally as 
possible. However, many factors impeded the implementation of this. The first 
key issue is that the project is my PhD research – I decided upon the topic, and 
how I wanted the research to be conducted. Having a particular topic that I 
wanted to discuss with participants meant that it could never be fully co-
constructed. Power-sharing and co-creation processes with learning disabled 
people prove difficult to achieve in practice (Nind, 2008; Walmsley, 2001). The 




without a disability, i.e., as someone in a position of authority, held agency 
within the hui in a way which could not be escaped. 
There were also some tensions in applying the methodological approach, 
particularly around consent. I reiterated many times to participants that if they 
said no to something, they did not need to do it. There was frequently a tension 
between needing to stop activities when participants said they did not want to 
do them in order to ensure consent was maintained, and not wanting to be the 
person who had the power to dictate what happened.  
One key lesson is that abstractions do not work for learning disabled 
people. Participants engaged best when discussions and activities related directly 
to their lives and personal experiences. Some of the resources I utilised, such as 
the YouTube videos, did not work well because they did not connect with 
participants’ personal experiences. This correlates with the advice provided by 
Cook and Inglis (2011), who state that ideas need to be linked to real-life 
examples of participants in order to ground them in reality. 
One of the greatest challenges I found using this methodological 
approach was the limitation it placed on the ability to prepare for the hui. 
Focusing on co-creation meant that it was not possible to know what would arise 
during the course of the research, and thus what to prepare for. This meant that 
I needed to prepare a large list of potential activities in advance, something 
which was highly time-consuming. It also meant that I needed to be prepared for 
the participants to want to do something I had not planned for, and meant that 
much of the preparation needed to be done in the two weeks between the hui.  
Another challenging aspect related to the variable amount of time it took 
participants to do activities. Some participants took a long time to answer 
questions, often needing to tell a personal story, whilst other participants would 
answer with only a few words. This made planning content challenging, as it was 
impossible to know prior to the hui how much could be achieved in one hui. 
Transport proved to be an ongoing challenge. In my experience this is one of the 
unavoidable challenges inherent in organising any event with learning disabled 
people. It is further not unusual for learning disability research, as G. Butler et al. 




time was needed to ensure participants had transport to and from the hui, which 
included providing transport myself and arranging friends to support with 
transport in some situations.  
Concluding Remarks 
The methodology for this thesis is formed from an entanglement of 
methodological perspectives. They are inclusive research, participatory action 
research, community based participatory methodologies, culturally responsive 
methodologies and decolonising methodologies. Several core elements were 
taken from the various methodologies: co-creation, with a particular focus on 
relationships and power equity; the drive to instigate change through research; 
and the embeddedness of the researcher. The role of ethics underpinned all the 
methodologies, in relation to the drive not to perpetuate the harms visited on 
learning disabled people through research conducted historically, and to ensure 
participants gave ongoing informed consent.  The methodological design was 
further underpinned by the desire to do research that works for learning 
disabled people and does not rely solely on cognitive abilities, and the desire to 
conduct research with a group. Limitations of the approach included the 
significant investment of time and personal commitment that was required, and 
the reliance on participants’ ability to talk.  
The data for this research were generated in partnership with seven 
learning disabled participants and one learning disabled co-facilitator, through a 
series of nine hui. Activities and resources for the hui were developed in 
partnership with the co-facilitator. These activities and resources helped to 
establish the culture of the hui, ensure participants gave ongoing informed 
consent, and helped to ensure that sensory, emotional and experiential abilities 
could come to the fore.  
The enthusiasm of participants, the strong relationships we developed, 
and getting participants to help me as a methodological tool supported the 
success of the project. Limitations included enacting co-creation in practice, and 




participants. This was largely because they did not relate directly to participants’ 







Diffractive Analysis  
Diffractive analysis is a tool that draws upon the ethico-onto-
epistemological framework of agential realism, incorporating ideas inherent in 
agential realism into an explicit methodological framework. Unlike many 
traditional analysis frameworks, diffractive analysis does not view words, matter 
and bodies as separate entities. Instead, it views these phenomenon as forces 
which both affect and are affected by the ongoing intra-activity of life (Barad, 
2007). 
Barad has drawn on the work of Donna Haraway (1997) in the 
development of diffractive analysis. Haraway (1997) used diffraction to rethink 
optical notions of relationality inherent in many methodological techniques, such 
as those using critical reflection. Where reflection is seen to mirror reality from 
afar, diffraction acknowledges that it is not possible to stand at a distance from 
any phenomena, particularly in research. As Barad (2007) states, we are always 
complicit in the world’s differential becomings.  
Barad (2014) defines diffraction as: 
Diffraction/intra-action - cutting together-apart (one move) in the 
(re)configuring of spacetimemattering; 
differencing/differing/différancing. (p. 168) 
Diffraction is often described using an image of waves. In this metaphor, waves 
are understood to roll, push and transform each other, changing in intra-action 
with obstacles and with the accumulation of each wave (Lenz Taguchi, 2012; 
Lenz Taguchi & Palmer, 2013). Diffraction takes into account the agential realist 
notion that thinking, knowing and seeing are “never done in isolation but are 
always affected by different forces coming together” (Lenz Taguchi & Palmer, 




In diffractive analysis, as with the notion of intra-action, there are no 
definitive boundaries separating phenomena into separate, bounded entities. 
This means that all intra-active phenomena are seen as agentic and necessarily 
affect and interfere with each other through the processes of the analysis 
(Davies, 2014b). This includes the research questions, theory, data, emotions, 
and memories (Lenz Taguchi, 2012). The researcher’s awareness is opened up to 
a much wider sphere of possibilities than whether, for instance, “A” causes “B”. 
It is possible to view multidirectional, emergent, intra-active interferences which 
can all affect and interfere with each other in a non-linear and non-causal 
manner. 
Diffractive analysis is considered to be a material practice – that is, a 
production of reality which has specific material consequences (Barad, 2007). 
Researchers do not stand at a distance from their work in order to “leave the 
material world behind and enter the domain of pure ideas where the lofty space 
of the mind makes objective reflection possible” (Barad, 2007, p. 55). Instead, 
researchers need to understand that theorizing, knowing, thinking and 
measuring “are material practices of intra-acting within and as part of the world” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 90).  
This means that researchers, with their bodyminds, play a crucial role in 
affecting and interfering in any analysis (Barad, 2007; Lenz Taguchi, 2012). The 
methodological implications for this are profound, as researchers are required to 
continually try to be conscious of how the research data, theories and the 
researcher’s own memories and emotions “interfere[s] with the sensibilities of 
our bodyminds and what this brings to the event of reading the data” (Lenz 
Taguchi, 2012, p. 272, emphasis in original). In this sense, the bodymind of the 
researcher becomes “a space of transit”, as Lenz Taguchi (2012) states; “a series 
of open-ended systems in interaction with the material-discursive 
‘environment’” (p. 265). This approach does not simply place the researcher (or 
observer) back into the world, but rather acknowledges the ways in which 
researchers have always already been involved in the research (Mazzei, 2013). 




project, but also emerge as particular types of “subjects” through the research 
process:   
 There is no ‘I’ that exists outside of the diffraction pattern, 
observing it, telling its story. In an important sense, this story in its 
ongoing (re)patterning is (re)(con)figuring me. ‘I’ am neither 
outside nor inside; ‘I’ am of the diffraction pattern. (Barad, 2014, 
p. 181, emphasis in original).  
As researchers we “become something else in the process [of researching]” 
(Mazzei, 2013, p. 777). Researchers both constitute and are constituted by the 
process of materially engaging with the research, and are both “made and 
unmade in such a practice” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 777). 
Methodological Implications 
There are several methodological implications when conducting a 
diffractive analysis which differ from more traditional analysis tools. Firstly, data 
should not be reduced to a series of already-established concepts, such as in the 
processes of coding (Mazzei, 2014, p. 2). Instead, the analysis should take a 
“rhizomatic (rather than hierarchical and linear shape) form that leads in 
different directions and keeps analysis and knowledge production on the move” 
(Mazzei, 2014, p. 2). As Davies (2014b) notes: 
The analysis is emergent and unpredictable, a series of encounters 
with the new. It is hard, demanding work, requiring the capacity to 
let go of the already-known, and of tired clichés and explanations, 
of tired categories and coding. It involves hard epistemological, 
ontological and ethical work to enable the not-yet-known to 
emerge in the spaces of the research encounter. (p. 735)  
The use of the term rhizome in these forms of analysis links back to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1987), and can be defined as  “a complex 
subterranean tangle of interconnected root-like sprouts which spreads in a 




modes of thought establish links and connections between surprising and 
different places (Gannon & Davies, 2007); these links are non-linear, follow 
multi-directional connections, and never lead to final closure of any particular 
link or thought (Feely, 2016). As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) note, “[a]ny point 
of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be” (p. 7). The 
methodological implications of this are that the analysis can head in unexpected 
directions, linking together unexpected phenomena and keeping knowledge 
production always on the move (Mazzei, 2014).  
One of the strengths of an agential realist framework is that it highlights 
the complexity and entanglements within any situation. It is not so much about 
isolating particular phenomena to study them, but rather to highlight intra-
actions in their fullness, addressing multiple agentic forces at play: the points at 
which the rhizomes connect in unexpected ways. However, it is important to 
take care to resist the lines of flight (or rhizomatic off-shoots) which can tempt 
researchers to head towards too many concepts, theorists and data (Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2011). Holding the research aim and questions in mind can prove helpful 
in discerning which lines of flight to pursue, and which lines will lead to confusion 
and clutter in the analysis.  
 
For me, navigating the rhizomatic lines of flight proved to be one of the 
most challenging parts of the analysis. When everything is connected with 
everything else, how does one go about writing the linear, coherent narrative 
that is required for the thesis? Where do you start when you need all of the 
concepts in order to understand all of the other concepts, and when your whole 
point is that everything is intertwined and cannot ever really be seen as separate 
phenomena? How do you write in a way which is coherent and clear, and yet 
doesn’t lose hold of the complexities inherent in the entanglements?  
What helped me through this process was to take to my whiteboard with 
some markers and write the ideas down, then rework what was on the 
whiteboard again and again, until I found a way to tell the story of the analysis. 
When this failed, talking things out with my supervisory team proved immensely 




me off into too many different directions, I found I needed to step back from the 
individual chapter I was working on and look at the project as a whole. I tried to 
think about the story I was trying to tell with the thesis, and which parts needed 
to be told in each individual chapter.  
 
Another methodological implication pertinent to this thesis is the focus 
on boundary-drawing and difference. In agential realism, boundaries and 
differences are viewed as an effect of intra-action, rather than essential 
phenomena (Barad, 2003). The researcher’s focus is placed on how differences 
are constructed and what is excluded in the process of constituting a 
“difference” (Barad, 2007). The point of this, as Barad (2007) notes, is to look at 
“which differences matter, how they matter, and for whom” (p. 90).  Binaries 
and dualistic thinking, such as human/non-human and abled/disabled, as well as 
notions of identity and difference are queered, questioned and rethought within 
the processes of a diffractive analysis; no single phenomenon is fixed in advance 
of the analysis (Barad, 2014). This means that researchers do not seek to uncover 
the “truth” of any data or phenomenon, but rather to uncover “a reality that 
already exists among the multiple realities being enacted in an event, but which 
has not previously been ‘disclosed’” (Lenz Taguchi, 2012, pp. 274–275, emphasis 
in original). A key point of focus for this project is on the material-discursive, 
boundary-drawing practices of disability, including what constitutes “disability”, 
what is excluded in the processes of this constitution, and how this comes to 
matter.  
Another important methodological implication in diffractive analysis is 
the way in which space, time and matter are understood. Within an agential 
realist framework, notions of space, time and matter are all “queered” – that is, 
they are not viewed as linear, separate phenomena. Instead, they are 
understood as phenomena which materialise through iterative intra-actions, 
which are non-causal and non-linear, and which are all inextricably intertwined in 
a process of spacetimemattering (Barad, 2007). As Barad (2007) notes: 
[T]ime and space, like matter and meaning, come into existence, 




making it impossible to differentiate in any absolute sense 
between creation and renewal, beginning and returning, 
continuity and discontinuity, here and there, past and future. (p. 
ix)  
In this understanding each intra-active entanglement, even when it is described 
as an “iterative entanglement” (as I do throughout this thesis), is never exactly 
the same twice over, as “[e]ntanglements of intra-acting phenomena are always 
located in time, history and place” (Renold & Ivinson, 2014, p. 364). Attention to 
fine detail is important, as “[s]mall details can make profound differences” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 92).  Furthermore, in connecting the concept of 
spacetimemattering with the concept of the rhizome, we can see that it is 
possible to make connections between phenomena which “do not appear to be 
proximate in space and time” (Barad, 2007, p. 74). In a diffractive analysis, the 
analysis phase of the project is not something that is considered to occur purely 
in the post-fieldwork stage of a project. Instead, the meaning-making processes 
of the analysis emerge over time, including before the research begins and 
during the planning and data collection phases (Ringrose & Renold, 2014).  
Choice of Data for Analylsis: Hot Spots 
Guided by MacLure (2013), I have chosen to utilise the notion of “hot 
spots” in identifying the data with which to work for this project. Illuminating the 
work of MacLure (2013) further, V. Mitchell (2016) defines hot spots as data or 
phenomena which “have an intensity and force on the researcher, creating hot 
spots that glow” (p. 240). These hot spots can disconcert, creating a sense of 
discomfort, or create a sense of wonder and piqued interest in the researcher. In 
these instances, the data “glow” with an intensity in various moments through 
the processes of the research (MacLure, 2013). The affective response a 
researcher has to the data plays an important role in identifying hot spots. In 
particular, dilemma, trouble and contradiction within the data prove good 




MacLure (2013) notes, data have their ways of making themselves intelligible to 
us.   
The notion of hot spots proves an interesting point of focus when viewed 
through the agential realist lens of spacetimemattering. When space, time and 
matter are viewed as non-linear and intertwined, hot-spots can be both brief, 
intense moments which glow white-hot, as well as “slow burning intensities that 
propel the creation and generation of research encounters and data” (Ringrose & 
Renold, 2014, p. 775). As Barad (2014) notes, diffractions are not singular events 
which happen in defined moments of space and time, but are rather “a 
dynamism that is integral to spacetimemattering” (p. 169). She explains further:  
Diffractions are untimely. Time is out of joint; it is diffracted, 
broken apart in different directions, non-contemporaneous with 
itself. Each moment is an infinite multiplicity. ‘Now’ is not an 
infinitesimal slice but an infinitely rich condensed node in a 
changing field diffracted across spacetime in its ongoing iterative 
repatterning. (Barad, 2014, p. 169).  
Choosing the data with which to work is probably not an easy feat for any 
research project, and this project was no exception. With around 30 hours of 
video, transcriptions of the videos, my notes from the data collection phase and 
my journal, I was faced with the luxurious problem of having so much rich data 
that I had to seriously consider which hot spots glowed the brightest. Or, to put 
this another way, I needed to spend time examining which data appeared to hold 
the most agency over me in the ongoing intra-active processes of the analysis.   
It was often my feelings about phenomena which alerted me to potential 
hot spots. My body became a space of transit through which the data and theory 
moved, often in ways which I was not conscious of. There would be powerful 
chunks of data to which I had a strong emotional reaction, or a theory or article 
about which I would become corporeally excited. I learnt to sit in long 
uncomfortable periods of disconcertion, and through this process I learnt to 
discover what felt wrong/right. Furthermore, my memories and experiences in 




times before and what was unexpected or new.   
             At times it felt as if the data was silently screaming at me, telling me that 
it would be neglectful of me to miss them out. I had a sense that particular 
pieces of data would sit on my shoulder and follow me around for the rest of my 
life if I did not involve them. At other times the hot spots were more of a slow-
burning intensity, emerging after simmering over time, or after I read particular 
articles and theories which spoke to me. Articles which particularly spoke to me 
included Bullying as Intra-active Process in Neoliberal Universities (Zabrodska et 
al., 2011), and New Materialist Analyses of Virtual Gaming, Distributed Violence, 
and Relational Aggression (Søndergaard, 2016), both of which helped me to see 
the power in looking beyond discourse and bringing a wider array of intra-active 
phenomena into the space of the analysis.  
 
Below I outline the process I went through to choose the data for the 
analysis:  
- I put all of the transcripts and my personal reflection notes into an 
analysis software, Nvivo. By placing the data chunks into folders 
which could be cross-categorised, I became more familiar with the 
data and started see patterns.  
- I went through the information in the folders and made an excel 
spreadsheet with brief information on what happened throughout 
the hui and key phenomena which emerged, such as the role of 
affect. I included thoughts I had on each of these phenomena.  
- Through this process of working with data again and again, 
alongside reading theory, I came to see where the rhizomes 
connected and to sense where the hot spots were – I could feel 
that data had their own agency in speaking to me.  
- Thorough this entire process I was guided by the research 
questions and the problem which drove me to the research: that 
despite our hardest efforts, disability oppression does not seem to 




Reading Data and Theory through Each Other  
Although Barad details what is meant by diffraction and diffractive 
analysis, there is very little detail in her work which outlines exactly how  
diffractive analysis is done. Fortunately, Jackson and Mazzei (2011) drew upon 
diffractive analysis for their own work, and provide some useful detail on how 
they went about this process. In particular, they use the concept of plugging in, 
which is further illuminated by Mazzei (2014). Plugging in was drawn from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1987). It is defined as a process 
rather than a concept; it is not about layering sets of codes or theoretical 
concepts onto data, but rather about plugging theory and data into each other. 
As Mazzei (2014) states, it is about “reading-the-data-while-thinking-the-theory” 
(p. 2). This understanding illuminates Barad’s (2007) description of diffraction, 
which she describes as “reading insights through one another” (p. 25). The 
process of reading insights through one another means understanding that both 
theory and data are a constitutive force (Lenz Taguchi, 2012). In this process, we 
open up our bodymind faculties and “experience the entanglement of discourse 
and matter in the event of reading the data” (Lenz Taguchi, 2012, p. 274). 
The process of plugging in involves at least three moves. The following 
extended quote from Jackson and Mazzei (2011) outlines the process of plugging 
in: 
1. putting philosophical concepts to work via disrupting the 
theory/practice binary by decentering each and instead showing 
how they constitute or make one another,  
2. being deliberate and transparent in what analytical questions are 
made possible by a specific theoretical concept (deconstruction, 
marginality, power/knowledge, performativity, desire, intra-
activity) and how the questions that are used to think with 
emerged in the middle of plugging in; and 
3. working the same data chunks repeatedly to “deform [them], to 
make [them] groan and protest” with an overabundance of 
meaning, which in turn not only creates new knowledge but also 




2011, p. 5, emphasis in original, and citation of Michel Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge (1980): Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 
1972 – 1977, translated by Leo Marshall Colin Gordon, John 
Mepham and Kate Soper, pp. 22 –23).  
 
Jackson and Mazzei (2011) also utilise the concept of the “threshold” to 
help guide them in the processes of plugging in. Thresholds, such as doorways, 
are defined as being “in the middle of things” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011, p. 6). 
They are both an entry and an exit; a passageway which has “no function, 
purpose or meaning until it is connected to other spaces” (p. 6). Using the 
concept of the threshold in diffractive analysis reminds researchers not to stray 
too far from either the theory or the data. It is in the threshold that a site of 
diffraction exists, and where researchers become aware of how data and theory 
constitute each other. As Jackson and Mazzei (2011) note, in the threshold, 
“divisions among, and definitions of, theory and data collapse” (p. 137).  
One of the key concepts which I held in the space of the threshold was a 
set of questions developed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and used by Jackson 
and Mazzei (2011): “how does it work” and “what does it do”, not “what does it 
mean”. These questions originate from Deleuze’s focus on desire, where he 
“would not have us look for reasons or causes, but to be once again confronted 
with the question of how desire works and who it works for” (Jackson & Mazzei, 
2011, p. 101).  
Looking at research data this way works well with an Agential Realist 
framework, particularly in regards to the nature of intentionality. As noted in 
Chapter Four, Barad does not view intentionality as a phenomenon which is 
ascribed solely to human subjects. Instead, she sees intentionality as a 
distributed phenomenon which, as Lenz Taguchi and Palmer (2013) note, 
“emerges from a complex network of human and nonhuman agents, including 
historically specific sets of material conditions, thus exceeding the notion of 
being assigned to an individual who produces intention that pre-exists an 




which can focus attention on the intended meaning behind a subject’s words and 
actions.   
 
Using Jackson and Mazzei’s (2011) process of plugging in helped me to 
understand that many of the key theorists and theories, research questions and 
problem statements with which I worked were emerging fluidly through the 
process of the analysis. At times I became stuck, unsure of how to progress 
forward, until I realised that I was attempting to look for the results the analysis 
would give me, in order to frame the analysis. Or, conversely, that I had strayed 
too far from the data in my desire to explore theory.  When I became stuck, I 
would bring myself back to the threshold where I held the research problem, the 
theory and the data. This did not always occur in a linear sense of time; I had to 
learn to sit in the threshold for long, often uncomfortable periods, unsure what 
to do with a particular “hot spot” of data, before I would read some theory and 
suddenly see a powerful connection. At other times I needed to sit with 
particular theories for long periods, allowing the theory to slowly work on and 
through me before a connection would suddenly come to the fore in moments of 
“aha!”, often happening when I was not consciously placing myself into the 
threshold, such as when I was at lunch or driving. Furthermore, I tried to be 
conscious of the way in which my own “situatedness” impacted on the research. 
This includes being a Pākehā (non-Maori) white New Zealander, non-disabled, 
middle-class, cis-gendered, heterosexual woman. 
 
The following phenomena were what I found situated within the 
threshold:  
- The fundamental problem that I came to the PhD with – i.e., that 
disability oppression exists and that, despite our hardest efforts, 
does not seem to be shifting very far  





- The key theories and theorists I used (as outlined in the 
conceptual framing chapter), which emerged rhizomatically 
through the process of the PhD 
- The key Deleuzian questions of “how does it work?” and “what 
does it do?”, not “what does it mean?” 
- My bodymind, including my emotions and memories associated 
with the topic area. 
 
To help make sense of the analysis as it progressed, I utilised a variety of 
methods. The most helpful method was to keep all my notes, which included 
notes from other scholars and my own thoughts, in large documents labelled by 
subject. These documents started with a wide mix of notes, which slowly became 
categorised, sub-categorised and re-categorised over time. The notes in these 
documents formed the basis of all of my chapters, and proved immensely helpful 
when I needed to go back and check for accuracy or more information in a 
particular area. Alongside the notes documents, I kept a journal of my thoughts, 
and drew mind maps on my whiteboard to help me work through the 
entanglements of concepts and data.  
Transcription Symbols 
In order to code the transcriptions of the hui, I used Conversation 
Analysis transcription symbols, as per the National Institutes of Health (n.d.) 
guideline, which can be found at:  
http://www.esourceresearch.org/eSourceBook/ConversationAnalysis/10Transcri
ptionSymbols/tabid/531/Default.aspx   
Descriptions of the symbols utilised are provided in the table on the 
following page, and will be used in each of the following analysis chapters where 








[word] Words in brackets have been inserted by me to help ensure 
readability of text 
(word) Parenthesised words are words that I am uncertain of 
((word)) Double parentheses in italics contain descriptions of non-verbal 
utterances and actions, such as laughter and hand and eye 
movements 
<word> Words between these symbols indicates two people speaking at the 
same time  
- Hyphens indicate words which are cut-off, including stutters 
° The degree sign indicates the person is speaking quietly  
Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, diffractive analysis is a tool which draws upon the ethico-
onto-epistemological framework of agential realism. This view takes into account 
that all phenomena – research questions participants, researchers, emotions, 
theory, data and much more, necessarily affect and interfere with each other. 
This means that the role of the researcher and their own “situatedness”, such as 
gender, ethnicity and disability status, is openly acknowledged as having a crucial 
role to play in the analysis.  
Data for the analysis were chosen utilising MacLure’s (2013) notion of hot 
spots. This was the data which “spoke” most to me, holding an intensity over me 
which was as much embodied as it was cerebral. The data were analysed 
following Jackson and Mazzie’s (2011) process of plugging in.  This process works 
to highlight how theory and data constitute one another, operating through the 
bodymind of the researcher in ways which researchers are not always conscious 
of. Furthermore, rather than fitting data into neat, pre-established concepts, 
diffractive analysis takes a rhizomatic approach. The line of questioning within an 
analysis can take off in unexpected directions, connecting together phenomena 





Engaging with Pride and the Truth-
Claims of Inferiority 
In this chapter, I examine whether the notion of pride presents potential 
to disrupt the “truth-claims” of inferiority connected to disability. I then outline 
how this examination ultimately has led to the development of the concept of 
disability as an entanglement. To do so I describe a series of critical moments 
which happened during the hui and which fundamentally (re)shaped the 
formation of the analysis. These critical moments focused on participants’ 
responses to discussions and visual resources on the idea of pride, and my 
response to participants’ reactions. A discussion about the development of a 
series of role plays utilising a co-creation approach is included.   
As this chapter begins the analysis, a significant portion is dedicated to 
detailing the substance of these key moments. Particular aspects of these 
moments are explored; however, other facets are covered in more detail in the 
subsequent chapters.  
Truth-Claims of Disability as Inferior 
This chapter begins with a glaring, white-hot spot of data which 
emanated from the research. As with all the excerpts in this thesis, this is not 
done in order to showcase the “authentic” voice and thoughts of participants. As 
discussed in Chapter Six, “voice” is understood as a distributed phenomenon 
which is not tethered to individual subjects. It is viewed as a complex network of 
human and non-human agents which are all entangled together (Mazzei, 2016). 
The excerpts of voice detailed in this chapter should be read as hot-spots which 




which are produced through multiple, performative agencies, and which emerge 
as productive forces in the ongoing entanglements of disability.   
Throughout the chapter I alternate between the terms “hot-spots”, 
“moments” and “excerpts”. These words are used interchangeably to indicate 
phenomena which arose during the hui, and which I discuss in the analysis. I have 
chosen to maintain the use of all three words as they serve different purposes in 
the text; where “excerpt” pertains to the specific words placed on the page, 
“moment” is used to describe instance/s when phenomena arose. “Hot-spots”, 
in contrast, refer to data or phenomena which “have an intensity and force on 
the researcher, creating hot spots that glow” (V. Mitchell, 2016, p. 240). These 
are as much about the researcher’s affective response to the data as they are 
about the data themselves. Crucially, the phenomena within excerpts, moments 
and hot spots are not always viewed as being proximate in space and time.   
The hot spot presented below is contained in an observation from Taylor. 
This comment arose during hui two, when participants were asked to describe 
disability. The word “Disability” was written on the whiteboard, and Taylor 
suggested that it could be changed to “Dis/ability”. She then suggested that we 
could use this word to discuss some of the positive and negative aspects of 
disability. Whilst discussing some of the negative aspects of having a disability, 
participants noted the similar treatment which disabled people and immigrants 
face, in that they are both bullied for being “different”; Taylor’s comment came 
forth unexpectedly: 
 
Taylor: I’ve got something that people with disabilities, 
not some people with disabilities might not feel 
but um, I think if I didn’t, if was still job hunting I 
think I would feel like I’m not worth anything, like 
I’m not, like ((pause)), why is it me that has a 
disability and that doesn’t have a job and stuff, 
like, um, am I worth anything and stuff so and 
sometimes I think if you, if you do get a job like 




because people are giving you more chances to 
have a job. 
 
Taylor’s comment highlights a phenomenon which I headed into data generation 
seeking to highlight and disrupt: that of the “truth-claims of disability as 
inferior”. These claims to truth play a profound role in shaping how disability is 
conceptualised, and, as Taylor’s comments highlight, shape the formation of 
one’s subjectivity: of the sense of “self”. Her remark, “if I was still job hunting I 
think I would feel like I’m not worth anything” highlights the powerful role of 
capitalism in the intra-active production of the self. Those who are unable to 
meet the expectations of economic contribution and productivity, necessitated 
through employment, are deemed to have less social worth  (Clapton, 2009; 
Hyde, 2000). As Shakespeare (1996) notes, “disabled people are socialised to 
think of ourselves as inferior” (p. 103). This totalising view of disability as 
“naturally” inferior is perhaps most evident in the view that many people would 
rather be dead than disabled (Fritsch, 2015).  
These messages of inferiority sink beneath the skin (Clare, 2001), seeping 
into “the psychological, emotional and relational lives of non/disabled people” 
(Goodley, 2017, p. 109). It seems that Taylor has taken on the messages 
regarding human worth, “why is it me that has the disability”; along with the 
capitalist demand for employment “like, um am I worth anything?”. As C. Gordon 
(1980) suggests, this positioning of inferiority plays a significant role in providing  
“the very rationality which grounds the establishment of a regime of 
acceptability” (pp. 257-258) in validating and perpetuating disability oppression.   
Part of the power of these truth-claims lies in the absence of messages 
which present an alternative view of disability. Scholars such as Garland-
Thomson (2002, 2005), Goodley (2011), Morris (1991) and Titchkosky and 
Michalko (2012) highlight the almost total lack of positive language regarding 
disability. As Campbell (2009a) writes, “[i]t is difficult, if not impossible in this 
present moment, to speak of disability as desirous or desirable given the 
overwhelming influence of such negative [inferior] ontologies” (p. 169, emphasis 




worth and work may not apply to everyone, “some people with disabilities might 
not feel...” it is difficult for her to maintain this position in relation to her 
comments about herself.  
Garland-Thomson (2005) argues further that the cultural narratives 
available to disabled people today are similar to those available in historical 
gender and race systems. These narratives are prejudicial, oppressive and 
disempowering, due in part to the lack of ways to understand disability which are 
not oppressive. There are few exceptions to these totalising views, and their 
power is limited. As Garland-Thomson (2002) notes, “[o]ur culture offers 
profound disincentives and few rewards to identifying as disabled” (p. 22). 
Truth-claims of disability as inferior are perhaps most profoundly evident 
when the learning disability identity category is brought into the picture. This 
category has been variously described as toxic, damaging, a stigma, a master 
status that obscures all other identities (Caldwell, 2011; Goffman, 1963; 
Kittelsaa, 2014), and as a “profoundly inferior anomalous Otherness” (Clapton, 
2009, p. 209).  
There is ample evidence in the literature that many learning disabled 
people are aware of the stigma attached to the label of learning disability, and go 
to great lengths to hide their disabilities – to “pass” as “normal” (Brune & Wilson, 
2013; Caldwell, 2011; Edgerton, 1967; Kittelsaa, 2014). In 1967, Edgerton noted 
the extreme lengths many ex-institution patients went to in order to “pass”, 
covering themselves with what he terms a protective “cloak of competence”. 
Tactics involved in applying this cloak included people not speaking in public so 
they did not risk saying anything foolish, lying to spouses regarding their history 
of institutionalisation and the sterilisation they were forced to undergo in order 
to leave the institution, for fear of rejection, wearing a broken watch so they 
could ask for the time without having to admit they cannot read a clock, and 
acquiring various high-esteem objects in order look “normal”, including hoarding 
mail found in rubbish bins, photos of other people found at second-hand stores, 





The desire learning disabled people themselves have to not to be 
identified as disabled is not surprising given that, as Taylor highlights, disability 
has such a profound unfavourable connection to social worth. However, as Brune 
and Wilson (2013) highlight, the strategy of “passing” often takes a psychological 
toll on the learning disabled person, and has the effect of reinforcing, rather than 
challenging, the stigma of the label.  
In the following section, I examine what happened in the hui when I 
attempted to rupture the “truth-claims of inferiority”.  
An Exploration of Pride 
Guided by the work of Foucault, I headed into the hui seeking to highlight 
and disrupt the idea of “truth-claims of disability as inferior”, through the notion 
of pride. Here, disability pride involves “refusing to accept the values of society 
which says – with its words, its attitudes, its practices – that some human 
identities are less valuable than others (Parsons, 1999, p. 3). It is also about 
demonstrating the values that society could embody moving forward. Disability 
pride is about the acceptance and celebration of the difference inherent in 
disability, rather than the sameness of disabled people in relation to non-
disabled “others”.  
While pride was a central aim, it was also important to keep in mind that 
researchers play a crucial role affecting and interfering in the research process, 
both within the methodological and analysis frameworks (Baum et al., 2006; Lenz 
Taguchi, 2012). My desire to achieve a state of “pride” with participants would 
undoubtedly have had an impact on participants’ response throughout the hui, 
and shaped the hot-spots which emerged through the analysis.  I needed to be 
cautious to avoid, where possible, seeking out data which “fitted” the research 
aim and what I hoped to achieve at the outset.  I worked therefore to ensure 
that the data had its own “voice”, highlighting the many contradictions and 
points at which the data did not show what I was hoping for. In this sense, I 
needed to be conscious of how the data, theory and research aim interfered with 




impact this process had on the eventual outcome of the analysis (Lenz Taguchi, 
2012).  
The plan for the hui was to work together with a group of learning 
disabled people (see Chapter Five), collaboratively analysing visual materials 
which highlighted disabled people foregrounding pride in their disabilities. Prior 
to the introduction of the visual material, Glen was to ask the following question. 
The question, and participant initial responses are outlined below: 
 
Glen: ((Reading from the script)) Do you think 
someone could be proud of their disability? 
((Not reading from the script)) I know I am. 
Natalie: Yeah I'm proud. 
Luke: So am I, I'm proud. 
Jonathan: Of course I am cuz I do, I (think of that) in my 
heart. 
Natalie: I wouldn't want to be any other way. 
 
These initial responses was were encouraging, as they indicated to me that 
participants were open to the idea of disability pride. Throughout the hui, many 
participants continued to comment that they liked the idea of disability pride, 
and thought the concept was important. However, upon further investigation it 
became apparent that these conversations pertained to the notion of disability 
pride as an abstract idea, rather than being linked to any specific form of 
disability. When the discussion moved on to discuss specific disabilities, such as 
being in a wheelchair and having one leg, participant responses were less 
enthusiastic.  
Conversations regarding specific disabilities were introduced in hui five, 
prior to watching YouTube videos of people showcasing pride in their disability. 
All of the videos intended for use with participants had been vetted by Glen, as 
part of the co-creation approach. There was a brief conversation about whether 
participants thought someone could be proud of being in a wheelchair before 




wheelchair doing stunts (Hardy, 2013). This conversation was halted at the 
request of Carl:  
 
Carl: Ah excuse me Ingrid. 
Ingrid: Mmm hmmm? 
Natalie:  <Getting a lot of support> 
Carl: <Can can you> stop talking about the wheelchair 
please. (But) I a little panic.  
 
Carl and Jonathan informed us that they did not want to watch a video of 
someone having a good time in a wheelchair. As part of the processes of ongoing 
informed consent, participants were repeatedly reminded that they could say 
“no” to any conversation or activity at any time. I read Carl’s request for us to 
stop talking about wheelchairs, followed by his explanation of “I a little panic”, as 
a clear “no” to conversations regarding wheelchairs. Thus, following the 
methodological importance of ongoing consent, I moved onto the next item on 
the agenda, a video which showcased a man with one leg (Sundquist, 2014).  
Prior to showing this video, participants were asked whether they 
thought there could be anything good about having one leg. Participants 
struggled to think of any positive aspects to having one leg, and many showed 
signs of discomfort whilst watching the video. When the video was finished, a 
few participants commented that they enjoyed it.  For instance, Natalie laughed 
and commented on the Halloween costumes that appeared in the clip, as well as 
the man’s ability to share shoes with another man who had had the opposite 
foot amputated: 
 
Natalie: ((She speaks with laughter in her voice)) 
Halloweeny person dressed up as a flamingo … he 
had lots of fun finding the other guy that had the 






However other participants had a different response to this light-hearted clip: 
 
Luke: Well I found that quite weird. 
Ingrid: Yeah? 
…  
Ingrid:  What do you think, Jonathan? 
Jonathan: I didn't really look at the video. 
Ingrid: What was that sorry? 
Jonathan: I didn't really look at the video, because I didn't 
watch it. 
Ingrid: Oh how come? 
Jonathan: Just   f̊eels weird  ̊ ((he screws up his face and 
clasps his hands together)) 
Ingrid: It feels weird seeing someone with one leg? 
Karissa: Yeah. 
Jonathan: Yeah. 
Carl: Yeah so am I. 
 
Below I detail the ethical dilemma I faced after encountering this response from 
participants, where the need to ensure I kept to the processes of ongoing 
informed consent conflicted with the need to address the issue which 
participants were pointing to. [NB: This excerpt is further analysed in Chapter 
Eight].  
An Ethical Dilemma  
The response by most participants to this choice of video was a surprise.  
I had anticipated that talking about ableism would be challenging, but that 
talking about pride would be fun and enjoyable. Certainly, my conversations with 
Glen indicated that he enjoyed the videos. Initially, their response as a collective 




disability pride with participants. However, my supervisors advised me that this 
discomfort was productive, and was something I needed to address.  
This situation presented an ethical dilemma for me. As part of the 
processes of ongoing informed consent, participants were repeatedly informed 
that they could say no at any time, and did not have to join in any activity or 
discussion. The participants were clearly telling me “no” to watching videos and 
talking about specific disabilities in a positive way. However, my supervisors 
pointed out that respecting the participants does not mean that I have to 
respond by closing down discussions. Instead, I could leave the issue on the table 
for participants to deal with, in the spirit of co-construction.  
I spent some time considering why I felt the need to address this issue 
with participants, especially given that I had concerns about consent and the 
potential to cause harm to participants by continuing conversations they were 
uncomfortable with. In my consideration, I was brought back to my rationale for 
the research – that disability oppression is profound, and that despite our 
hardest efforts, this situation does not seem to be changing. This situation 
needed to be addressed. But then, why my participants? Why did I feel the need 
to address this issue with this group, given my concerns for harm?  
It was at this point that the power of diffractive analysis came to the fore. 
I realised that the question I was asking myself about why I felt the need to 
address the issue with participants was uncomfortable, and that I had 
unconsciously pushed it away and moved on to another point. Once I was 
conscious of my desire to avoid the question, I stepped back to it and 
acknowledged my discomfort, realising that this feeling meant there was an 
important issue to address. I saw that the ethical dilemma was much more 
complex than whether I would cause harm to my participants by addressing the 
issue; by stepping away from the conversation I was leaving the wider issue of 
disability oppression unaddressed. Participants were highlighting the key truth-
claim I believed needed to be ruptured – that seeing (and feeling) that disability 
is inferior leads to disability oppression. But my own engagement with the 
effects of this truth claim made it hard for me to see how I was going to move 




By leaving these effects unaddressed, I was foreclosing an opportunity to make 
headway into changing the very situation I was asking my participants to try to 
confront.  Was leaving the issue unaddressed really the ethical option? I did not 
believe it was, and proceeded with the advice of my supervisors.  
I decided that the best strategy to deal with this issue of participants 
wanting to shut down conversations was to follow the co-creation approach as 
advised.  Opening myself up to being vulnerable with participants, I came to 
realise, was an integral part of this approach. So I prepared and gave a “speech”, 
laying out the dilemma faced, and leaving space for participants to choose what 
they wanted to do with this dilemma. Participants responded well to my speech, 
and indicated that they wished to continue with the hui. Glen and I asked 
participants what they wanted to do next; however, the participants indicated 
that they enjoyed the pre-prepared activities and that they wished to do 
whatever Glen and I had planned.  
 
In the following section, I discuss the activity that Glen and I conducted 
with participants which drew upon the possibility of using the disability identity 
as a tool to enact change. 
An Attempt at Rupture 
After the “weird” response from participants, Glen and I spent some time 
together working through ideas. I wanted to explicate and problematize the 
truth-claim of “disability as inferior”, as well as the connection between thinking 
something is inferior, and our subsequent actions. However, how this might be 
achieved required re-thinking. Glen and I tipped the “bag of things” onto the 
floor and played around with different resources, until the topic of bullying came 
up. Bullying had emerged as one of the key issues participants face in our 
discussions about ableism. I had also recently read the article by Davies (2011), 
Bullies as Guardians of the Moral Order or an Ethic of Truths?. Davies’ idea, that 
bullying is one of the means by which the normative moral order is established 




The discussion with Glen reminded me of an incident in high school when 
someone attempted to bully me for being short. A tall young man came and 
stood over me, saying “you’re really short!” in a derogatory tone of voice. My 
reply of “…yeah”, spoken as if to say “that is very obvious. So what?”, seemed to 
confuse him. The young man seemed unsure what to do about my refusal to 
accept the inferiority of shortness, and simply walked away. Glen and I role-
played this scene, then swapped the notion of shortness for that of disability. I 
was the bully, and Glen replied with something like “yeah”, and “I don’t care I’m 
proud of it”. Glen enjoyed the role play, and to me it seemed perfect. It both 
highlighted and disrupted the notion of “disability as inferior”, and further 
emphasised how thinking something is inferior, and the actions one takes, are 
entangled. 
After my “speech” in hui six, participants indicated that they were 
enthusiastic about watching Glen and I do a role play. Below, I detail several 
excerpts which highlight what happened during the role plays, as well as the 
participants’ responses:  
 
Ingrid: ((I am standing on a tool so I look tall)) Alright, so 
one time. This person, this boy, he was quite tall, 
and he came up to me at school and, Glen do you 
want to come right here?? ((I motion to the spot 
in front of the chair)) 
Glen: ((Moves over to stand in front of the chair)) 
Ingrid:   Yeah, so he came right up to me ((I fold my arms, 
look down at Glen, and speak in a mean-sounding 
voice)). You're really short! ((I change to my 
normal voice)). Yeah, so he was trying to pick on 
me cuz I'm short. And he thought that being short 
was a problem. So what would you do in that 
situation Glen? Someone comes up to you and 




Glen: I will... ah, damn I need to, um… ((Glen appears as 
if he is trying to remember what we did in our 
earlier role plays)) 
Ingrid: Just what, what, what is your instinct? What do 
you think you would do? 
Glen: Well for me I would walk away and, like, like, ig-
ignore that person. Like that ((he avoids eye 
contact with me and walks off)). 
Ingrid:   Yeah. OK. So what about if instead, I came up to 
you, and I went ((I hop off the stool, stand in front 
of Glen with my arms folded, and speak in a 
mean-sounding voice)) "you play rugby!" 
Jonathan: Yeah ((spoken with an intonation indicating he 
means “so what?”)). 
 ((pause)) 
Ingrid:  What do you think about that? 
Taylor: I know, you can say back to them, yeah, so ((said 
to indicate “so what”)). 
Ingrid: Yeah. Yeah, what do other people think? 
Jonathan: Um, I reckon yeah I play sp-, I play rugby, and you 
could say what team you're in. 
Ingrid: Yeah. So you think if someone came up to you 
and went "you play rugby!" you'd just be like ((I 
lift my arms up, indicating “so what?”)) 
Jonathan: Yeah. 
Natalie: Yeah so. 
Jonathan: Yes. 
By bringing in the notion of rugby to the role-play bullying, I was drawing upon 
the notion which Davies (2011) had identified. Rugby is not the subject of 
bullying in Aotearoa New Zealand, because it is not deemed a source of 
inferiority within the normative, moral order.  When Glen was being bullied for 




advised as a method to stop bullying. However, participants understood that this 
technique would not be necessary in the case of bullying about rugby: they 
would say “yeah so”, and, as Jonathan comments, say what team they are in. 
After this role play, Glen and I moved on to the disability role play we had 
developed. In doing this, I sought to harness the line of flight established in the 
rugby role play, where participants did not participate in the inferiorisation of 
rugby; replying “yeah so”, as if playing rugby was nothing to be embarrassed 
about. It was my hope that this line of flight could be transferred across to the 
notion of disability:  
 
Ingrid: Ok. What about if I came up to Glen and I went ((I 
fold my arms and speak in a mean-sounding 
voice)) "you're disabled!”. 
Glen: So what? ((Glen unfolds his arms and holds them 
out to emphasize the “so what”)). 
 
Doing the bullying role play with Glen reminded several participants of their own 
experiences of bullying. Jonathan in particular seemed at least momentarily to 
pick up on the new line of flight; however, this line was soon reterritorialized 
onto a line of descent: 
 
Jonathan: I had the, I had the same, I had a similar thing. 
Um, it was, he was actually picking on me but he 
thought I was disabled. 
Ingrid: Yeah.  
Jonathan: Back when I was young.  
Ingrid: Mmm hmm.  
Jonathan: Ummm, he thought, he thought that, me being 
disabled that young. That he said, you shouldn't 
be disabled like that. Um, because um, he 
thought he was picking on me.  




Jonathan: But, he said to me um, I said its OK being disabled 
but um, I'm changing my um answer to that. But 
it's half and half like, you could say yeah I'm OK 
with it but, I don't believe being disabled 
anymore. So, that helps the bully to back away.  
Ingrid: Yeah? So what helped the bully back away sorry? 
Jonathan: Um, that saying that I'm not disabled anymore. 
Ingrid: You said that you weren't disabled? 
Jonathan: Yeah. 
 
In this excerpt, Jonathan first states “I said it’s OK being disabled”, picking up on 
the new line of flight introduced through the bullying role play with Glen. 
However, he informs us further “I’m changing my um answer to that” in his 
retelling of the story, indicating this was not the answer he gave to the bully at 
the time that the incident happened, and is perhaps not the answer he would 
give now if faced with the same situation again. Jonathan seems to vacillate 
between the lines of flight, stating “But its half and half like, you could say yeah 
I’m OK with it but, I don’t believe being disabled anymore”. While he initially 
indicates a connection with the new line of flight, he then decides that telling the 
bully he is “not disabled anymore” will help them to back away.  
This role play about bullying built upon an idea first articulated by 
Foucault (1980), in which he argues that “there are no relations of power 
without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they 
are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised” (p. 142, 
emphasis added). Butler (1997a) builds upon Foucault’s work in her development 
of performativity, noting that a performative must continually be repeated in 
order to establish its legitimacy. As she asserts, “[i]f such a structure is 
dependent upon its enunciation for its continuation, then it is at the site of 
enunciation that the question of its continuity is to be posed” (p. 19). That is, the 
moment of repetition, whereby a (gender/disability/race etc.) identity is recited, 
is the achilles’ heel of power (Buchner, 2015); it is in this moment that the 




concept; they grabbed hold of the site of enunciation, when someone is 
(re)constituted as a disabled subject, and took the process of subjection onto a 
new line of flight; it utilised “the tools of recognition in order to disturb their 
recognisability” (Brady & Schirato, 2011, p. 64). In Jonathan’s statement, “but 
um, I'm changing my um answer to that” he appears to see the possibility for a 
new line of flight in reframing his response to the bully, stating “I said it’s OK 
being disabled”. Jonathan evidences the possibility of rupture to the sedimented 
lines of flight when the disability identity is (re)cited; however, this rupture is 
soon reterritorialised as Jonathan wavers between accepting and rejecting the 
identity.  
Furthermore, the idea of challenging power relations through reworking 
the constitution of the disability identity shown in this excerpt aligns well with 
the similar occurances in relation to rights movements. The language regarding 
disability – the site of enunciation where resistance to power can be harnessed, 
is particularly important. Titchkosky and Michalko (2012) state, “[t]hat disability 
is conceptualised as a problem is what we take our problem in need of 
theorising” (p. 127). Similarly, Oliver (1990) asserted that, from the 1950s 
onwards, marginalised communities realised that the problems they were facing 
needed to be redefined. One of the means by which this was achieved was by 
challenging the sexist and racist language which underpinned the existing 
problems, and “creating, substituting or taking over terminology to provide more 
positive imagery” (p. 3).  
Clare (2015) notes that language, and naming specifically, has been used 
to create pride and power in these rights movements. For instance, the term 
“Black is Beautiful” became a “rallying cry for Black community and culture” 
(Clare, 2015, p. 109). The term “queer” has also served as a coalition-building 
word, bringing together a diverse group of people with differing sexualities and 
gender identities (Clare, 2015). In short, the literature highlights the powerfully 
agentic nature of language; it can be used as a tool to establish and maintain 
unequal power relations, yet also be a place where resistance to these power 




To transform self-hatred into pride is a fundamental act of 
resistance. In many communities, language becomes one of the 
arenas for this transformation. Sometimes the words of hatred 
and violence can be neutralized or even turned into the words of 
pride. To stare down the bully calling cripple, the basher swinging 
the word queer like a baseball bat, to say “Yeah, you’re right. I’m 
queer, I’m a crip. So what?” undercuts the power of those who 
want us dead. (p. 109) 
In 1990, Oliver noted that this change in language was a phenomenon yet to be 
seen in the disability community. Disabled people have long challenged the use 
of oppressive language regarding disability – do not say “retard”, “cripple”, or 
“handicap” - yet this language has not been supplanted by more positive 
language which could foster an affirmative group consciousness or identity. It 
was my hope that by harnessing the moment of citation, whereby the disability 
identity is recited, we could enact a new line of flight by responding with pride. I 
hoped that, through doing this, we could begin the work of fostering more 
positive language in regards to disability.  
A Moment of Rupture  
In contrast to the participants’ reactions to the videos in hui five, 
participants indicated that they enjoyed the role plays and discussions in hui six. 
They stated that they would like to do more of this, and in hui seven the 
participants developed their own role plays. Several participants played around 
with the “short” role play as well as a few other ideas. However, little productive 
progress into the development a new line of flight was made. After a while, 
Jonathan decided that he would like to conduct a role play utilising items from 
the “bag of things”. He picked out many of the medical supplies from the bag, 
winding bandages around several parts of his body, and placing an eye patch 
over his eye. He told us that he had just come back from the war. He also picked 
up my handbag and placed three hats upon his head. As no other participants 




against Jonathan because of his newly acquired disabilities, and we had a 
discussion about how I as the bully was thinking about disability. This was done 
once again in order to draw out the connection between thoughts and actions. 
Thereafter, I shifted my positioning within the role play by tying a bandana 
around one eye, indicating that I had become blind in that eye, and thus 
disabled. I opened up to being vulnerable once more, and invited participants to 
help me. I asked how I would feel OK about myself, having bullied someone for 
having a disability, then becoming disabled. Participants initially suggested that I 
would feel “stink”, and change my attitude, because I would understand how 
disabled people feel. I continued to ask how I would feel proud about myself and 
OK about myself with my newly acquired disability, and the conversation 
meandered without much progress into discussing disability in a positive way. 
However, this changed when Jonathan stepped up to me, as outlined below: 
 
Ingrid: How else could I feel proud of myself? 
Jonathan: We could be mates ((steps over to me and links 
his arm through mine)). 
Ingrid:   Yeah. 
Natalie: Get new friends. 
Ingrid:   Yeah, how would I get new friends, do you think? 
Glen:  ((Walks around to the other side of me and puts 
his arm around my waist)) 
Carl: Ingrid. 
Taylor: From the Blind Foundation. 
Ingrid: Yeah, so I would get to meet new people, 
wouldn't I? 
Taylor: Mmm. 
Ingrid:   That would be cool. 
Jonathan: Yeaaah. 
Natalie: Other people that can help you out. 






Although brief, this conversation was the closest we got to a new line of flight, 
whereby disability was talked about in a positive way with specific, rather than 
generalised, language. There were other small deterritorialisations throughout 
the hui which hinted at pride. For instance, in the excerpt from Jonathan noted 
earlier, he changed his story from saying that he does not believe he has a 
disability, to saying “it’s OK being disabled” to the historical bully.  When Karissa 
was asked to define disability in hui eight, she stated “um, if the people comes 
up to you and say um I'm a disability, you say ((shrugs)) so what?”. 
Discussion 
Despite some promising lines of flight, there was no clear evidence to 
indicate that, overall, a state of pride was achieved in the hui. In hui eight, 
participants were specifically asked whether they thought their ideas related to 
disability and / or themselves had changed because of the hui. No participants 
indicated that they had noticed any change, with the exception of Glen who felt 
the hui had helped him develop his public speaking and facilitation skills. 
However, participants continued to state that they liked the idea of disability 
pride, and many participants said they thought it was important. This aspect of 
my data collection has left me with much to speculate about, and I outline key 
outcome reflections below.  
While it may be that the indications of pride were a result of participants 
responding to my desire for this to happen; that is, participants may have picked 
up on the “correct” answer that I was seeking in that situation, rather than a 
sense of pride being fully mobilised in the participants’ bodyminds, perhaps the 
reason pride was so hard to mobilise was because I do not have a disability. 
Would seeing someone in a wheelchair talk about their disability in a positive 
way, rather than trying to “act” have produced a different reaction in Carl? 
Would someone with one leg missing have elicited a different response from 
Luke and the participants who found the video “weird”? Perhaps the issue was 




terms such as “embracing disability” or “embracing who you are” hold more 
potential?  
Regardless of why pride was not mobilised, I realise that the challenges 
we faced in mobilising pride during the hui, and in discussing disability as 
anything other than a truth-claim of inferiority, mean that I cannot clearly state 
that we achieved a state of pride in the hui. Therefore, no clear answer for 
research question one: “does the notion of pride present potential for a positive 
re-imagination of disability?” could be arrived at.  However, the challenge in 
achieving pride is not entirely unexpected. As Campbell (2005) states, the 
pervasive view of disability as inferior “makes possibilities of “pride” difficult (if 
not impossible) to generate” (p. 117). Drawing on the work of Barad helps to 
illuminate this point further. As she notes, “[i]ntra-active practices of 
engagement not only make the world intelligible in specific ways but also 
foreclose other patterns of mattering” (p. 394). My attempt to change the way 
disability came to matter seemed to be foreclosed through forces which I was 
not aware of during the hui. However, the foreclosure itself presented potential 
for an alternative line of flight in the analysis.  
Rather than viewing the research problem as “truth-claims of disability as 
inferior", I came to see that the issue was a much wider and deeper one than I 
had initially thought. In particular, participants’ affective responses to the videos 
and discussions signalled the limitations of viewing the problem as largely 
discursive. I came to see that “the truth-claims of disability as inferior” involved 
much more than the working of a discrete discourse, and could indeed be more 
productively seen as an ontology of inferiority. What arose from the data were 
particular key phenomena which were agentic in foreclosing patterns of 
mattering in relation to disability, and that these forces were preventing the 
development of pride, or preventing an alternative imagination of disability. 
These forces can be seen to enable disability oppression to continue to flourish. 
In short, the challenge in achieving pride enabled me to come to the view of 
disability as an ongoing series of entanglements; entanglements which 
materialise in such a way that they reiterate disability oppression. I came to view 




production of new lines of flight in the way people imagine the possibilities for 
disability.   
Over the next four analysis chapters I further explore the territorialising 
forces of the entanglement. In particular, I examine what constitutes these 
entanglements, and what the performative agencies within these entanglements 
are. Then, I explore what is happening within these entanglements which 
enables disability oppression to flourish, and what these entanglements 







The Affective Entanglements of 
Disability  
Within agential realism, all phenomena are seen as performative agencies 
– theories, concepts and material objects included. This chapter brings several of 
these performative agencies into the threshold of the analysis. These include: 
participant responses to visual materials on pride, agential realism, Wetherell’s 
work on affective practice, and the notion of disability as an ongoing series of 
entanglements. In particular, participants’ adverse responses to visual materials 
on ableism will be analysed as an affective practice; one which both emerged 
through, and served to shape, the problematic iterative entanglements of 
disability. The Deleuzian questions of how does it work and what does it do will 
be utilised in order to examine what constitutes the affective entanglements of 
disability, how these entanglements enable the perpetuation of disability 
oppression, and what potential for foreclosure and allowance these 
entanglements enable.  
The Absence of Affect 
As part of the discussion regarding informed consent in hui one, 
participants were reminded that some conversations throughout the hui might 
be upsetting; something which had been discussed during the initial consent 
process. To help participants consider the importance of difficult conversations, 
Glen asked them to tell a story about a time when they needed to talk about 
something that was hard to talk about, but was important to talk about. This 






Ingrid: Has anyone else got a story of a time 
when they had to talk about something 
that was hard but it was important to talk 
about it?  
((a few people say yes simultaneously)) 
Luke: Well I’ve got one. 
Ingrid: Luke? 
Luke When my grandfather passed away. 
Ingrid: Yeah. 
Luke Mum couldn’t tell me for a few days.  
Ingrid: Ohhhh 
Luke:  I said mum what's happened? She 
wouldn't tell me. I said are you serious, 
(she) won't tell me for a few days. And 
(everything just) ((clicks fingers)) when I 
was there for the weekend and Judith20 
just told me he died. 
 
Luke’s story of not being told about a close family death is not unusual. A similar 
story was told in the film A Place of Our Own: Living with the Legacy of 
Institutionalisation (Marbrook, 2009). In this film, Murray, who had previously 
lived in an institution, was not told for a week that his mother had died. He was 
not allowed to go to the funeral because people feared it would make him upset. 
In the above excerpt, Luke too appears to have been excluded from knowledge 
of a death - his mum “wouldn’t tell me” and ‘‘a few days’’ pass before he finds 
out. In the end, he learns about the death from someone who may not have 
been a family member.  Such stories raise questions about how often learning 
disabled people are excluded from knowledge where strong emotions are 
involved.  
 
                                                     




When thinking about how the issue of silence impacted upon my own 
practice as a support worker, I realise that I simply cannot remember a time 
when I talked with someone I supported about expressing and managing 
emotions. As someone who loves attending training courses, I have attended 
almost every course offered to me over the years. Despite training packages 
including non-violent crisis intervention, and how to support people with mental 
illness, I cannot remember a single piece of training related to how to proactively 
support people to manage their emotions. I don’t even remember a training 
session which told me that this is something I should do.  
After this realisation, I started to notice how I and other people around 
me tried to protect the people we supported from having negative emotions. If 
someone did seem to have a negative emotion, helping the person feel “better” 
as soon as possible seemed almost instinctive. Looking back, I felt that it was my 
job to ensure that the people I supported were happy at all times. If someone 
was upset, I was failing as a competent support worker, and needed to work to 
ensure the person felt happy again. I am left wondering about the impact that 
this has had on the people I supported, and the impact that this practice 
continues to have on people currently in support services.  
The Affective Entanglements of Disability 
At the start of the hui, I had not given a great deal of consideration to the 
relationship between affect and disability. Most likely, this was simply because I 
was not reading about it in the disability studies literature I engaged with prior to 
the hui in 2015. However, I had given some consideration to the role of affect in 
the methodology, and anticipated that affect could play a powerful role during 
the hui. I had worked to ensure I had robust safety systems in place for 
participants (see Chapter Five), so that I could respond in an ethical manner to 
any challenging emotions which arose during the course of our conversations. As 
it turned out, my preparations were highly beneficial, as many challenging 
incidents related to affect occurred during the hui. However, these incidences 




During the consent process, I warned participants that we would be 
having challenging conversations about disability, and asked for consent on the 
basis of this knowledge. To my complete surprise, several participants became 
more enthused about joining the project after hearing this warning than at any 
other point, with one participant stating quite simply “sign me up!”. This 
enthusiasm for having challenging conversations was a trend which continued 
into the hui. Many participants were eager to talk about ableism, or “how their 
disabilities have caused difficulties in their lives”. However, this enthusiasm did 
not continue for all participants when the discussion moved to disability pride. I 
had assumed that discussing ableism would be challenging, and talking about 
pride would be “fun” and “easy”. As I will highlight throughout this chapter, my 
expectations were far removed from the reality of what emerged.  
In Chapter Seven, I briefly discussed participant responses to discussions 
regarding specific disabilities in hui five. This chapter discusses participant 
responses to these videos in greater depth.  
Glen and I had picked the video we liked most to introduce discussions 
regarding disability pride with participants; this video highlighted the story of 
Aaron “Wheelz” Fotheringham, an extreme wheelchair athlete who performs in 
the Nitro Circus (Hardy, 2013). Prior to watching the video, Glen asked 
participants what they thought could be good about being in a wheelchair. The 
conversation progressed as below:  
 
Ingrid: So, what else do you guys think could be 
good about being in a wheelchair? 
Carl: Ah excuse me Ingrid. 
Ingrid: Mmm hmm? 
Natalie: <Getting a lot of support> 
Carl: <Can can you> stop talking about the 
wheelchair please. (But) I a little panic. 





Ingrid: Ok, um, well we're going to watch a video 
soon, which I think you might enjoy, is 
that OK? 
Carl: ((Shakes head)) <No> 
Ingrid: <You don't> want to watch a video about 
someone in a wheelchair having a good 
time? 
Carl: No.  
Ingrid: No you don't want to? 
Jonathan: I don't want to either. 
 
Carl informed us further that his “panic” response was because the discussion 
reminded him of the time he saw his nana in a wheelchair, commenting “yeah 
but I a little panic about my nana in wheelchair”. Is Carl’s panic because 
wheelchairs also function as a symbol connected to ideas about the frailty of the 
human condition? Wheelchairs can symbolise accidents, illness and death, 
serving as a reminder of human vulnerability and mortality. For Carl, seeing his 
nana in a wheelchair may have served as a signal of his nana’s increasing frailty 
and approaching death. In this intra-active moment, Carl’s experience with his 
nana became entangled within the discussion, serving as a territorialising force 
which  inhibited further conversation about the empowering qualities of 
wheelchair use at that moment.  
We moved to the next video that Glen and I had picked out. This is video 
of a man with one leg who wears funny Halloween costumes, such as a 
gingerbread man with a leg missing (Sundquist, 2014). Before watching the 
video, Glen asked participants what they thought could be good about having 
one leg. Luke responded:  
 
Luke: Well I know a guy who's got one leg. He's 
got a leg wrong ((indicates chopping off 





Luke:  And that just freaking freak me out man. 
 
Once the video started playing and the man with one leg came onscreen, 
mentioning that he has one leg, Luke had a powerful affective response. He 
reeled back against the couch, shuddered, put his hand by his face and made 
what sounded like a “disturbed” noise. This event could best be described as a 
display of embodied repulsion. Or, as Hughes (2012) might state, a 
demonstration of “ableist disgust”.  
It is important to remember at this point that although some participants 
stated that they found the video “weird”, this was not the response of all of the 
participants. Glen, Gary, Natalie and Karissa said that they enjoyed the video, 
and found the Halloween costumes amusing. However, it is the negative 
response to the videos and discussions which I wish to explore, as these 
responses can be viewed as an affective practice, in line with Wetherell’s (2012) 
understanding of this idea, as below. Practices are: 
[A] figuration where body possibilities and routines become 
recruited or entangled together with meaning-making and with 
other social and material configurations. It is an organic complex 
in which all the parts relationally constitute each other. (p. 19) 
These practices can be understood as routinized entanglements – as sites of 
repetition which emerge unbidden and unfold “relatively automatically with little 
conscious monitoring” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 129). Crucially, Wetherell’s quote 
points to the intertwining of affective practices and wider meaning-making 
processes. This can be seen in Luke’s response, included again below.  
 
Luke: Well I know a guy who's got one leg. He's 
got a leg wrong ((indicates chopping off 
motion with hand against his leg)) 
Ingrid: Yeah. 





What can be seen in these remarks – “He’s got a leg wrong” and “that just 
freaking freak me out man” – is an example of an embodied meaning-making 
practice of disability. Luke highlights some of the beliefs, practices and processes 
which enable the positioning of disability as inferior. According to Hodge and 
Runswick-Cole (2013), these beliefs, practices and processes are often obscured 
and difficult to pin down in the everydayness of life-as-usual. Luke’s response 
foregrounds the logic inherent in the abled/disabled binary, as discussed in 
Chapter Two. The notion of abled is established as the ascendant term – as the 
natural, normal and desirable way of being human (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, 
Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017) – hidden in this example within the phrase “a leg 
wrong”. In contrast, disability as the subordinate term within the binary is fully in 
view, signalled by what is considered non-normative, abnormal and undesirable:  
“a leg wrong” (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017). The 
result “that just freaking freaked me out”, coupled with Luke’s embodied 
response, indicates the affective impact of the entanglement of these processes.  
Participants’ responses to videos and discussions highlight the role of 
affective practice in the ongoing inferiorisation of disability; this feeling about 
disability is part of the meaning-making “beliefs, practices and processes” which 
enables disability to be continually positioned as “naturally” inferior. Or as Barad 
(2003) might say, this phenomenon is a boundary-making practice which is “fully 
implicated in the dynamics of intra-activity” (p. 822), through which the 
phenomenon of disability comes to matter.   
In particular, affective practices have a powerful role to play in shaping 
what could be termed the normative orders of life. As Wetherell (2012) argues, 
affective practices are subtly woven into communal methods for developing 
moral and normative assessments. Affective practices form an integral 
component of the normative practices that shape what is considered “socially 
appropriate” and expected in relation to disability.  
When viewed through a humanist lens, Luke’s visceral response to the 
video could be understood as the intentional choice of a rationally acting 




disability. However, when looking at this moment through the lens of agential 
realism and the framework of affective practice, Luke’s response can be viewed 
as an embodied enactment of the normative orders of the disability 
entanglement, as a practice which shapes the very materiality of the body. As 
Foucault asserts: 
The body is…directly involved in a political field; power relations 
have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, 
torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to 
emit signs… power is not exercised simply as an obligation or 
prohibition on those who “do not have it”; it invests them, is 
transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon 
them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist 
the grip it has on them. (Foucault, 1977/1995, pp. 25–27) 
Numerous normative orders are intertwined within the entanglements of 
disability. Some of the orders already outlined in this thesis include the 
seemingly “rational” drive to pursue normal and to become “independent”, as 
well as the well-established truth-claims of “disability as a problem” and 
“disability as an essential category”. What Luke and the other participants’ 
responses highlight is that these orders are not a purely cognitive phenomenon – 
they are an embodied knowledge – a power relation which has an immediate 
hold upon the body.  
This connection between the normative orders of disability and 
embodied, affective practice was highlighted by participants when they 
described the video of the one-legged man as “weird”, as noted earlier. Taylor 
highlighted this phenomenon further when asked about her response to the 
video:  
 
Taylor: I sort of think it's a bit fake. 
Ingrid: Yeah? How come? 
Taylor: Because. Um. 




Taylor: No not those costumes but, it wasn't like a 
serious YouTube clip. It was like a fun YouTube 
clip. Like YouTubers do. 
Ingrid: Mmm hmm? 
Taylor: In those videos. But. It was like he was joking 
about missing a leg, sort of. 
Ingrid: Yeah. 
Natalie:  Like he didn't care if he had, if he was missing a 
leg. 
Ingrid: So you think if somebody has one leg missing, 
that, and they joke about it, it doesn't quite seem 
right? 
Taylor: Yeah.  
 
Taylor’s response, wherein she found the video “fake”, once again highlights the 
territorialising force of affect within the hui. Seeing someone joke about missing 
a leg just “doesn’t seem quite right”. Taylor seems sceptical about the idea that 
someone could miss a leg and joke about it as if they did not care, commenting 
“It was like he was joking about missing a leg, sort of…Like he didn’t care if he 
had, if he was missing a leg”. In this sense, what feels wrong/ right/ weird/ fake 
in relation to disability is an affective practice – an embodiment of the normative 
orders of the disability entanglement which shape the possibilities for the lines of 
flight. Participants’ affective responses highlighted the way in which disability 
and affect are inescapably, ontologically entangled, shaping what it is possible to 
think, know and feel about disability.  
Furthermore, these normative orders play an integral role in the 
formation of the subject and their subjectivity; they are a part of the boundary-
making practices through which humans are intra-actively co-constituted. As 
Wetherell et al. (2015) note, affective practices play an important role in 
“constructing legitimate and illegitimate social actors” (p. 62). Taylor and the 
other participants’ responses to the video demonstrate this very phenomenon, 




“weird” and “fake”. Wetherell et al. (2015) note further that “[t]he dance 
between authenticity and inauthenticity, between reason and passion, between 
moderation and intensity, and the variable accounts this allows, is eminently 
suited to the play of power” (p. 62). The formation of subjects, their “identity” 
and subjectivity, affective practice, and legitimacy are closely woven together 
(Wetherell, 2014). Or, as Barad (2007) insists, humans do not stand separate 
from the world in which they are constituted. 
The Agency of Memory  
Another performative agency entangled within the affective practices of 
disability was that of memory. In hui six, I asked participants directly if their 
desire not to continue with the discussions and videos on disability pride was 
because they made them feel “uncomfortable”. However, none of the 
participants seemed to agree with my conclusion, and the conversation 
progressed as below:  
 
Ingrid:  … but the people who said that they didn't want 
to watch the video and they didn't want to talk 
about it, is that because you felt uncomfortable 
about it?  
((Nobody indicates agreement)) 
You're not sure?  
Natalie: I think it reminds, reminds us that we know 
someone that's in that situation. 
Ingrid: Yeah? 
Natalie: And that brings up memories and stuff. 
Ingrid: Yeah. 
Natalie: For some people. 
Ingrid: Yeah that's a good point. Yeah. And why do you 
think that would, do you think the memories 




Natalie: Yeah it'd be, unhappy. 
Ingrid: How come? 
Natalie: Oh, like, like when I saw it. Um, when it was in a 
wheelchair. It reminded me of my nana being in a 
wheelchair and being in a rest home. 
Ingrid: Yeah. 
Natalie: And can't walk. 
 
As Natalie tells us, the discussion on wheelchairs in hui five was entangled 
together with the memory of “nana being in a wheelchair and being in a rest 
home”, when she also “can’t walk”. As with Carl’s nana, this symbol could be 
read as a display of frailty and the closeness of death, an unpleasant experience 
which was remembered during the hui.  
Looking further through the data, I realised that these were not isolated 
incidences. When participants were asked in hui two to describe disabled people 
they knew, memories of relatives with disabilities who had died came to the fore 
from several participants. This is highlighted in the excerpt below from Jonathan: 
 
Jonathan: Um, this is really important to me. Um, this 
person who I know really really well was my 
cousin, um, he um, he since he was alive and well 
and um, ((Jonathan starts playing with the chord 
on shorts)) he got a disability um he had a 
disability where he can’t do anything for himself 
and um, he couldn’t move. He couldn’t do 
anything. He has a tube for his food and that 
what’s was, was not a good feeling for me. But 
um, since then um, since he passed away, 
because he died, and um, I found it really really 
hard to think about the good times what I think 
about him. Because he was a person in my life 




with me ((Jonathan wipes his eye, Karissa puts a 
hand on his shoulder)), he… ((Jonathan starts 
crying, Karissa puts her arm around him and 
starts rubbing his arm)), he was everything to me 
((Jonathan’s voice goes higher from crying, he 
sniffs and rubs his eye)), and I miss him every 
single day.  
 
Jonathan’s story indicates that he is still affected by the experience of his 
disabled cousin’s death, commenting “I found it really really hard to think about 
the good times what I think about him” and “I miss him every single day”. This 
affective event is still so powerfully felt that he starting crying in the hui and 
asked us to stop talking about death, because it was making him upset. 
Jonathan’s story, along with the responses from Carl and Natalie, foreground the 
entanglement of memory, affect, disability and mortality. These memories were 
not something which existed purely in the mind, nor exclusively in the past. 
Memory is an embodied phenomenon (Hirsch & Spitzer 2009) which became re-
experienced through the intra-active moments in the hui, as Jonathan so 
movingly highlights. Deleuze (1956) elucidates this idea further, arguing that the 
notion of “the past” is not constituted “after having been present, it coexists with 
itself as present” (as cited in Davies et al., 2013, p. 682, emphasis in original).  
 
Jonathan’s story reminded me of another gentleman, Jim21, whom I did 
not directly support, but who was supported by the service I worked in. Jim was 
a kind, loving gentleman whose daily schedule revolved around visiting his best 
friend, Janet, who had Alzheimer’s and lived in a rest home. Every day, Jim would 
turn up to the rest home to feed Janet lunch and read her a story, then continue 
on with his other interests. I remember a service manager commenting one day 
that Janet’s health was failing, that she would soon die, and that we should really 
do something to help Jim prepare for this. However, perhaps unsure about how 
                                                     




exactly this should / could be done, this preparation never happened. Janet’s 
death was traumatic for Jim, particularly because he did not understand what 
was happening or why the rest home staff would not let him visit Janet when she 
was extremely unwell. To make matters worse, Jim’s mother died within a few 
months of Janet, something which Jim again seemed to be unprepared for. As 
Jim’s support service, it seemed like it should have been our job to support him 
through these important life events, yet how were we supposed to go about 
doing this? As I was not directly involved with supporting Jim until later on I do 
not know exactly what was done or tried; however, I do know that Jim’s mental 
health soon spiralled out of control. He went from being a cheerful, motivated 
man with a busy life (albeit with its ups and downs), to being an angry, severely 
depressed man who became violent and did not want to leave the house. He 
went from living in his own house with about 17 hours visiting support per week, 
to having 24/7 one-on-one support with staff trained in crisis intervention and 
keeping themselves safe.  
I am left wondering what we should have done for Jim. What would his 
life look like today if we had provided support to help him prepare for Janet and 
his mother’s deaths? What would this support look like? Was our inaction driven 
by our fear that addressing the issue poorly would be worse than not addressing 
it? Who do you even ask when you want help with this as a support worker? And 
how many other learning disabled people are left with these powerful, 
unresolved emotions because we are paralysed by our lack of knowledge and 
skills as support workers? I believe we need to seek some answers to these 
questions, so that the Jonathans and Jims of the world do not continue to be left 
in limbo.  
 
In the following section, I examine how affect operated as a performative 




Affect as Agentic  
Affective practices are a performative agency within the entanglements 
of disability. Or, as Ria Cheyne (2016) so succinctly states, “disability makes 
people feel” (3:02). Crucially, this view of affective practice means that affect not 
only emerges through the entanglements of disability, but also shapes the 
emergence of the lines of flight. Discussions regarding ableism – which 
participants were eager to engage in – flowed relatively unproblematically with 
the lines of descent, wherein disability is positioned as inferior. However, 
discussing disability in a positive way seemed to diverge from this line of flight. 
The affective responses from participants appeared as a territorialising force; 
one which held the line of descent firmly in place, and prevented rupture to the 
lines of flight. Wetherell (2012) speaks of this idea when she argues that affective 
practices can be “very densely knotted in with connected social practices where 
the degree of knitting reinforces the affect and can make it resistant and durable, 
sometimes unbearably so” (p. 14). 
This territorialising force manifested through the affective practices 
embodied by participants. When the situation became too discomforting, many 
participants asked for the conversation to stop, asked not to watch the videos, or 
in the case of Jonathan, simply turned away when the videos were playing. 
However, even when the response from participants was not to shut down what 
was happening, the line of descent still held strong. For many participants, the 
response to discussing disability in a positive way was that it felt “weird” and 
“fake”. These practices ensured that it was not possible in those intra-active 
moments to conceive of disability as anything other than an ontologically 
negative phenomenon.   
What Do These Entanglements Do? 
At this point, I would like to bring the Deleuzian question of what does it 
do into the focus of the analysis.  In exploring the entanglement between the 
phenomenon of affective practice highlighted in this chapter, along with the 




This is particularly in relation to the capacity to harness the agency required in 
order to disrupt the iterative, problematic entanglements of disability. Miller, 
Parker and Gillinson (2004) argue, “if you do not name that which has to be 
defeated, it will not be beaten” (p. 15). Not naming or discussing a phenomenon 
thus means a loss of agency over that particular phenomenon; it means this 
phenomenon is likely to continue sweeping us along, denying us the ability to 
challenge and disrupt it.  
However, in connecting these ideas back to Barad’s (2007) quote: “[t]he 
world and its possibilities for becoming are remade with each moment” (p. 396), 
I am reminded of the always-present possibility of rupture to the lines of flight 
(Davies, 2008). Affective practices not only serve as a territorialising force – when 
harnessed effectively, they also hold potential to deterritorialise.  These affective 
practices are constantly being remade anew, and have the potential to be 
radically reconfigured at each moment. As Cheyne (2016) argues:  
If feelings are fundamental to prejudice and prejudicial 
behaviours, they are also potentially the key to changing attitudes. 
Affective and emotional factors are often much more powerful at 
changing attitudes than ideas based in reason and logic. (34:11)  
Whilst an agential realist lens would look at much deeper issues than “attitudes”, 
Cheyne’s quote foregrounds the agentic potential of affect in shifting 
conceptualisations of disability; that is, in presenting potential for a positive 
reimagination of disability. However, if we are to challenge the affective 
practices of disability – these problematic lines of flight – then we have to be 
able to name them. As Davies (2008) argues, we have to “begin with a detailed 
reflexive examination of our habituated immurement in the ordinariness of life-
as-usual” (Davies, 2008, p. 173). To do this, we need to identify these practices 
within ourselves, and in particular identify the “feelings” which arise within the 
entanglements of disability. Affect can be an impeding force, but it also holds the 
potential to be harnessed as a tool to shape the continually forthcoming lines of 




argues, are an ethical necessity of life if we are to challenge the ongoing 
oppression of marginalised groups.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter has explored the affective entanglements of 
disability. Whilst this is an under-theorised area in the disability studies 
literature, affect emerged as a powerful, performative agency for participants 
during the hui. Through analysing some of these critical moments with 
participants, I explored the Deleuzian questions of how does it work and what 
does it do. Drawing upon Wetherell’s work on affective practice, alongside 
Barad’s work on agential realism, I examined the intertwining of affective 
practice and memory within the wider meaning-making practices and 
entanglements of disability. In particular, participant’s affective responses to the 
stimuli in the hui can be understood as the embodied enactment of the 
normative orders of the disability entanglement. These practices serve to 
perpetuate disability oppression, as they territorialise and hold in place the 
existing problematic lines of flight, such as “disability as inferior”. However, I 
have also argued that affective practice does not need to be seen solely as a 
phenomenon which forecloses potential for change. Instead, it can be viewed as 
a tool which, when harnessed effectively, can be used to shift these problematic 





Chapter 9:  
Recognition and the Disability 
Identity 
This chapter explores the entanglement of the disability identity, and the 
desire to be recognised as a viable subject. Key hot spots of data are brought into 
the threshold of the analysis, alongside Butler’s work on performativity, agential 
realism, and the Deleuzian questions of how does it work and what does it do. 
The desire to be seen as “normal” and the desire to “focus on abilities” will be 
examined in particular, as well the desire to reject the disability identity. What 
the entanglements foreclose and present potential for will be discussed, 
including how they show the ever-present potential for rupture.  
The Pursuit of “Normal” 
Butler (2004) argues that the experience of recognition enables us to 
become constituted as socially viable beings. Because recognition is required for 
social existence, it is something we come to desire (Butler, 1997b). As Davies 
(2015) notes, “our very sense of personhood is linked to the desire for 
recognition” (np). Importantly, this means that we are oriented to desiring the 
social categories through which we become recognisable – including 
male/female, abled/disabled, and so on. In short, in order to be constituted as a 
socially viable being, we seek recognition within these identity categories.  
In the conceptual framing chapter, I outlined an agential realist view of 
the processes of recognition. In this understanding, recognition is not 
understood as “a simple reflecting back of an entity that pre-exists the act of 
recognition”, but rather as “a mutually constitutive act of becoming, through 
which being is made to make sense.” (Davies et al., 2013, p. 682, emphasis in 




stable, rational, humanist subject. Instead, identities are understood as social 
categories which enable being-ness to make sense. These identities are neither 
stable, fixed nor singular. Instead, they are viewed as fluid, ever-emergent and 
multiple (Kittelsaa, 2014); as a phenomenon whereby a sense of self – an “I”- 
emerges through the ongoing intra-activity of life.  
In hui three, participants were asked whether they would describe 
themselves as having a disability. However, before exploring the participants’ 
engagement with the disability identity, I would like to step back to the 
preceding question in the hui, when participants were asked about the idea of 
being “treated like a normal person”. These questions should perhaps have been 
thought through more thoroughly, as the order appears to have had a significant 
impact on the answers which participants provided. As Barad (2007), notes, 
attention to fine detail is important, as “[s]mall details can make profound 
differences” (p. 92).  The conversation progressed as below:  
 
Ingrid: I notice sometimes, like, because I’ve 
looked at lots of um, YouTube videos and 
movies and stuff … um, and I notice that 
on the videos people say that they, a lot of 
people are saying that they want to be 
treated like an ordinary person or they 
want to be treated like a normal <person>. 
Jonathan: <Yeah>. 
Glen: Yep. 
Ingrid: Does anyone here ever feel like that? 
Jonathan: I do ((raises hand)). 
Natalie: Yep ((nods)). 
Carl: Yeah I have. 
Karissa: Yeah I have. Yes I do. 
 
As can be seen in the excerpt above, five people immediately agreed with the 




normal person”. Jonathan was so eager to concur that he replied “Yeah” before I 
had finished answering the question. Natalie also agreed that she would rather 
“just be treated like anyone and everyone”; however, Carl, Gary and Luke said 
that they had not heard of the expression. When this idea was investigated 
further, most of the participants were unable to explain what it meant to be 
“treated like a normal person” or “treated like a disabled person”.  Jonathan and 
Natalie were the only two participants to give a response, both of whom noted 
that disabled people are “treated differently”. Jonathan commented further that 
if you are not disabled “you get to do things more better”, and “you can do 
things by yourself”. While none of the participants could clearly articulate what it 
meant to be “treated like a disabled person” at this point in the hui, there was a 
clear inference that it meant to be treated “differently”, and that “different” was 
worse.  
For the following question in the hui, participants were asked whether 
they would describe themselves as having a disability. In order to ensure that 
disability was not positioned as the totalising source of identity in the 
participants’ lives, this question was prefaced by reference to earlier discussions 
in hui two and three, when participants were asked to describe themselves. I 
asked participants: 
 
Ingrid: So um, I'm just thinking about how 
everyone's described themselves, and like 
over the last hui and today and lots of 
people have said things like your family is 
really important and you really like music 
and people talked a lot about where they 
came from  and some people have said, 
you've used the word disability to describe 
yourself today. So how... would... 
everyone here describe themselves, just 






Luke was the first to respond to this question, stating:  
 
Luke: Yeah I would say to people I'm, I'm, I'm a 
normal person and stuff like, I'm a normal 
person and I don't like to be treated like 
crap. 
 
Luke’s comment “I’m a normal person and I don’t like to be treated like crap” 
seems to reference the previous conversation regarding treatment. Although he 
did not participate in the previous conversation and said he had not heard of the 
desire to be “treated like a normal person”, his comment indicates a powerful 
connection between the way people are treated, and whether they are 
recognised as “normal”. The inference within this statement is that to be 
categorised as “not normal” means to be “treated like crap”.  
Natalie did not go as far as Luke when asked whether she would describe 
herself as having a disability; however, she expressed a similar sentiment:  
 
Natalie: I mean, yeah I mean, I know I've got a 
disability but, you know, I’ve never 
wanted to be treated like a person with a 
disability... and I've always said that to 
everyone that I pretty much know. 
 
Natalie’s opening comment “yeah I mean, I know I’ve got a disability” comes 
across as somewhat defensive; she accepts the disability label in a way which 
suggests it is not a desirable form of recognition. She comments further “I’ve 
never wanted to be treated like a person with a disability … and I’ve always said 
that to everyone that I pretty much know”, once again drawing out the 
connection between “treatment” and the disability identity.  
When questioned further on what it means to be “treated like a person 




that when you do not have a disability you would probably only get support from 
family and friends, as opposed to having a support worker like her. Later on in 
the hui, Natalie drew out the idea of being “treated like a disabled person” 
further:  
 
Natalie: … a lot of people that don't have a 
disability have jobs. And few of us don't. 
So we get treated differently like, people 
with disabilities and people not with 
disabilities think that we can't get a job, 
like we're useless, you know, there's no 
way we can get a job. But we can, people 
with not disabilities don't give us a chance.  
Ingrid: Mmmm. Thanks, that’s a really good 
example. 
Glen: Yeah. 
Natalie: That’s how we're treated differently 
because I mean, when I watched [a video 
about Taylor looking for a job], and how 
long Taylor’s taken to get a job, you know 
it, it does hurt. I mean. I'm still look-I'm 
still looking for a job and that takes a while 
and yes I've got disability but you know a 
lot of people that don't have a disability 
they've all got a job, you know, takes 
them, you know, CV in, get a job, you 
know.  
Ingrid: Mmm. 
Natalie: As well as um, qualifications, you need a 
lot of qualifications and things to get jobs. 
Ingrid:    ̊Mmm   ̊





In these statements, Natalie is able to clearly articulate the differing treatment 
offered to non-disabled people. As she comments, “a lot of people that don’t 
have a disability they’ve all got a job, you know, takes them, you know, CV in, get 
a job”, suggesting that it is comparatively much easier to find a job when you do 
not have a disability. She further elucidates the issue of employment, observing 
that “you need a lot of qualifications and things to get jobs”, yet “it’s hard for us 
to learn”. The difficulty which Natalie faced in finding employment was shared by 
most of the participants in the hui, including Taylor, who had a TV show made 
about her long, multi-year search for a job which was eventually successful. 
When Taylor was asked whether she would describe herself as having a 
disability, she gave a different response to Luke and Natalie:  
 
Taylor: Um, sometimes.... I do, I feel like I've got a 
disability but um, I think like when I do 
things around disability and like today and 
other stuff but, I think because I just 
wanted a whole year of, well, some of the 
year off like all disabil-, some disability 
stuff. Because like, um, I've just wanted to 
be treated as normal as possible, and um, 
I think the only part of this year that I 
thought of really having my disability bad 
is me trying to look for a job. 
 
In this statement, Taylor appears to accept the disability identity, commenting “I 
feel like I’ve got a disability”. However, like Luke and Natalie she references the 
idea of “treatment”, stating “I’ve just wanted to be treated as normal as 
possible”. The wording “as normal as possible” is noteworthy; once again the 
idea of being treated like “normal” is restated as preferable. However, Taylor’s 
response indicates that it is not fully possible to be treated “like normal” when 




hui, Taylor commented that she saw herself as living in two different worlds. In 
hui two she observed “like with me I feel like I've got two different worlds. Like I 
live in two different worlds. So one's um, around disability, like it's around 
disability stuff. And then the other one’s, um, life without a disability”. Her 
statement “I just wanted a whole year of, well, some of the year off like all 
disabil-, some disability stuff” references her desire to spend less time in the 
world of disability, and more time in the second, non-disabled world where she 
can be “treated as normal as possible”.  
Both Jonathan and Gary also discussed the notion of treatment when 
asked whether they would identify as having a disability:  
 
Jonathan: Um, I actually um, for my life since I was a 
kid and now um, I'm not known as a 
disability person…. But um, from years 
onwards till now um... since when I was a 
little kid I didn't have a disability because 
everyone was treating me fairly… When 
I'm not disabled. I get support when I'm 
not disabled, as well. I get a lot of things 
done. 
 … 
Gary: I like to be treated just the same. 
Ingrid: Yeah? Would you use the word disability 
to describe yourself or not really? 
Gary: No, not really. 
 
The only participants who did not use the term “treatment” when asked if they 
identified as having a disability were Carl, who responded with a hesitant “yes”, 
although I later discovered that Carl had no understanding of what the words 





Karissa: (Weeesh). Uaahhhmm, for me, I think 
what Taylor just said. Um ((laughs 
briefly)), I-, I think I don't have disability 
because I use able-ability. 
 
Although Karissa preferred the term “able-ability” to the term disability 
throughout the duration of the hui, she did identify herself as someone who is 
“different” and who is thus treated differently. She told a story about a recent 
experience at a shopping centre called Agana22, observing: 
 
Karissa: Some people in Agana, and they say, 
saying stuff about me and they were 
always looking at me.  And I said... I turned 
my head around and I said what Taylor has 
just said ((she moves her eyes to the left, 
staring at the person next with a look of 
intrigue on her face)) "What are you 
looking at?". They're looking at me ((she 
points to herself)), because I'm different 
person 
 
From these excerpts, it is evident that several participants did not 
recognise themselves as having a disability. Furthermore, many observed a 
connection between the way a person is treated and whether they are 
recognised as “normal” or “not normal”. Statements included “I'm a normal 
person and I don't like to be treated like crap”, “I know I've got a disability but, 
you know, I’ve never wanted to be treated like a person with a disability, “since 
when I was a little kid I didn't have a disability because everyone was treating me 
fairly”, “I like to be treated just the same”, and “I've just wanted to be treated as 
normal as possible”. This connection was almost certainly impacted by the 
entanglement of the previous discussion within these intra-active moments.  
                                                     




When viewed through the lens of rational humanism, it is not difficult to 
understand why participants would want to be seen and treated “like a normal 
person”. Although most participants were unable to articulate what it meant to 
be “treated like a disabled person”, they seemed to understand that it meant 
being treated “differently”, and that “different” treatment meant worse 
treatment. Observations of this differing treatment included being stared at in 
public, having immense difficulty finding a job and having greater difficulty 
attaining the “qualifications and things” necessary for obtaining employment. 
With these remarks, participants appeared to be pointing to the issue which was 
outlined in the opening chapters of this thesis; that is, that being recognised as 
disabled and thus positioned as “other” to the ideal norm, has negative material 
consequences. As I argued in Chapter Two, people placed in a subordinate 
identity category are at risk of social exclusion, and are further “subjected to 
normative pressure to become more like those who are read as normal” (De 
Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017, p. 1). In this sense, the 
desire to “pursue normal” can be understood as an entirely rational pursuit.  
However, when these statements are read using Mazzei’s (2016) work on 
Voice without Organs (VwO), a different understanding of the situation comes to 
the fore. As noted in Chapter Six, VwO is conceptualised as an assemblage which 
is a complex network of human and non-human agents that exceeds the 
traditional notion of the “individual,” the “body,” the person” (Mazzei, 2016, p. 
155). This understanding does not see voice as emanating from a rational, 
humanist subject who understands what they mean and speaks with full 
intention (MacLure, 2008). Instead, as Mazzei (2016) notes, “[t]here is no 
separate, individual person to which a single voice can be linked – all are 
entangled” (p. 158). Voice can thus be understood as an entangled phenomenon 
within the ongoing intra-activity of life, and within the ongoing entanglements of 
disability.  
The “voices” of participants in these excerpts appear to be mobilising a 
much wider force evident in society – that of the desire to preserve the 
normative categories of ableism, and to be recognised as belonging in this 




understood as an entanglement which emerges through, and has agency in 
shaping, the ongoing, normative orders of life. However, two problematic issues 
appear when looking at this phenomenon through the question of what does this 
do. First, the desire to preserve normal reaffirms the ascendancy of ability, and 
simultaneously serves to uphold the positioning of disability. Thus, although the 
desire to be “treated as normal” can be seen as a desire to escape the processes 
of otherisation and the inferiority of the disability identity, this strategy holds the 
effects of “othering” in place.  
Secondly, these processes elide the interdependence of the notions of 
“abled” and “disabled”. As outlined in Chapter Two, notions of  “abled” (or 
“normal”) and “disabled” are born from and grafted upon each other – neither 
term can exist without the other (Campbell, 2009a). Disability serves as the 
requisite “constitutive outside” (Campbell, 2008b) – the “other” to the ideas of 
rationality, able-bodiedness and normal IQ. In the desire to preserve “normal”, 
the ability to point to and challenge the vacuousness of this term is foreclosed.   
The Pursuit of “Ability” 
A second, similar strategy to that of pursuing “normal” is the desire to 
“focus on abilities”. The desire was particularly notable in Jonathan, shown in the 
following extract from hui two:  
 
Ingrid: How did you guys describe disability? 
Jonathan: You use ability. Because ability is a good 
thing.  
Ingrid: Yep. Can you tell me more about that? 
Jonathan: Sure. Ability is like doing good things. Like 
if you’re doing something in the 
community. Like able to do things. Around 
town. And for abilities to people to know 
about how you can go around town and 




disability you are your own person. And 
um, from that you can um, do things more 
differently.  
Ingrid: Yep. So what does that mean? 
Jonathan: It means you can do things equally, like 
work in a team, work by yourself or work 
independently. And um, if people has a 
disability they have jobs or courses they 
do and they are proud of that and that’s 
so people who can um, who can help 
others regularly more often than daily 
basis. And um, what ability means for as 
well it’s um you can do things alone if you 
want to. And I had these meetings about 
you can choose your decisions wisely and 
um, you can use your, like make your life 
more easier.  
 
When viewed through the lens of VwO, these statements can be seen as the 
embodiment of normative orders, particularly those connected with disability. 
For instance, Jonathans comments include “doing something in the community”, 
“work independently”, “if people has a disability they have jobs or courses they 
do”, “who can help others regularly”, and “do things alone if you want to”. Many 
of these statements align with the ideas presented in the principle of 
normalisation and social role valorisation, as outlined in Chapter Three. These 
frameworks encourage the dispersal strategy, placing a strong emphasis on 
participation in “the community”, as opposed to segregated settings where 
learning disabled people socialise exclusively with other learning disabled people 
and support staff (H. Brown & Smith, 1992). Having jobs, attending courses and 
working independently are considered “socially valued roles”, and are thus 
activities in which learning disabled people are strongly encouraged to 




capitalism and ideal subjects; having a job, attending a course with the aim of 
upskilling towards employment, helping others and working independently (and 
thus not being a burden on others) are considered desirable activities which 
showcase one’s status as an abled, productive citizen. In short, Jonathan’s 
statements can be seen as the mobilisation of discourses required to showcase 
one’s status as an ideal citizen.  
Jonathan’s preference for the word “ability” over “disability” was stated 
repeatedly throughout the hui. For instance, in hui eight, Glen asked “what does 
everyone think about ideas of disability pride?”. Jonathan answered: 
 
Jonathan: A-Bility pride. Um, ability pride is 
important because using able and, you get 
to do things more often. That’s why I’m 
sticking to the word ability. 
 
However, Jonathan was not the only participant to evidence a desire to focus on 
abilities. For instance, as noted earlier, Karissa stated “I think I don't have 
disability because I use able-ability”, a term which places double-emphasis on 
the notion of able. Natalie also stated “I think that everyone with disability has 
actually got their own ability ((with emphasis on the word)) in things, so I think 
that’s quite important”. Natalie’s statement “everyone with a disability has 
actually got their own ability” references an idea which was pointed to by many 
participants during the research. Regardless of whether or not the participants 
identified as disabled, many commented on their desire for everyone to be seen 
as abled. For instance, while giving feedback to participants in hui eight about 
the findings from the research, the following conversation happened:  
 
Ingrid Um I’ve noticed that, lots of you like to 
use the word ability to describe yourself.  
Karissa:  ((nods while I'm talking))  
Ingrid: Is that?  




Ingrid:  You just like the word, you wouldn't use it 
to describe yourself? 
Jonathan:  I just like the word that describes 
everyone 
 … 
Glen:  I actually agree with Jonathan actually 
because we are all able to do things, but 
um, but yeah we all have disabilities that 
actually have, um, ability to do all of that 
stuff. 
 
In this conversation, both Jonathan and Glen valorise the word “ability”, stating it 
should be used as “word that describes everyone”, and that “we [the 
participants] all have disabilities that actually have, um, ability to do all of that 
stuff”. Thus, although the participants did not view disability/ability as a binary, 
where one sits in one category or the other, they nonetheless upheld the notion 
of “ability” as preferable – as the ideal which is “naturally” superior.  
Ultimately, the drive to be viewed as “normal” and to “focus on abilities” 
are strategies designed to focus on the sameness of disabled people, rather than 
celebrating differences. This desire to focus on abilities is a common strategy 
employed in the disability rights movement, as discussed briefly in Chapter Four. 
As Parsons (1999) notes, the disability rights movement has: 
[B]een a movement that, rather than celebrating the difference of 
its members from the rest of society has instead asserted the 
“sameness”. It has, therefore, focussed its efforts on demanding 
the sorts of services and supports that might enable that 
“sameness” to be realised. (P. 28) 
As with the focus on “normal”, the drive to “focus on abilities” appears to 
be a desire to reject the processes of otherisation, which position people labelled 
as disabled in an inferior category – as “other” to the ideal norm. As Natalie 




people not with disabilities think that we can't get a job, like we're useless”. 
However, when examined further, this strategy can be seen as a practice which 
disempowers in the guise of empowering (Wetherell, 2012). In particular, the 
drive to “focus on abilities” can be seen as part of the strategy to focus on the 
“common humanity” of disabled people. Bunch (2017) outlines how the 
approach of focusing on sameness fits into a wider process known as the 
“politics of assimilation”. The politics of assimilation underlies many rights 
movements, including feminist politics and mainstream LGBT movements 
(Bunch, 2017). These approaches, according to Bunch (2017) are grounded in 
Kantian ethics, which “requires sameness for ethical recognition” (p. 133). Within 
the drive to focus on the “common humanity” of a person there is an unsaid 
implication that there is a need to emphasise a person’s common humanity or 
sameness; this statement is never applied to someone without a disability. The 
emphasis on sameness in these statements implies that there is some form of 
deficit to overcome. As Pryde (2015) asserts: 
You see, my being human is rather obvious and I am certainly no 
less human because I was born with unique neurology [autism], so 
the need to emphasize my common humanity seems wildly 
redundant. (para. 8) 
The strategy of focusing on sameness thus appears to unwittingly perpetuate 
ideas related to disability and diminished personhood.  
 
The desire to be recognised as an abled subject, as well as the desire to 
focus on the abilities or common humanity of disabled people, is something so 
well-established in many Western societies that it is often seen as something 
entirely “natural” or “logical”. It is something that I have encountered so 
frequently in my years in the disability support sector that I have had to develop 
a skill-set of language that enables me to navigate these practices. I have learnt 
how to talk with people about the support they need, as well as write support 
plans for them, without ever mentioning the reason why we provide support – 




receive referrals for new clients which would state that the person does not like 
to be described as disabled, and that it is important we do not use the 
“disability” word when meeting the person. These statements were never 
questioned by those of us who worked with the people – we simply seemed to 
accept the “natural” desire not to be recognised as disabled.   
              This drive to “focus on abilities” can be seen across the disability 
community, support and business sector. For instance, a quick Google search on 
May 17, 2017 for “able nz” brought up: “Able”, the “television captioning and 
audio description service for hearing and vision-impaired audiences” (NZ On Air, 
2017, top para.), “able”, a service provider for people with mental illness (able: 
Southern Family Support, 2015), “ableaxcess”, a company which provides ramps 
(ableaxcess, n.d.), and “accessable”, a company which offers “services that 
enhance independent lifestyles and equipment management” (accessable, 2017, 
para. 1). All of these services came up on the first page of search results.  
This phenomenon of calling services “able” (as well as, for some unknown 
reason, not capitalising the first letter in “able”) is not limited to New Zealand.  
For instance in the United Kingdom there is a magazine called “able: Your 
favourite disability lifestyle magazine” (able, n.d.), and in Australia there is a 
company called “able australia”, a “non-profit organisation that provides services 
to people living with multiple disabilities” (able australia, 2015, para. 1). It 
appears as if “able” is the favourite word at the moment for anyone wanting to 
start up a disability service, or a magazine for their disability service. 
 
In contrast to the focus on sameness, Bunch (2017) draws on the work of 
Kristeva to present a different view of ethics. While Bunch has reservations 
about Kristeva’s work, she also finds points which give her pause, including the 
assertion that “variability is the essential characteristic of all humanity” (p. 142), 
and that the denial of the heterogeneity of human embodiment is a denial of our 
own embodiment. Drawing from this, Bunch (2017) argues further that the 
denial of heterogeneity:  
[L]imits possible ways to imagine the good life, understand what it 




institutions that would allow all people to flourish, value different 
kinds of social contributions, and organize human life to engage 
relationships of interdependence and care for each other. (p. 138) 
Instead of focusing on sameness, a Kristevan approach to ethics is “structured by 
a transformative openness to heterogeneity” (p. 133), and furthermore 
“positions diverse embodiment as a potentially powerful force of transformation 
to late capitalism” (p. 135). 
Furthermore, in returning once again to the Deleuzian question of what 
does this do, a key question arises. That is, how are we to challenge exclusionary 
structures and practices related to disability, without focusing on disability? It 
takes somewhat of a leap of mental gymnastics to ensure that disability is 
factored in to new building designs, or in to the design of “inclusive” classrooms, 
without directing one’s attention towards disability. How are we to design a 
world that is truly inclusive for all, without actively thinking about those who are 
excluded, and the differences which lead to exclusion?  
The third problematic strategy related to recognition and the disability 
identity will be explored in the following section – that of rejecting disability.  
Rejecting Disability  
Social performatives are an ongoing part of our everyday lives, and they 
are of fundamental importance if we are to “exist” as socially viable beings 
(Butler, 1997b). However, performatives are not generally executed on a 
conscious level (Butler, 1997b). Part of the power of performatives is in their 
“everydayness” which renders them naturalised and difficult to see (Butler, 
1990). It is often only when a performative is not repeated as usual, that such a 
repetition becomes apparent. On the following page, I highlight a moment from 
the hui in which a performative became evident when it was not repeated as 
usual.  
The conversation between Johnathan and Taylor on the following page 
arose shortly after I finished my “speech” in hui six. This speech was given in 




in hui five. We had been discussing what the participants would like to do after 
my speech, and Jonathan suggested that he would like everyone to do an activity 
as one group (rather than split into two), but that he did not want us to talk 
about disability. I questioned how we were going to talk about disability pride if 
we did not talk about disability, and repeated something which I had previously 
said in my speech. The conversation progressed as below:  
 
Ingrid:  I think the reason that disabled people 
aren't treated fairly, and the reason that 
disabled people get bullied and have a 
really hard time finding a job is because 
we think there's something wrong with 
being disabled.  And talking about 
disability and thinking about disability 
makes us uncomfortable and it makes us 
sad and it makes us upset. But I think that 
it's that feeling ((I touch myself on the 
chest)), where we feel uncomfortable or 
sad or upset. I think that feeling is the 
reason that we think it's OK to treat 
disabled people worse. 
Carl: No. 
Jonathan: I don't want to be disabled anymore. 
Ingrid: No?  
Jonathan: ((Looks down at the floor and shakes his 
head. Speaks quietly)) Not anymore. I just 
had that thought, for years now that I 
want that to happen. 
Ingrid: Yeah23. 
                                                     
23 In New Zealand, ‘yeah’, ‘mmm’ and other statements of agreeance are often used to indicate 
to the speaker that you acknowledge what they are saying and support the right of the person to 




Jonathan: ((Speaks quietly)) I want, I don't really 
want to be disabled anymore.  
Taylor: Jonathan I've sometimes, sometimes I’ve 
felt like, I've been thinking to myself why 
did this happen to me, like why was I the 
one in, well my uncle's got a disability. But 
why am I the one in my family that's got 
the disability but then I also think what's, 
um, what opportunities I've had living with 
a disability and I've like had heaps of 
opportunities. So just like think of what 
you might not have if you don't have a 
disability. 
Jonathan: Oh I don't really have one [a disability]. 
Um, I can do actually heaps of things, like 
talk to mates and catch up, go for a drink, 
like, hang out with my brother a lot. 
Things I can do more. If I’m not disabled. 
That’s easy fix. 
 
With this statement, “I don’t want to be disabled anymore” Jonathan appears to 
be attempting to step out of his inferior subject positioning by declaring himself 
to no longer be such a subject. Despite Taylor’s ardent attempt to help Jonathan 
take a more positive view on disability, Jonathan continues in his positioning, 
commenting “Oh I don’t actually have one”. However, despite Jonathan’s 
attempt to reject the disability identity, he does not truly escape the ongoing 
processes which position him as disabled. His statements are an unsuccessful 
form of resistance to the processes of inferiorisation; they do not successfully 
disrupt the processes which hold Jonathan in an inferior position, and do not 
disrupt the material consequences of his inferior subject positioning. Instead, 




Davies et al. (2013) note that in order to be a recognisable subject, we 
need to perform ourselves “within the terms that constitute us” (p. 683); we 
cannot stand outside the discourses and other intra-active phenomena which 
constitute us (A. Y. Jackson & Mazzei, 2011). That is, in order to be recognised as 
a legitimate, viable subject, we must perform ourselves according to a set of 
citational phenomena including discourses, affective practices, social practices 
and bodily practices. In short, we emerge as autonomous individuals through “a 
necessary subjection to the terms of existence” (Davies et al., 2013, p. 681).  
However, at the same time as these citational chains enable us to be recognised 
as viable subjects, they also restrict what is considered possible (Davies, 2015); 
citational chains both enable and restrict the range of discourses, affective 
practices, social practices and bodily practices that enable us to be recognisable 
subjects at the given time they are being drawn upon.  
In Gender Trouble (1990), Butler asserts that gender is performative. She 
argues further that “the authority on which that performativity depends comes 
from the constitution of bodies within a heteronormative matrix of intelligibility” 
(Brady & Schirato, 2011, p. 45, emphasis added). This matrix is sometimes 
referred to as a grid of intelligibility, or simply cultural intelligibility. It is hard to 
define what precisely forms any given matrix of intelligibility, or put another way, 
what makes a performative act culturally intelligible. However, it is clear that 
some of the elements of the matrix become apparent when a performative act 
fails “to confirm to those norms of cultural intelligibility” (Butler, 1990, p. 17) – 
that is, when these norms are challenged or disrupted, or, as with Jonathan’s 
statement, a performative act does not successfully reiterate the required 
citational chains. As Butler (1990) states, when certain kinds of identities fail to 
conform to the requisite norms of cultural intelligibility, “they appear only as 
developmental failures or logical impossibilities from within that domain. (p. 17)  
Jonathan does not utilise the required tools of recognition within the 
ableist matrix of intelligibility; he does not perform himself within the terms in 
which he is constituted, and it is thus a failed performative. Jonathan alone does 
not have the agency required to shift the constitution of himself as a disabled 




as Davies (2008) argues, does Jonathan “need to be aware of the terms of [his] 
recognition for it to have an effect on who [he] becomes” (p. 31). Butler (1997a) 
argues further: 
[O]ne may well imagine oneself in ways that are quite the contrary 
of how one is socially constituted; one may as it were, meet that 
socially constituted self by surprise, with alarm or pleasure, even 
with shock. And such an encounter underscores the way in which 
the name wields a linguistic power of constitution in ways that are 
indifferent to the one who bears the name. (p. 31)  
In the box below, I highlight how these processes operated through me 
during the encounter with Jonathan, shaping the possibilities for thought in 
relation to Jonathan’s identity.  
 
When Jonathan said “I don’t want to be disabled anymore”, and then “Oh 
I don’t really have one [a disability]” I initially found myself thinking that 
Jonathan was not properly participating in the processes of his subjectification. 
That is, Jonathan does not understand that he is disabled, and that he cannot 
simply choose not to be. I found this an intriguing thought; one which did not 
seem to match with the very arguments I pose in this thesis about disability 
being a social construct which does not innately exist in the world. What was 
happening here?  
This thought process24, I have now come to realise, is a powerful example 
of how the entanglements of disability – including the ableist matrix of 
intelligibility, operate through me. These entanglements hold agency over 
shaping how I see myself and “others” in the world. This is not an “I” making a 
rational, intentional choice about whether someone is or is not disabled. Rather, 
it is a thought process which highlights a powerful force in the ableist matrix of 
intelligibility – that if you have certain forms of difference that are categorised as 
                                                     
24 While “thought process” implies a purely cerebral phenomenon, I am aware that this process 





disabled (in this case, Down Syndrome), you cannot escape that categorisation. 
This force is so powerful that its agency over how I think and see people is almost 
impossible to escape, even when I try to.  
 
One of the ways in which the matrix of intelligibility works is through 
norms; these are the normative orders which were discussed earlier in this 
chapter. The desire to be seen as “normal”, and to “focus on abilities”, showcase 
some of the normative orders of disability. De Schauwer and Davies (2015) 
define norms as “a pattern regarded as typical, as the way things happen, or are 
said to be” (p. 85). They note further that “[t]he norm comes to be what is 
expected, and the expected slides quickly toward moral judgement, where is has 
turned into ought” (p. 85, emphasis in original). Performing ourselves within the 
terms of these norms, or normative identity categories, is essential for a 
performance to result in recognisability; if we do not perform ourselves 
according to these norms, our performatives fail and we cannot accomplish 
ourselves as recognisable subjects. Because we depend on norms for our very 
existence, “we come to desire them, and to desire to preserve them” (Davies, 
2015, n.p., emphasis in original). As Davies (2015) states “[i]n that very process of 
coming to be, and continuing to be, we necessarily take up as our own those 
normative terms through which we become, and go on becoming, recognizable.” 
(np). 
One of the normative identity categories through which humans are 
judged as recognisable is that of ableism. Like gender, ableism can be viewed as 
“a culturally sanctioned performance, a requirement that a body coheres, and 
continues to cohere, according to certain norms of intelligibility” (Brady & 
Schirato, 2011, p. 45). Ableism operates as a binary, requiring “the abjection of 
the qualities of the subordinated other” (Davies, 2015, np) when taking on a 
normative identity. This means that in order to perform ourselves as a 
recognisable subject, we must perform ourselves within the ableist matrix of 
intelligibility; on the current terms of ableism, this matrix requires both the 
devaluation of disability, and the valorisation of the corporeal ideal. In short, 




on terms which devalue disability.  This is evidenced not only in Jonathan’s 
outright desire to reject his disability, but also in the other participants’ desire to 
be seen as “normal” and “abled”.  
Disrupting the Conundrum 
The processes outlined in this chapter appear to leave people labelled as 
disabled with a conundrum. Attempts to reject the disability identity are often 
rendered unintelligible. The disability identity is not a construct which can be 
escaped in the current context; we cannot stand outside the discourses and 
other intra-active phenomena which constitute us (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011). As 
Davies et al. (2013) note, we must perform ourselves within these very terms in 
order to be considered viable subjects. Yet, if Jonathan was to successfully 
participate in the processes of subjectification – that is, if he was to accept the 
disabled subject positioning, this would mean he would be acceding to his place 
as an inferior subject, complete with the concomitant material consequences. As 
Butler (1997b) asks: 
How is survival to be maintained if the terms by which existence is 
guaranteed are precisely those that demand and institute 
subordination? On this understanding, subjection is the 
paradoxical effect of a regime of power in which the very 
“conditions of existence”, the possibility of continuing as a 
recognizable social being, requires the formation and maintenance 
of the subject in subordination. (1997b, p. 27) 
Furthermore, the alternative strategies of focusing on “normal” and “ability” 
reaffirm the existence of the ableist binary, and uphold the inferior positioning of 
disability within the binary. None of these strategies challenge the position of 
disability as “other” to the ideal norm, and none of the strategies challenge the 
material consequences of this positioning. The capacity to harness the agency 
necessary to challenge the processes of otherisation, and exclusionary practices 
and structures related to disability, is largely foreclosed. The question then arises 




In this thesis, I argue that rather than attempting to reject the notion of 
the disability identity, or to focus attention on the sameness of disabled people, 
a greater level of agency can be harnessed by embracing disability. This entails 
working with the ableist matrix of intelligibility and accepting the disability 
identity. This strategy seeks to harness the power of the matrix whilst 
transforming its constitution; by performing ourselves within the terms through 
which we are constituted, and, simultaneously, taking this constitution onto a 
new line of flight. As Parsons (1999) highlights, this is effectively what was done 
in the gay and lesbian rights movement; people rejected the idea that their 
identity was a source of inferiority, and embraced the queer/ gay/ lesbian (etc.) 
label. Parsons (1999) argues further that the strategy of asserting pride in 
identity is the first crucial ingredient in any successful rights movement; it is “a 
radical way to respond to discrimination because it takes the very basis of 
oppression, turns it around, and uses it as the basis for pride” (p. 3).   
Showing pride in the face of bullying, a social practice which often seeks 
to reiterate the inferiorisation of particular identity categories, was attempted in 
hui six and seven with the bullying role plays. These role plays were discussed in 
Chapter Seven, and were connected to literature from Foucault (1980) and 
Butler (1990), related to the potential for disruption at the moment of citation. 
That is, the moment of repetition, whereby a (gender/disability/race etc.) 
identity is recited, is the achilles’ heel of power in the ongoing processes of 
subjection (Buchner, 2015). It is in this moment that the possibility for rupture 
lies.  As Butler (1990) notes: 
Indeed, precisely because certain kinds of “gender identities” fail 
to conform to those norms of cultural intelligibility, they appear 
only as developmental failures or logical impossibilities from 
within that domain. Their persistence and proliferation, however, 
provide critical opportunities to expose the limits and regulatory 
aims of that domain of intelligibility and, hence, to open up within 
the very terms of that matrix of intelligibility rival and subversive 




The disability identity can thus be understood as a tool for rupture in the 
iterative entanglements of disability; one which can harness the possibilities for 
becoming which are remade with each moment (Barad, 2007).   
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the entanglement of the disability identity and 
the desire to be recognised as a viable subject. Three key phenomena which 
arose during the hui were discussed; the desire to be seen and treated as 
“normal”, the drive to “focus on abilities”, and the desire to reject the disability 
identity. Each of these phenomena can be understood as a desire to reject the 
processes of otherisation, which position those labelled as disabled in an inferior 
position.  
By drawing upon Mazzei’s work on VwO, the “voices” of participants can 
be understood as an agentic phenomenon within the ongoing entanglements of 
disability. In particular, the statements from participants can be viewed as the 
mobilisation of forces evident in wider society – that of the desire to preserve 
the categories of “normal” and “abled”, and to be recognised as belonging in 
these ascendant categories. These processes present several problematic issues. 
First, they appear to reaffirm the existence of the ableist binary, inescapably 
positioning disability as inferior.  Second, these processes keep hidden the 
mutual interdependence of the notions of “disabled” and “abled”, foreclosing 
any challenge to the truth-claims related to the notion of “normal”. Third, these 
processes play into the “politics of assimilation”, focusing on the sameness of 
disabled people, rather than celebrating difference. This practice unwittingly 
perpetuates the connection between disability and diminished personhood. 
Furthermore, these practices raise questions as to how we are to challenge 
exclusionary structures and practices related to disability, without focusing on 
disability.  
In summary, the practices outlined in this chapter present something of a 
conundrum. By focusing on “normal” and “abilities”, one reaffirms the existence 
of the ableist binary, upholding the inferior position of disability within the 




work with the matrix of intelligibility. In this chapter I have argued that rather 
than attempting to deflect attention away from disability, or reject the identity, a 
greater level of agency can be harnessed through embracing the identity. 
Embracing the disability identity works with the matrix of intelligibility, 
challenges the terms through which disability is constituted, and asserts that this 
identity is not a source of inferiority. The notion of identity can thus be viewed as 
a tool which holds potential to rupture the problematic iterative entanglements 






The Entanglements of Silence 
This chapter explores one of the problematic iterative entanglements 
which arose during the hui – that of silence. This entanglement will be analysed 
by examining participants’ understanding of disability, alongside Butler’s work on 
performativity and the framework of desiring silence. In particular, the 
entanglements of silence are examined alongside the desire for belonging, and 
the constraints of the normative order. What these entanglements produce and 
present potential for will be discussed.  
A Lack of Knowledge about Disability  
This chapter begins by exploring participant’s understanding of disability. 
In hui two, participants were asked to define disability. As part of this 
exploration, participants were asked to describe someone they know who has a 
disability, and someone they know who does not have a disability. Carl’s 
response is of note:  
 
Ingrid: So do you know someone who you know 
is disabled? Can you think of someone you 
know is disabled?  
Carl: What is it? 
Glen: Someone who is disabled like you, me, 
everyone here ((there is no noticeable 
response from anyone)).  






Carl: Yeah I remember I hang out with Jonathan 
and Felix25, long time. And we, yeah my 
mum and I going to, yeah we go to um 
(inaudible), yeah we go this- this place. 
Yeah we go to this place and the people 
(inaudible) people (inaudible) and 
Jonathan ((looks at Jonathan)) to long 
time. I um, --hang out (inaudible) long 
time.  
Ingrid: So one of those people that you were just 
mentioning we- do you-, is one of them 
disabled, would you think one of them is 
disabled, or not?  
Carl: Maybe. 
 
In Carl’s response, “what is it?” he appears to be directly asking what “disabled” 
is. Glen replies “someone who is disabled like you, me, everyone here”, and Carl 
goes on to tell us a story about some friends, including fellow participant 
Jonathan.  Glen’s answer to Carl’s question does not seem to suffice for Carl, as 
he responds with an uncertain “maybe” when asked if he would think of one of 
his friends as disabled. A few minutes later when Carl was asked to identify 
someone he knows who is not disabled, he again inquired “what is it?”. These 
answers suggest that Carl has little-to-no knowledge of what the term “disabled” 
means, a surprising situation for someone who has been labelled as disabled, 
and who lives in a learning disability support service. A similar situation can be 
seen in responses from other participants. For instance, when asked to identify 
someone who is not disabled, Luke responded, “no I don't know anybody that 
isn't disabled”, and Gary identified his girlfriend, a woman who uses learning 
disability support services.   
                                                     




Furthermore, many of the participants seemed to have a lack of 
knowledge regarding their own disabilities, as highlighted in the conversation 
excerpt below:  
 
Glen: Hey Jono, ah, because that you are the 
first born out of your family, right?  
Jonathan: Yeah. 
Glen: How did you end up being disabled in that 
family and … your younger brothers are 
not? 
Jonathan: Ah because I chose to be disabled not, not 
dis-not using having a disability because 
um, I’ve, when I first came in the world 
um I did not have a disability then. Um, 
now I am now because I was diagnosed 
cuz since I was five. 
Ingrid: Mmm hmm. 
Jonathan: Then I was diagnosed with Down 
Syndrome. Yeah. 
 
These statements from Jonathan, “when I first came in the world um I did not 
have a disability”, and “I was diagnosed cuz since I was five… Then I was 
diagnosed with Down Syndrome” indicate that he is aware of the label of his 
diagnosis, however, he is unaware of the particularities of this condition; that is, 
a label that is assigned well before the age of five. The specific mention of age 
may be important here. Most children in Aotearoa New Zealand start school 
when they turn five, so this may have been the point at which the materiality of 
his diagnosis first became apparent to Jonathan; that is, the point at which the 
“difference” of his disability came to matter in Jonathan’s life. It is likely that 
Jonathan would have been subject to “special” conditions to aid him in the 
classroom, such as having a teacher aide and an individualised education 




outcome is often a positioning of children as “different”. Starting school is a time 
in which many children encounter the “othering” effects of their difference, 
particularly as it becomes harder for children categorised as learning disabled to 
“keep up” with the expectations set in the curriculum.  
Jonathan’s seeming lack of knowledge regarding his own diagnosis poses 
some questions regarding the information he has received about his condition. 
What has he been told about Down Syndrome? Why does he have such a poor 
understanding about the particularities of his condition? Who has been talking to 
him about his condition, who has not, and when are these conversations 
happening, if at all? A similar situation regarding lack of knowledge was 
presented by the co-facilitator, Glen, who also has Down Syndrome. During the 
preparatory phase of the research, I asked Glen what impact Down Syndrome 
has had in his life, to which he responded “I wouldn’t know anything about that”. 
Later on that meeting, Glen and I had a conversation about why he found some 
of the words in the script hard to say. Initially, Glen said that he did not know 
why he found the big words hard to read; however, when asked if it could be 
because of his disability, he said yes. Glen was also diagnosed with a serious food 
intolerance as a teenager, and regularly confused his food intolerance with Down 
Syndrome, at one point mentioning that he was diagnosed with Down Syndrome 
as a teenager. 
It seems therefore that a large number of the participants lack knowledge 
regarding the term “disability”, and their own diagnostic labels in particular. This 
lack of knowledge exists despite all participants receiving support from disability 
support services, and despite the significant material consequences they face 
because of their positioning in a society designed for the corporeal norm. This 
situation indicates that there are some profound silences in the lives of the 
participants regarding the topic of disability. 
 
This view of silence was further informed by my own “reflections” 
regarding my practice as a support worker, and my practice during the hui. I 
came to realise how much I participate in these silences around disability; at no 




at birth, or have any conversation about what the term might mean, despite 
what seemed to be a gap in his knowledge. Indeed, prior to conducting the hui, I 
cannot remember a single instance of having a conversation with anyone I 
supported about their disability. I have worked with hundreds of people in 
various capacities, including in a position where I wrote support plans about the 
support that people needed because of their disability. At times I went to great 
lengths to avoid writing about the person’s disability, or speaking about a 
person’s disability with them, unaware of why I did this, only knowing that it was 
something that must be done. Speaking with someone about their disability was 
such a challenging practice for me that I made a diary note about it after the 
conversation with Glen, where he told me that he “wouldn’t know anything” 
about his disability: “The fact that we were able to have that conversation today 
and that I was able to say to Glen about his being bad at reading is a sign I guess 
of our relationship building and the immense trust we have. I have to trust in Glen 
(I guess in his trusting of me?) to be able to say to him about his disability, where 
in the past I haven’t felt it was something I could address with him”. 
 
These particularities of the phenomenon of silence in both participants 
and me were illuminated further when read diffractively through the framework 
of desiring silence.  
Desiring Silence  
In Chapter Four I outlined the framework known as desiring silence, 
which draws upon the Deleuzian notion of desire. Contrary to Lacan, Deleuze 
does not view desire as something which emanates from the desire to fill a need 
or a lack (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011; Mazzei, 2011). Nor is it seen as a force which 
emanates from a rational, intentional subject; that is, as something which 
indicates an individual’s true self, wants and needs (Laws, 2011). Instead, desire 
is viewed as a productive force, “a coming together of forces/drives/intensities 
that produce something” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011, p. 92). Desire produces other 




interest here, silence (A. Y. Jackson & Mazzei, 2011). Jackson and Mazzei (2011) 
view desire and silence as two phenomenon which at once produce and rely on 
each other. They note further that this production functions “much in the same 
way that power/knowledge operates for Foucault, [in that] they express each 
other, rely on each other, and produce something that is not singular to one or 
the other” (p. 102). Desiring silence can be viewed as an entanglement formed 
through the ongoing intra-activity of life, an entanglement which both shapes 
and is shaped by collective narratives, images, and metaphors, and by our 
experiences over time (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011; Laws, 2011). As with all 
entanglements, these are not viewed as being the same twice over. Each 
entanglement changes with each intra-action as “space, time and matter do not 
exist prior to the intra-actions that reconstitute entanglements” (Barad, 2007, p. 
74).  
Working with the notion of desiring silence means to question what is 
producing the silences around disability, and what these silences, in turn, 
produce. It means, as Jackson and Mazzei (2011) state, “to consider the forces of 
desire that are acting through and with our research participants, and to make 
sense of what results from such interaction” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011, p. 91).  
Whilst desiring silences appear to operate through all who participated in 
the hui, they were particularly evident in Jonathan. In hui seven, he expressed 
how desiring silence operates through him:  
 
Jonathan: Um there's a um a few things about being 
disabled um, like, like for example with 
someone was saying that to me [that he is 
disabled]. And um, and I would say um, I 
don't care I am who I am. 
Ingrid: Mmm hmmm. 
Jonathan: I don't care if I’m disabled or not. Um, I 
just stop thinking about it when it comes 




change, like, it's good to start something 
new. 
Ingrid: Sorry what do you mean by that? 
Jonathan: Cuz um if someone's doing that to you, 
and you're not trying to think about it. 
And um, you just, I just move on. And do 
something positive. 
 
Jonathan’s comments “I just stop thinking about it when it comes back up”, and 
“you’re not trying to think about it… I just move on. And do something positive” 
indicate that when thoughts about disability “come up”, he attempts to silence 
those thoughts by endeavouring to “stop thinking about it”, “move on” and “do 
something positive”. He informs us further that these “positive” activities include 
“going out to the community and hanging out with mates and hanging out with 
family”, as well as going to the Special Olympics competition he had the 
following day. In considering “the forces of desire that are acting through and 
with” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2011, p. 91) Jonathan, it appears that desiring silence is 
productive in shaping Jonathan’s thoughts, words and actions. He informs us that 
he is actively “not trying to think about” disability.  It appears that Jonathan 
either has a lack of knowledge regarding the particularities of his diagnostic label, 
or finds it so difficult to talk about that it comes across as a lack of knowledge. 
Furthermore, these issues appear to stem as much from him actively seeking 
these silences, as from the silences of other people around him.  
Desiring silence was also spoken about by Taylor. She informed us that 
her work colleagues have been told she has a disability, and that they “sort of 
treat me differently but they also treat me just as someone working there”. She 
comments further:  
 
Taylor: I think it's when people don't really know 
me, like last night me and Hayley26 went 
                                                     




to this lady's night and this lady was 
talking really fast and I couldn't 
understand what she was talking 
about...But I'm like always, like I don't 
always want to tell people, can you talk 
slowly because I've got a disability. 
Ingrid:   ̊Yeah  ̊. 
Taylor: Because it sort of makes me sad and I 
don't want them to make a... excuse for 
me. Like to, make stuff easier for me just 
because I've got disability. But I think it's 
when people don't really know me they 
don't know um.... like if I’ve got disability 
or not.  
 
As Taylor notes, she “doesn’t always want to tell people, can you talk slowly 
because I’ve got a disability”. Taylor’s comments allude to her desire to not be 
treated “differently” because of her disability. To ask for an accommodation, 
such as for a person to talk slower or “make stuff easier”, would mean troubling 
the assumption that she is a “normal” and “independent” young woman who 
does not need assistance from others. Taylor does not want others to “make a… 
excuse for me”, suggesting further that she does not want to impose by asking 
for social accommodations, something which “normal” women are often 
socialised into spurning.  
This idea of desiring “normal” treatment is discussed further in the 
following section by drawing upon Butler’s work on performativity.  
Norms and Performativity 
Butler’s work on performativity (e.g., 1990, 1997a, 1997b) helps to 
illuminate the productive force of recognition, which is needed in order to be 
constituted as a viable subject. This recognition occurs within a matrix of 




Jackson, 2008). As Jackson (2008) notes, “desire for recognition is in actuality a 
site of power where who gets to be recognized, and by whom, is governed by 
social norms” (p. 171, emphasis in original). This understanding of recognition 
has a strong alignment with Mazzei’s (2011) work on silence. As she notes, 
silence can be understood as “an enactment of a desire to be recognized as 
governed by social norms” (p. 661). 
The desire to be “recognized as governed by social norms” (Mazzei, 2011, 
p. 661), and to not trouble the idea of one’s status as a “normal” subject, appear 
to play a powerful role in shaping discourses regarding disability. This is as 
evidenced by Taylor’s comment earlier, “I don't always want to tell people, can 
you talk slowly because I've got a disability”. Historically, disability has been a 
topic which must only be discussed in a limited range of circumstances, and in a 
limited range of ways, giving the impression that it is a minefield of unspeakable 
words and topics. De Schauwer and Davies (2015) explicate this issue further, 
noting the many unspeakable items related to disability: 
This complex, multi-directional silence forms a void around which 
a great deal of work with the people with a disability circulates, 
making the pathway to embracing multiplicity a complex dance 
around that which cannot be spoken.  (p. 87) 
However, it should be noted that progress-gains have been made in this area in 
recent years, particularly as social media has provided a platform for many 
disabled people to give voice to their experiences (see for instance Carly Findlay 
at https://www.facebook.com/Tune.into.Radio.Carly/, and Kylee Black at 
https://www.facebook.com/Kylee-Black-Public-Speaker-347045309001678/).  
Participants themselves hinted at the unspeakable words related to 
disability.  For instance, Natalie told us a story about a time when she went to 
the doctors to get a form signed for her annual benefit renewal with WINZ (Work 
and Income New Zealand), and noticed a word on her form:  
 
Natalie: Well I had to renew, I had to renew mine 




that's on my form that's the kind of like 
the, what they call it the title under WINZ. 
It’s like the worst word ever, it's actually 
worse than disability.  
Ingrid: What is it, sorry? 
Natalie: I don't even want to say it cuz it's horrible. 
It’s called mental retardation.  
 
Natalie speaks with great power in these comments about the unspeakable 
words related to disability – “it’s like the worst word ever”, so horrible that she 
does not even want to speak it. Natalie seems affronted by this positioning, and 
she goes on to tell us that she questioned the doctor, “I said to the doctor what 
[am] I a retard now”, and commented that “it’s harsh”. Jonathan remarked 
further on the unspeakable words of “mental retardation” within Natalie’s story, 
stating “it’s not right”. Luke also had a personal story about the unspeakable 
words of disability:   
 
Luke: I had guys come and see me the [other] 
day. ((Luke gets quieter and has a snarly 
look on his face for the following section. 
He speaks a little muffled)). You know 
what he’s called me. He called me a 
handicapped. You don't call me 
handicapped like that. I've got a problem 
with my, I've got behaviours, mental 
health, mental problems and stuff … and 
this guy goes what are you (what are you 
doing you mental) prick. I said excuse me? 
So I went up there and said, don't you say 





Like Natalie, Luke is affronted at the use of the term “handicapped” to describe 
him, declaring “You don’t call me handicapped like that”. He tells us that he was 
“offended” by the use of the word, and comments further “I said you come here 
and say it to my face, and I says, you better watch your mouth mate, I’m gonna 
do something stupid… °smack you in the head°”. Luke’s comments highlight the 
powerful affective response he had to this unspeakable word; he threatens to 
“do something stupid… °smack you in the head°”, his offense is so powerfully 
felt. It is interesting to note that both Luke and Natalie highlighted their 
preference for the term “disability” in these scenarios. Whilst Natalie 
consistently identified herself as disabled throughout the hui and displayed a 
reasonable understanding of what this subject positioning means, Luke did not 
share the same knowledge base. Instead, he rejected the identity label (see 
Chapter Seven), and appeared to have a poor understanding of what the label 
meant, for instance telling us that he does not know anyone who is not disabled. 
However, in this scenario Luke clearly states his preference to be recognised as 
someone who has a “disability”, rather than as someone who is “handicapped”.  
Butler’s work on recognition and social norms is developed further by 
Zabrodska, Linnell, Laws and Davies (2011), and Jackson and Mazzei (2011). By 
pulling agential realism into the threshold of the inquiry, these authors highlight 
the way in which the desire for recognition is connected with the desire to 
belong in the ongoing intra-activity of life. In short, one of the reasons we desire 
to exist as recognisable subjects, even when existence is on terms which do not 
offer us a viable life, is because recognition leads to the promise of belonging. 
For instance, in discussing bullying in neo-liberal universities, Zabrodska et al. 
(2011) note:  
Drawing on the concepts of intra-activity and performativity, we 
examined bullying in universities as it informs and is informed by 
the necessity of belonging, of being recognized as of value, and the 
desire to act as one and be seen to act as one who is professional 
and accountable within a neoliberal environment. (p. 717, 




The issue of belonging and disability is discussed by Strnadová, Johnson 
and Walmsley (2018). As they note, although belonging is increasingly being seen 
as central to well-being, there is a “striking absence of people with intellectual 
[learning] disabilities in the wide literature on belonging” (p. 1093). Furthermore, 
in their focus groups with learning disabled people, many participants noted that 
disability was viewed as being “a major barrier to belonging” (p. 1098). Another 
major barrier to belonging was the bullying and prejudice which many of their 
participants faced on a daily basis; these behaviours were viewed by focus group 
members as a consequence of their disability (Strnadová et al., 2018). 
The connection between belonging and some life-skill programmes for 
learning disabled people is discussed by Van der Klift and Kunc (1994). As they 
discuss, the intention of many life-skill programmes is to improve quality of life 
and create the impression of “normalcy” through increased functioning and skill 
development. The carrot held up to potential participants is the promise of 
future acceptance and belonging (Van der Klift & Kunc, 1994); that is, the closer 
to “normal” one achieves, the greater the promise of belonging. The desire to be 
recognised within the constraints of normativity and the desire to belong appear 
to be powerful, performative agencies within the ongoing entanglements of 
disability. These agencies shape the production of silences regarding disability, 
ultimately having an effect on the knowledge participants have access to in 
relation to disability, and on their ability to discuss it in the hui.  
Silence in Disability Studies  
It is important to note that the entanglements of silence are a known 
issue in the disability studies literature. Oliver (1990), for instance notes “[o]n the 
experience of disability, history is largely silent, and when it is discussed at all, it 
is within the context of the history of medical advances” (p. xi). Lourens (2016) 
observes that from a very young age, disabled children are socialised into 
believing that speaking of their disability causes anxiety for others. Disabled 
people will not truly belong in the world, they hear, unless they make their 
disabilities invisible (Lourens, 2016). This is perhaps what was being pointed to in 




people, can you talk slowly because I've got a disability”. In Taylor’s statement, 
being seen as “different” to people without disabilities appears to imply inferior 
treatment, and perhaps raises questions as to one’s sense of belonging.  
Lourens (2016) discusses her own practice of silence in relation to her 
disability. She comments that these silences are largely caused by “the 
confluence of inaccessible physical and social environments and the 
psychological internalisation of these worlds” (p. 1). In particular, the 
proliferation of messages from society which present “whole” and “perfect” 
bodies as desirable bodies, along with the absence of disabled bodies, serves as a 
reminder that disabled people fail to meet the standards of “wholeness” and 
normality (Lourens, 2016). This view could equally be applied to those who fail to 
meet the standards of “wholeness” and normality in relation to cognitive 
capacity; although, the particularities of how this would function in relation to 
invisible disabilities may be somewhat more complex. For Lourens, this view led 
to the belief that she had nothing of value to contribute and that her voice 
“carried no real weight and that no one would want to listen anyway” (p. 7). It 
may be that similar forces were at work in Taylor’s desiring silence.  
Further to Lourens’ comments on the absence of disabled bodies in 
messages from society, the limited portrayal of disability in the media is noted by 
many scholars. In 2016, a study was published in which the 800 top-ranking films 
from 2007-2016 were analysed (Smith, Choueiti, & Pieper, 2016). This study 
found that only 2.4% of speaking roles were held by people with disabilities, and 
that 90% of those roles were minor characters. In the instances when disability is 
portrayed, it is often restricted to a limited trope of images. These include 
superheroes who overcome their disability (Overboe, 1999), objects of charity 
(Morris, 1991), passive recipients of (charitable) services (Blackmore & Hodgkins, 
2012), and victims (Oliver, 1990).  
The issue of what these silences produce will be explored further in the 




What do the Entanglements of Silence do? 
In bringing the analysis back to the Deleuzian question of what does it do, 
we can see that the entanglements of silence function to produce many effects 
in the ongoing intra-activity of life. In particular, these entanglements of silence 
had a profound effect on the mobilisation of a positive disability identity within 
the hui, and whether pride was able to be mobilised with the participants. 
Desiring silence, and the subsequent lack of knowledge regarding disability, 
served as a territorialising force inhibiting the production of pride.  
Many  participants did not appear to fully understand that they have 
been positioned as disabled subjects; most switched between identifying as 
disabled, not identifying as disabled, and refuting the disability label throughout 
the duration of the hui. This switch happened with some regularity for several 
participants, at times within a very brief period. For instance, in hui three, 
participants were asked whether they would describe themselves as having a 
disability. Jonathan and Karissa replied: 
 
Jonathan: Um to describe me I don't think I have a 
disability 
 … 
Karissa: (Weeesh). Uaahhhmm, For me, I think 
what Taylor just said. Um ((laughs 
briefly)), I, I think I don't have disability 
because I use able-ability. 
 
Both Karissa and Jonathan articulate that they “don’t think” they have a 
disability, a somewhat tentative response, erring on the side of not having a 
disability. However, in the following question from Glen “can you tell me about a 
disabled person who is really successful”, Jonathan responded that he and Glen 





Jonathan: Yeah I think [of] myself as successful 
person. Successful disabled person. Um 
because um, recently I've been awarded 
with trophies, I’m also been awarded 
being a part of um, sports teams.  
 
In this statement, made only a few minutes after he told us he does not think of 
himself as having a disability, Jonathan informs us that he thinks of himself as “a 
successful person. Successful disabled person”. Karissa also demonstrated a 
change in identity, noting:  
 
Karissa: I think... I am disabled person. My family is 
successful… they tell me what to do and 
do the right things. Like ...   ̊can't 
describe  ̊... um... I do things my own 
way… ((she points to herself with both 
hands)) on my own, by myself. I'm a great 
able-ability.  
 
In this statement, Karissa both identifies herself as a disabled person, and as “a 
great able-ability”. This contrasts with her earlier statement, where she told hui 
members that she does not think she has a disability, because she prefers the 
term able-ability.  
There appeared to be a connection between participants’ knowledge of 
disability, and whether or not they identified as disabled. Taylor and Natalie were 
the only participants who demonstrated a working knowledge of a “common-
sense” understanding of disability, which sees disability as a flaw inherent in 
individuals whose bodies and minds do not “work properly” (Marks, 1999). As 
Natalie notes:  
 
Natalie: We might be slow at somethings like 




harder to do courses or something like 
that it just takes a bit of time and more 
help to do things 
 
However, she notes further:  
 
Natalie: I like the word ability in disability because 
all of us people with disabilities we have 
abilities in some form or another.  
 
Throughout the hui, Taylor and Natalie were the only participants who 
consistently identified themselves as disabled. The remaining six participants 
appeared to have a significant lack of knowledge or understanding about 
“common-sense” understandings of disability, as well as their own disabilities / 
diagnosis. As discussed earlier, Carl in particular did not indicate any 
understanding of what the word disability means. Although the participant group 
was small and thus cannot be seen as a “valid representative sample” of the 
wider learning disability population, there appeared to be a correlation between 
understanding what disability is, being able to talk about their understanding of 
disability, and identifying as disabled. The lack of knowledge regarding disability 
served as a powerful, territorialising force inhibiting the mobilisation of disability 
pride in the hui; how can you be proud of something, if you do not know what it 
is?  
The entanglements of silence also appeared to be productive in the 
maintenance of ableism. The absence of discussions of disability leave hidden 
any discussion regarding disability’s binary opposite – the normal, ideal human. 
The normative category is able to remain unmarked and un-noticed: a non-
identity (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017). This 
phenomenon was alluded to by participants when they were asked what word 
they would use to describe people who do not have a disability. Participants did 
not choose the anticipated words such as “normal” or ordinary”. Instead, most 




words utilised the terms “lovable”, “encouragement” and “ability”, the latter 
being a term which they also ascribed to themselves. The difficulty finding a 
specific term, along with the choice of words “lovable”, “encouragement” and 
“ability”, are indicative of the unmarked, un-noticed and non-identity of people 
without disabilities.  
 Similarly, Mazzei (2011) highlights how desiring silence functions to 
maintain whiteness as an unmarked identity. As she notes:  
Because whiteness has historically gone unnamed and unnoticed 
as the hegemonic norm, a failure to voice whiteness, or put 
differently, the choice to articulate one’s white identity by not 
doing so, is another strategy for maintaining power through a 
move to maintain the normative (and unspoken) presence of 
whiteness. (p. 659) 
In this quote, “whiteness” can be substituted for “abled-ness”, demonstrating 
how “abled-ness” is maintained as an unmarked identity. By not speaking of 
whiteness, or abled-ness, the existing power asymmetries of race and disability 
remain in force. Elaborating this point further, Mazzei (2011) discusses how 
desiring silence ensures that those of us in an unmarked identity category 
continue to view those outside the category as “other”. As she notes, “they are 
raced, I am not” (p. 661); they are “different”, I am not. Ableist privilege remains 
unnamed and unchallenged.  
Another way ableism is maintained through the entanglements of silence, 
which is connected to the absent discussions of disability, is in the inability to 
name and thus challenge ableism. Naming oppression is considered crucial to the 
struggle against it (Morris, 1991). As noted earlier by Miller, Parker and Gillinson 
(2004), “if you do not name that which has to be defeated, it will not be beaten” 
(p. 15). The lack of language and knowledge participants have to understand 
their positioning as disabled subjects raises some challenging questions: how do 
people label the problems they face as anything other than an internalised 
problem of the self, without this language and knowledge? How can people see 




when the issues cannot be discussed? How are we to challenge ableism, if we 
cannot name it or speak about it?  
Barad (2007) argues that in the constitutive entanglements of life, more 
attentiveness must be paid to existing power asymmetries. There are many 
power asymmetries in relation to disability, most notably in relation to 
what/who has the power to shape the way disability is conceptualised. Current 
forces which have the power to shape the way disability is defined, and the way 
it is subsequently treated, include medicalised perspectives, the notion of the 
ideal human, which includes the differing gendered standards of “ideal men” and 
“ideal women”, the charity-context, the limited trope of media representations 
noted earlier, and non-disabled people’s fears and hostility (Morris, 1991; Oliver, 
1990). Many of the participants’ responses to questions about disability appear 
to mobilise these forces. For instance, as discussed in Chapter Eight, Luke 
commented that the man with one leg had “a leg wrong”, drawing upon a 
medicalised perspective of the corporeal norm. Further, Luke and Carl both 
displayed fear in their responses to the videos, with Luke commenting that 
seeing someone with one leg “freaking freak me out man”, and Carl commenting 
“I a little panic” when discussing wheelchairs. Through not speaking of disability, 
and not setting the terms for how disability is defined, the entanglements of 
silence continue to grant agency to these forces, including the always-present 
notion of the ableist ideal human. As Jackson and Mazzei (2011) assert, 
authority, privilege, and control are “maintained in a hegemonic and normative 
silence” (p. 99).  
Morris (1991) is clear in her assertion that the silences regarding disability 
needs to change. As she states, disabled people need to have the courage to 
speak about the negative aspects of disability, as well as the positive aspects. 
When disabled people feel strong enough to do this, she argues, they will be able 
to challenge the way non-disabled people make judgements about their lives, 
and, in doing so, “take charge of the way in which disability is defined and 
perceived” (Morris, 1991, p. 71). 
The intra-action of these phenomena – the lack of knowledge regarding 




maintenance of ableist privilege produce a key inhibiting phenomenon is 
produced. That is, the capacity to harness the agency necessary to challenge 
ableism and disability oppression is significantly constrained. In particular, the 
entanglements of silence affect not only the voicing of disability in an 
individualised sense, but also inhibit the collective voicing, reshaping and 
reimagining of disability.  
However, if one returns once again to Barad’s formative quote, “[t]he 
world and its possibilities for becoming are remade with each moment” (396), 
this entanglement does not need to be seen as totalising and immovable. 
Instead, it appears to be the least problematic entanglement to disrupt from the 
other entanglements outlined in this thesis; for, in order to rupture this 
entanglement, we just need to start speaking of disability. This may be 
challenging, but is surely not impossible.  
Conclusion  
The entanglements of silence function as an agentic force within the 
ongoing intra-activity of life, are evidenced through the participants’ lack of 
knowledge regarding disability. This lack of knowledge included Carl asking “what 
is it?” when asked to identify someone with and without a disability, Luke 
informing us that he does not know anyone without a disability, and Jonathan 
informing us that he was diagnosed with Down Syndrome when he was five. 
When read diffractively through the framework of desiring silence, these 
responses can be understood as the result of “the forces of desire that are acting 
through and with” (A. Y. Jackson & Mazzei, 2011, p. 91) participants, shaping the 
desiring silences. These desires have a strong alignment with Butler’s work on 
performativity, which illustrates the role of social norms in the processes of 
recognition. Furthermore, Zabrodska et al. (2011) and Jackson and Mazzei (2011) 
connect the desire for recognition with the desire to belong, where the closer to 
“normal” one achieves, the greater the promise of future acceptance and 
belonging.  
Multiple phenomena are produced through the entanglements of silence. 




understanding of disability. This presents questions as to the participants’ ability 
to challenge the material consequences of their subject positioning, without 
having the knowledge or language to identify issues beyond the view of these as 
individualised problems.  Not speaking of disability impedes the agency 
necessary to reimagine the way disability is conceptualised. This silence grants 
other intra-active forces agency, including non-disabled people’s perceptions, 
fears and hostility towards disability. One of the most problematic phenomenon 
produced through these silences, however, is the maintenance of the notion of 
the normal, ideal human. In this way, ableist hierarchies remain unnamed and 
unchallenged, leaving the notion of the ideal human untouched. The sum of 
these phenomena is a situation where the agency necessary to challenge 








The Entanglements of Help  
In this chapter I explore a powerful and perplexing phenomenon which 
arose during the hui – that of help. I analyse this entanglement utilising 
Wetherell’s work on practice, alongside Butler’s work on performativity, Davies’ 
work on positioning and Barad’s work on agential realism. Through using the 
Deleuzian questions of how does it work and what does it do, I explore how the 
notion of help is intertwined within the ongoing entanglements of disability, 
what this phenomenon produces and what possibilities it forecloses. In 
particular, the positioning of people labelled disabled in relation to “helping” will 
be explored, along with the intertwining of the ideal human within these 
entanglements. Lastly, I will examine the disruptive potential of the 
entanglement of help.  
Defining Disability and the Notion of Help 
When participants were asked to define disability in hui two, the word 
“help” appeared on several occasions. Unfortunately, this happened when the 
camera was not recording, and the specific details regarding what participants 
said were missed. Seeking to remedy this gap of information, participants were 
directly asked what was meant by the use of the word “help” in hui three. 
However, none of the participants seemed to remember using the word, and 
some suggested that perhaps we had been talking about “health”, rather than 
help. Yet, the word continued to pop up throughout the course of our 
conversations and activities in the remaining hui, as participants spoke of their 
desire to help disabled people, and how disabled people should be helped. In hui 
eight, participants were asked again how they would describe disability, and the 





Ingrid: What do you think disability is Gary?  
Gary: ((Clears throat)) I-, I like, um, to help someone. 
Ingrid:   To help someone? 
Gary: Yeah. 
 
Soon after, Carl expressed a similar sentiment: 
 
Ingrid: What about you, Carl? What do you think 
disability is? 
Carl: ...°um°.... um take care of people. 
Ingrid:   Pardon?  
Carl:  Um care of, to take care p-people. 
Ingrid: Care people? 
Carl: Yeah. 
Ingrid: To care for people?  
Carl: Yeah. 
Ingrid:  Ok. Cool. 
Carl: Yeah to care people and helping people out. 
 
Although Carl uses the word “care” more than “help”, “care” appears to be used 
in such a way that it indicates a similar meaning or intent to the word “help”. As 
the point of this analysis is not to seek an understanding of what participants 
mean, but rather how these phenomena work and what they do, I analyse this 
excerpt with an understanding that the terms “care” and “help” are somewhat 
conflated.  
This notion of “caring for people” and “helping people” was by far the 
most perplexing phenomenon which arose from the hui. Despite the frequency 
of its appearance, participants themselves seemed unaware of what the 
connection was with disability, or why this connection existed. It was only when 




Wetherell et al., 2015), in which she touches on the notion of social practice, that 
a connection finally emerged.  
Wetherell (2012) defines practices as routines, assemblages, or “ways of 
doing things”, including ways of working, of moving our bodies, of cooking, of 
consuming, and of feeling. These assemblages are sites of repetition, which are 
made up of multiple intra-acting elements (Barad, 2007) which assemble 
together into patterns, and “provide the basic intelligibility of the world” 
(Wetherell, 2014, p. 12). Although Wetherell’s work largely centres on affective 
practices and affective-discursive practices, she also touches on the notion of 
“social practices”. For instance, she notes that affect is embedded in situated 
practice, and can be “very densely knotted in with connected social practices 
where the degree of knitting reinforces the affect and can make it resistant and 
durable, sometimes unbearably so” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 14). Indeed, Wetherell 
(2012) notes that it is not always helpful to distinguish between affective and 
social practices, because “[i]n some sense all social practice is affective because 
all human practice is embodied and comes attached with some valence” (p. 96). 
Viewed through this lens, “help” can be viewed as social practice; as a routinised 
entanglement which includes ways of moving our bodies (such as stepping in to 
help someone in a wheelchair up a steep curb), ways of spending money (such as 
donating to charities which are for disabled people, rather than non-profit 
organisations which are run by disabled people), and ways of feeling about 
disability.  
Keith (1996) provides a useful plain-language description of social 
practice, stating:  
All social encounters are governed by rules of behaviour. There are 
things that it is normally acceptable for strangers to say to each 
other and things that are not. For example, in the particular 
section of British society in which I usually mix, it is considered 
okay, indeed complimentary, to remark that people [usually 
women] are thin, but rude to say that they are fat. It is acceptable 
to tell people they are very tall but impolite to remark on the fact 




These social practices, or “rules of behaviour”, can be viewed as performative 
agencies within the iterative entanglements of disability. As Davies (2008) notes, 
“the ordinary everyday world is sedimented in repeated citations of the way the 
world is (and, it is believed, ought to be)” (p. 173).  
 
The connection between help, disability and social practice was also 
prompted by a video that I watched on Facebook during the time that I was 
reading about affective practices. In this video, a boy with CP (cerebral palsy) 
competes in the school cross-country race and is helped by his PE teacher and 
entire class, who by the end are walking next to him chanting “Let’s go Matt, 
Let’s go (clap clap)” (Liftable, 2017). The video could be described as a real “tear-
jerker”, and as I watched the video I observed myself becoming teary and 
emotional, at the same time as I was perplexed by this reaction. I came to realise 
that what I was noticing was a powerful social practice of disability – we help 
disabled people. Furthermore, this social practice is entangled with affective 
practice, as helping the boy to finish the race like “normal” children do, with 
moral rather than physical assistance, feels “right”.  It seems that helping 
disabled people feels so “right” that it is worthy of innumerable “inspirational” 
YouTube and Facebook videos showcasing this practice.  
 
Taking on this understanding of social practice, the question then 
becomes what the “rules of behaviour” are in relation to disability. Furthermore, 
how does the notion of help connect in with these rules? This subject will be 
explored in the following section.  
The “Rules of Behaviour” in the Entanglements of 
Disability  
Keith (1996) notes that the rules of behaviour for how we should conduct 
ourselves are not always clear when disability is involved. This results in “all kinds 





[T]he able bodied person… must struggle against the underlying 
ambiguity of the encounter, the lack of clear cultural guidelines on 
how to behave and perhaps his [sic] own sense of revulsion. (p. 
121)  
Murphy (1987) argues further that many non-disabled people look on disabled 
people as an almost “alien species”, a people whose reactions to conversation 
and offers of assistance cannot be anticipated. Because of this, many non-
disabled people refrain from establishing eye contact with disabled people and 
go out of their way to avoid conversations with this “unknowable” species 
(Murphy, 1987). The specific issue of avoiding disabled people was also discussed 
in a recent Independent news article titled One in four Brits admit to avoiding 
conversations with disabled people (Bulman, May, 2017). In this article, Bulman 
(2017) notes that “fear of causing offence”, “feeling uncomfortable” and “not 
knowing what to talk about” were the most common reasons cited for avoiding 
conversations with disabled people.  
During the hui, Natalie told a story about an encounter she had had in 
which the absence of visible disability appeared to change the rules of 
encounter. In this story Natalie and her flatmate were at the supermarket 
checkout with a support person, when her flatmate’s card was declined. Natalie 
described the reaction of an older gentleman behind her, who was “being really, 
really rude” towards her and her flatmate. Natalie explains further below. 
 
Natalie: ((mimicking the man)) [He was saying]"ohhh and 
now I'm going to miss my bus" and everything 
and you know like all this bad mouthed language 
out of his mouth. And I’m thinking, you know, 
he's treating us as like a normal person, like not a 
person with a disability. Cuz, they won't, they 
won't even know. 
Ingrid:  Yeah.  
Natalie: Um, yeah it was really bad mouthed and that. 




telling people behind oh they're slow, ohhh, you 
know she should have had money and all that. 
And then, you know he was talking about the bus 
and stuff and we saw him walk up to his car. So 
he wasn't exactly catching the bus at all. 
 ((Ingrid and Taylor laugh a little)) 
Natalie:  Um, yeah so he didn’t know that, you know we 
had a support worker with us. 
Ingrid: Yeah. 
Natalie: And then when like, she wasn’t a family member 
so. 
Ingrid: So <what do you think?> 
Natalie: <I think> he just treated us as one of the public. 
Ingrid: Yeah. 
Natalie: Like everyone else.  
 
Although there were undoubtedly some gendered practices also intertwined in 
this scenario, Natalie’s story highlights the powerful role of visible identifiers of 
disability in shaping the “rules of behaviour” related to “help” between 
strangers. When Natalie states “they won’t even know”, and that the gentleman 
treated her and her flatmate “as one of the public…Like everyone else”, she 
appears to be pointing to the absence of help (or patience) which arises when 
someone’s challenge is invisible.  
The work of Graham (1997) helps to elucidates Natalie’s story further. 
Graham (1997) describes the differing “rules of behaviour” which arise when 
someone is seen as being responsible for their “plight”, versus when they are not 
seen as responsible. As she notes, “when a person’s need state is perceived as 
uncontrollable [such as a visible disability], that individual is not held responsible; 
the absence of responsibility tends to elicit pity and prosocial actions such as 
help” (p. 23). In contrast, people who are seen to be responsible for their plight, 
such as when they have an invisible disability like Natalie, are viewed as not 




in others, and help is withheld as a result of this feeling (Graham, 1997). The 
older gentleman in this story appears to perceive Natalie’s flatmate as not 
exhibiting the expected level of personal responsibility, stating “she should have 
had money and all that”. The affective practices of personal responsibility 
become intertwined in this scenario, and the gentleman becomes angry and 
“really, really rude” to the three women.  
Keith (1996) points out that the “rules of behaviour” in relation to 
disability become much clearer when a visible disability is involved, driving the 
desire to help. Keith (1996) tells the story of a woman who has a son with acute 
communication and learning difficulties. The son can walk, however he “has no 
concentration and is very unco-ordinated” (p. 77). She explains further:  
When they are struggling together, people feel awkward and 
embarrassed and turn away but when he is in a wheelchair they 
rush to open doors and help them up kerbs or steps. People are 
glad to help in this case because they feel they know what to do, 
the rules of behaviour are clear to them. (p. 77) 
It appears thus that help is one of the few clear social practices within the 
entanglements of disability, a practice which is strongly impacted by the visible 
presence of disability. As Carl notes, disability is “helping people out”. Keith 
(1996) picks up on the power of this key practice in her work, arguing:  
The central confusion of the relationship between us [disabled and 
non-disabled people] is that on the one hand they are 
disconcerted by our presence, and are confused about how to 
behave towards us or even what words they should use to 
describe us, but on the other hand they have a clear idea that they 
should be helpful and kind. (p. 81) 
This practice of help appears to be a powerful, performative agency within the 
entanglements of disability. Indeed, it is such an agentic phenomenon that it was 





In the following section, I explore how the social practices of help play an 
integral role in the ongoing formation of the establishment of viable subjects.  
Viable Subjects and the Practices of Help 
The social practices of help can be viewed as an integral component of 
the establishment of what Butler (1997b) terms viable subjects. That is, there are 
certain practices that subjects are expected to both partake in and take up as 
their own if they wish to be constituted as a viable subject. Davies (2000) speaks 
of this phenomenon in her work, stressing that an important part of the 
establishment of ourselves as subjects is: 
[T]o desire as one’s own, to take pleasure in the world, as it is 
made knowable through the available practices, and in particular 
the discursive practices, the patterns of power and powerlessness 
and one’s positioning within them. (p. 22, emphasis in original) 
In relation to disability, these practices include the social practices of help, 
affective practices – such as the feeling that disability is a tragedy or that a 
disabled person is inspirational – and discursive practices, such as the silences 
regarding disability and the desire to speak of people as having socially valued 
roles.  
Davies (2000) argues that taking on these practices forms an integral part 
of the “correct” way of taking oneself up as a subject; that is, to understand how 
to be positioned in a social context, and how to “position oneself as a member of 
the group who knows and takes for granted what other people know and take 
for granted in a number of settings” (p. 22). 
In order to explore what the social practices of help foreclose and present 





What Does the Practice of Help Do? 
In many ways, the performative agency of help presents potential for 
countless positive outcomes. As Graham (1990) states, “[b]eing the recipient of 
aid usually results in some tangible gain, at least when compared with 
undesirable alternatives such as failure” (p. 28). However, the performative 
agency of help also presents some complexities and challenges. In particular the 
problematic approach of state-wide interventions designed to “help” 
marginalised groups is the subject of scholarly discussion (e.g., K. Dunn & Kaplan, 
2009; Moldovan & Moyo, 2007). As Dunn and Kaplan (2009) highlight, large 
numbers of people  who are on death row or are sentenced to life imprisonment 
in the USA have engaged in various “helping” support systems over their lifetime. 
Similarly, Lynch (2016) discusses the “significant over-representation of 
individuals with neurodisabilities27 in both the adult and youth justice systems” 
(p. 3) in Aotearoa New Zealand. Many of these individuals will have engaged with 
various “helping” agencies in relation to their disability diagnosis. Dunn and 
Kaplan (2009) argue that rather than “helping”, many of these social 
interventions “enforce a certain type of personhood that may or may not be in 
the helpee’s best interest”. Further, these authors suggest that “while the stated 
goal is to help, the real purpose is to get the person to conform to a certain way 
of being”. (p. 339)  
Connecting these practices with the Foucauldian notion of the 
“psychological complex” or “psy-complex” (a concept first developed by Nikolas 
Rose, see for instance Rose, 1985), Dunn and Kaplan (2009) highlight how these 
state-wide helping interventions use scientific knowledge and professional 
expertise in an attempt “to improve people, to change their characters, 
attitudes, and behaviours through manipulation of their qualities and attributes” 
(p. 339). The interventions perpetuate a hegemonic notion of individualism, as 
they ignore “the sociocultural aspects of being human” (p. 364). This serves to 
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differences such as dyslexia and communication disorders through to attention deficit 
hyperactive disorder (ADHD), autism spectrum disorder (ASD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), 




separate individual actions from the environment which is often a significant 
cause of the issue at hand. Thus, the “helping” interventions can be understood 
as a tool of the state for regulating its citizens, particularly in regards to 
liberalism’s focus on the individual.  
Whilst such analysis of macro-level, state-wide “helping” interventions is 
thought-provoking, I have chosen to take a different approach in this thesis. This 
is largely because participants’ comments, along with the conceptual framework, 
led me towards a more micro-level view of these practices; that is, towards an 
exploration of the everyday practices through which disability oppression is 
fostered.  
  In the following section, I investigate how the social practice of help 
intersects with the modernist notion of the ideal human.  
Help and the Notion of the Ideal Human  
The social practice of help brushes up against the modernist ideal of 
independent, autonomous, always-in-control and self-reliant individuals (Crotty, 
1998; Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2016). As highlighted by Van der Klift and Kunc 
(1994), whilst being a provider of help is often seen as desirable, many people 
are decidedly uncomfortable being the recipient of help. This discomfort, they 
argue, is because being the recipient of help serves as a reminder of one’s 
vulnerability and, within a (neo)liberal view, can suggest deficiency, burden, 
inferiority, and a sense of obligation to another. Being the recipient of help can 
call into question one’s embodiment of the expected, ideal traits. Autonomous, 
self-reliant individuals are not expected to need help.  
In particular, this practice confronts the ideal of the always-abled subject. 
This point was alluded to in Natalie’s story, when the gentleman turned to the 
people behind them at the checkout, commenting “oh they’re slow, ohhh, you 
know she should have had money and all that”. Natalie comments that he was 
treating them “like a normal person, like not a person with a disability”. 
Presumably, were the man to treat Natalie and her flatmate like “a person with a 
disability”, they would have been afforded a higher level of “help” or patience 




ensure they have the money they need to purchase groceries; “normal people” 
who act “slow” are not worthy recipients of the “help” and patience of other 
people.  
Graham (1990) argues further that receiving help can function as a low-
ability cue. As their research highlights, when children receive help they do not 
ask for from a teacher, the helped child is perceived as being of lower-ability 
than non-helped students. This view of lower ability impinges upon the capitalist 
demand for productive, autonomous workers (or “citizens”) who are not a 
“burden” on others. It appears thus that being the recipient of help can serve to 
question one’s status as a fully abled, ideal subject; it threatens to jeopardise 
one’s placement in the ascendant, “normal” category (De Schauwer, Van de 
Putte, & Davies, 2017).  
It is also important to consider how the operation of these social 
practices keeps hidden the interdependence of all lives. For instance, the 
gentleman in Natalie’s story is helped by the checkout assistant (or machine) to 
pay for his food, by people who keep the shelves stocked at the supermarket, 
who in turn rely on the people who grow/manufacture the food and deliver it to 
the supermarket, and on the people who lay and maintain the roads, which the 
gentleman in Natalie’s story uses to drive to the supermarket, and on the list 
goes. These “helping” practices form an integral component of the lives of all 
humans; as Goodley and Lawthom (2015) argue, “[w]e need other humans and 
non-humans in order to live” (para. 3). The intra-active processes of normativity 
work to ensure that this interdependence is kept invisible (Wearing, 
Gunaratnam, & Gedalof, 2015). Thus, certain types of help remain naturalised 
and difficult to see, while other forms of help, such as the forms which disabled 
people often receive, are viewed as exceptional and attention-worthy (Wearing 
et al., 2015). 
In the following section, I draw upon positioning theory to explore the 
key Deleuzian question of what does this do. In particular, I examine how the 
social practice of help functions to position people assigned the label disabled as 





Positioning, as described by Davies and Harré (1990) is: 
[T]he discursive processes whereby selves are located in 
conversations as observably and subjectively coherent participants 
in jointly produced storylines. There can be interactive positioning 
in which what one person says positions another. And there can 
be reflexive positioning in which one positions oneself. However it 
would be a mistake to assume that, in either case, positioning is 
necessarily intentional. (p. 48) 
Alongside discursive processes, I would add the full breadth of intra-active 
processes which enable selves to be located as “observably and subjectively 
coherent participants” (p. 8). This process of positioning is part of what 
continually enables the materialisation of a self; one who is continually 
(re)constituted in ways which can be multiple and contradictory, through the 
various practices in which they participate (Davies & Harré, 1990). Once a person 
has taken up a particular position as their own (i.e. father, student, female), they 
inevitably see “the world from the vantage point of that position” (Davies & 
Harré, 1990, p. 46). Burr (1995) notes furthermore: 
Once we take up a subject position in discourse, we have available 
to us a particular, limited set of concepts, images, metaphors, 
ways of speaking, self-narratives and so on that we take on as our 
own. This entails both an emotional commitment on our part to 
the categories of person to which we are allocated and see 
ourselves as belonging (such as male, grandfather or worker) and 
the development of an appropriate system of morals (rules of 
right and wrong). (pp. 145-146)  
There is a clear alignment between this understanding of positioning, and the 
social practices of disability discussed previously. As Burr’s (1995) statement 
highlights, an important part of taking up a subject position is “the development 




added). These rules of right and wrong include a sense of what it is possible and 
appropriate to do, and form part of what Davies and Harré (1990) describe as the 
ubiquitous moral order. The “rules of behaviour”, or social practices of disability, 
thus form an important part of the ubiquitous moral order, an order which must 
be taken up as one’s own if one is to be positioned as a viable subject.  
In exploring the connection between positioning and the social practices 
of help, a key issue arises. That is, the way this practice is currently enacted tends 
to place the helper in a position of power over the helpee. This furthermore 
positions the helpee (e.g., the disabled person) as passive or lacking in agency. 
When someone is the recipient of help there are certain social practices which 
are expected. In the Western world in particular, the person receiving help is 
expected to be grateful. The socially desirable and expected way to be a helpee 
is to not challenge how help is given, nor to dictate the terms by which they are 
helped, or to insist that they receive help in the first place. When a person is 
helped they are expected to be patient and wait for help to arrive, not get angry, 
tell the helper they have done something wrong, or show anything other than 
good humour at the remarks that are given (Keith, 1996). When someone is in 
the position of needing help “[t]he power to decide where and when help should 
take place, who should help us, and whether in fact help is needed is stripped 
away” (Van der Klift & Kunc, 1994, p. 5). As Overall (2006) argues, this 
demonstration of gratitude serves as a compensation for the “burdensome” 
nature of the helpee. 
This social expectation creates many problems for disabled people, 
particularly when the “help” offered is based on the helpers’ perceptions of 
need, rather than the helpee’s perception of what might be useful to them 
(Keith, 1996). A brilliant example of this is found in Janice Pink’s poem “Do Unto 
Others”, which is highlighted by Keith (1996). The story and the poem below 
bear telling in their entirety, as I fear I could not do it justice with paraphrasing: 
Janice Pink’s poem ‘Do Unto Others’… tells the (true) story of her 
encounter with a woman at a supermarket checkout. This woman, 
alerting the cashier’s attention to the fact that ‘we’ve got a cripple 




that I can do/because but for the grace of God, I could be just like 
you!’ But her ‘thoughtfulness’ soon turns to outrage when Janice 
begins to make it clear that she finds this behaviour both 
interfering and offensive. The poem ends with the lecture the do-
gooder felt she needed to give to the ungrateful Janice.  
I know you’ve being very brave, but that was rather rude –  
Next time someone helps you, try to show some gratitude.  
Of course you think life isn’t fair, but when you’re feeling blue –  
Big smile! And then remember, there’s someone worse than you!’ 
(Pink, 1994). (pp. 80-81) 
If people do not display the appropriate gratitude response to being helped, they 
are considered ungrateful and are cast as an illegitimate subject. They have not 
properly participated in the social practices required of them in order to be 
considered a viable subject. In Wetherell’s (2012) terms, this is a practice which 
disempowers in the guise of empowering.  
The expectation of gratitude is particularly sedimented in the charity 
model, which plays a profound role in disability support in Western society. As 
Keith (1996) and Morris (1991) argue, charities form an essential part of the 
relationship between non-disabled and disabled people. The charitable model 
comes with an expectation of gratitude, which, as Morris (1991) argues, “is 
actually about making the non-disabled person feel good about themselves. Our 
gratitude is the gift we are expected to make in exchange for tolerance and 
material help” (p. 108). This situation is especially notable in learning disability 
support services where, as Goodley, Hughes and Davis (2012) argue, learning 
disabled people are often expected to be passive, grateful recipients of 
charitable services.  
The social practices of help, including the expectation of gratitude, can be 
understood as a line of descent within the iterative entanglements of disability, a 
line which forms part of the unreflected ordinariness of the world (Davies, 2015). 
The positions offered, accepted and resisted in these everyday practices are part 




power implications are brought to life” (Burr, 1995, p. 147). Thus, it can be said 
that social practices of help, as they are currently enacted, are disempowering. 
The continually iterated line of descent is one of the means by which disabled 
people are repeatedly positioned as passive and lacking in agency, as holding a 
diminished position of power. This is one of the lines of flight which must be 
opened up for examination and ruptured if we are to challenge the power of the 
status quo. As Butler (1997a) points out, for those who are not supported by the 
status quo “the opening up of the foreclosed and the saying of the unspeakable 
become part of the very ‘offence’ that must be committed in order to expand the 
domain of linguistic survival” (p. 41). 
Although the practice of help emerged as a problematic line of descent 
within the hui, it also simultaneously emerged as a phenomenon with disruptive 
potential. The latter point will be addressed in the following section.   
The Disruptive Potential of Help 
As noted earlier, help emerged as an agentic phenomenon at multiple 
points throughout the hui. In this section, I explore several key moments when 
the lines of flight took off in new and unexpected directions. These moments 
highlight the potential of help in the production of ethical responses between 
beings.  
The first moment of disruptive force came through in the stories of two 
participants. Natalie and Taylor both spontaneously told stories in hui eight 
about the differing behaviour they observed in people when help was required. 
The first story from Taylor arose while I was talking with participants about my 
preliminary findings from the hui. I mentioned that I had noticed that many 
participants liked to use the word ability to describe themselves, and then 
referred to a conversation from the previous hui about the ableism binary. In this 
conversation, I had drawn two stick figures on the whiteboard in separate circles, 
which Natalie referred to as the “A” and “B” boxes. Taylor’s comment arose 





Ingrid: Alright. um, I've also noticed that, remember how 
last time we did those two like stick figure 
drawings. 
Jonathan: Yeah sticky ((said with humour in his voice. 
Karissa laughs and they look at each other and 
grin)). 
Ingrid: Ok, so um, and that, I think lot of people think of 
the world, so Natalie you called it the “A” and “B” 
boxes.  
Natalie: Mmm hmmm. 
Ingrid: Like that. So I think a lot of people think of the 
world in terms of 
Taylor: It sort of reminds me of something that happened 
yes-, that happened this morning. 
Ingrid: Yeah? 
Taylor: Um, I was like catching, I was on the bus. And 
then the, um, the petrol station by where, um, 
Pizza Hut used to be and where WINZ [the Work 
and Income office] is now. Um, I think a lady fell 
off her bike. But everyone like, there were heaps 
of people helping her and stuff. So, um... so 
everyone helps people cuz that's their, like, sense 
to help people. But they don't really... um... 
that's, oh, that's their... °forgotten the word°, but, 
um... people are like, some people are mean 
people but when someone's hurt they help out. 
So... yeah ((she smiles and laughs a little)). 
 
It is unclear from the conversation exactly what prompted Taylor’s memory of 
the morning’s accident, although it may have been stimulated by the “A” and “B” 
drawings on the whiteboard, which had just been re-drawn based on the 




whole legs inside a circle (the “A” box), and a stick figure with one whole leg and 
one half leg inside a circle (the “B” box). It is interesting to note that the 
entanglement of Taylor’s memory with the conversation regarding ability, 
disability and the ableism binary brought up a connection between injury and 
disability. Many disabilities are the result of injury, particularly when someone 
has a visible “difference” such as missing half a leg. However, the medicalised 
association of disability is often vehemently rejected by many in the DRM and in 
the field of disability studies. Perhaps unconsciously, Taylor appears to be 
drawing a connection between the idea of disability, seeing someone who is 
injured, and the differing way that people act when they see someone in need of 
help.  
This story from Taylor seemed to remind Natalie of her recent experience 
at the supermarket, wherein the older gentleman had been “really, really rude” 
to her and her flatmate. Directly after telling this story, Natalie told another story 
which aligned with what Taylor had said:  
 
Natalie: And I noticed [a] thing another day where, you 
know how school kids um, I dunno if you guys 
catch buses around school kids time. 
Taylor:  ((Nods)) Mmmm. 
Natalie: Um, how they like to push in and stuff and the 
bus comes about three o’clock and you're like 
((she puts hands up by her face and looks quite 
stiff and cramped for a moment)) you're like the 
only one that's not like a school kid. Everyone’s 
got their uniform. They’re like barging in on the 
bus. Well at Eastgrove28 I was waiting for my bus 
about 3 o’clock and all the Eastgrove High School 
people came. And there was a lady in this like 
wheelchair. Ummm, you know mobility, 
wheelchair, I think it was. And I noticed that, they 
                                                     




all stood back. Because they like to get on the bus 
first because it gets so full. And I noticed that, you 
know this, the all the school kids stood back and 
let that lady on first. 
Ingrid: Ohhh. 
Natalie:  Um, instead of all <barging in>. 
Ingrid: <Yeah>. 
Natalie:  They actually like walked back ((gestures apart 
with her hands)) and then they helped her get on 
((gestures helping motion with hand)) and, you 
know. Opened the thing to get on the bus. And 
they also let me on as well. Cuz they usually let 
the public on before the school kids. Which I 
thought they really got, you know, nice manners. 
 
Both Natalie and Taylor’s stories highlight the agency of “help” in producing an 
ethical response from other beings. Where Natalie states that the school children 
who normally “barge in” suddenly became much more respectful with “nice 
manners” in the presence of a wheelchair (a visible display of disability), Taylor 
highlights how “some people are mean people but when someone’s hurt they 
help out”. Perhaps what participants were emphasising was the agency of help in 
producing an ethical response, for the “lively relationalities of becoming of which 
we are a part” (Barad, 2007, p. 393). As Barad (2007) argues, matter, meaning 
and ethics are inseparable and mutually dependent. We are always already 
responsible for other beings and phenomena with which we are entangled, “not 
through conscious intent but through various ontological entanglements that 
materiality entails” (p. 393). Or, as Davies (2014b) argues:  
Being open, and being vulnerable to being affected by the other, is 
how we accomplish our humanity; it is how the communities, of 
which we are part, create and re-create themselves. We are not 
separate from the encounters that make up the community but, 




Taylor and Natalie’s responses to the scenarios they experienced emphasise the 
role of vulnerability (that is, being in a position of needing help) in affecting each 
other, in accomplishing our humanity and in (re)creating the communities “of 
which we are part” (Davies, 2014b, p. 10). For instance, Taylor comments “there 
were heaps of people helping” the woman who fell off her bike, reasoning 
further that people who are generally “mean people” respond with humanity to 
“help” fellow members of their community, when they see someone in a 
vulnerable position; that is, “mean people” emerge as helpful people through 
such encounters.  Natalie commented further that the normally “rude” school 
children emerge as differing beings with “nice manners” in the presence of a 
wheelchair.  
In the key moment outlined below, I sought to (re)create such a scenario; 
that is, to open myself up and be vulnerable to being affected by the 
participants, and see whether this presented potential to disrupt the iterative 
entanglements of disability. This scenario was examined previously in Chapter 
Seven. In this chapter, I outlined the moment in which I opened myself up to 
being vulnerable with participants, and invited them to help me think about how 
I could feel OK about myself with a newly acquired disability. Participants 
responded, albeit briefly, with some positive discussion about disability. The 
excerpt is repeated below: 
 
Ingrid: How else could I feel proud of myself? 
Jonathan: We could be mates ((steps over to me and links 
his arm through mine)) 
Ingrid:   Yeah. 
Natalie: Get new friends. 
Ingrid:   Yeah, how would I get new friends, do you think? 
Glen:  ((Walks around to the other side of me and puts 
his arm around my waist)) 
Carl: Ingrid. 




Ingrid: Yeah, so I would get to meet new people, 
wouldn't I? 
Taylor: Mmm. 
Ingrid:   That would be cool. 
Jonathan: Yeaaah. 
Natalie: Other people that can help you out. 
Ingrid:   Yeah? So I would get more support people then? 
Natalie: Yeah. 
 
Although there had been small moments of pride demonstrated during the hui, 
this was the only point at which disability was discussed in a positive way without 
the territorialising forces shutting down what was happening. As this moment 
highlights, asking participants to help me seemed to present some productive 
potential in shifting the lines of flight, ever so briefly. Both Jonathan and Glen 
stepped up to link their arms around me, demonstrating a physical act of 
support, and participants commented that “we could be mates”, that I could “get 
new friends”, such as people at the Blind Foundation, and that I would have 
“other people that can help [me] out”. In this response, participants’ were 
demonstrating the presence of collective support within the disability 
community; support which not only leads to “new friends”, but which can also 
provide a sense of community and belonging.  
A similar effect of opening myself up to being vulnerable and disrupting 
the lines of flight was seen in hui six when I gave my “speech” to participants, as 
outlined in Chapter Seven. This speech arose in response to participants’ 
responses to videos and discussions on disability pride, in which they indicated a 
strong desire not to continue with these activities. In my speech, I handed the 
dilemma I faced to the participants in the spirit of co-construction, and asked for 
their help in proceeding with the hui. Participants responded well to the speech, 
and we were able to progress.  
Participants themselves seemed to greatly enjoy being positioned as 
helpers during the hui, and several participants commented that they 





Ingrid: So Gary, what made you want to come to the hui 
and what made you keep coming back to the hui? 
Gary: Because I like doing-, because I like doing helping 
you out. 
…  
Taylor: Um, I liked coming back and helping you out with 
your research. And I also liked having a day off 
work ((laughs)). 
 
Karissa and Jonathan did a haka, a Māori ceremonial dance often conducted as a 
sign of honour and respect in Aotearoa New Zealand, to thank me for 
“everything”, which included allowing them to help in the research. Gary also 
gave me a box of chocolates, which I have placed a photo of below: 
 
 
Figure two: A photo of a box of chocolates in pink wrapping 
paper. The words “To Ingrid. Thank you for letting me help you 
in research” are written in vivid.  
Opening oneself up to being vulnerable is not without risk; it was a 
challenging, almost frightening experience as a researcher, and could have gone 
very differently had different intra-active elements come to play. It is thanks to 




support and goodwill of participants, that I felt safe enough to open myself up to 
being vulnerable, and we were ultimately able to progress the hui. It seemed 
that opening myself up to being vulnerable and accepting help enabled the 
participants and myself to be affected by each other (Davies, 2014b) – to create 
and recreate our “selves”, our sense of subjectivity, and the possibilities for 
thought and action in relation to disability.  
Perhaps the remarks from participants highlight the power of positioning 
in disrupting these problematic and seemingly unchangeable issues; for us as 
researchers to step away from the mantle of “knowledgeable experts”, and 
position marginalised communities as the helpers rather than the helpees. In this 
particular project, getting participants to help me as the researcher enabled us to 
progress past seemingly intractable “knotty points”, in which territorialising 
forces held the lines of flight firmly on a line of descent. Furthermore, this 
approach appeared to enable us to progress past these knotty points in a 
manner which was safe for, and accepted by, the participants. Perhaps this 
positioning presents potential to disrupt the problematic normative orders of 
research and of life, as was highlighted in the role plays on pride. It may present, 
as De Schauwer, Van de Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al. (2017) state, “a creative 
evolutionary or de-territorializing force that opens up the new, the not-yet-
known, and the emergent possibility of becoming different” (p. 2).  
Conclusion  
This chapter explored a powerful and somewhat perplexing phenomenon 
which arose at multiple points during the hui – that of help. This phenomenon 
was particularly noticeable when participants were asked to define disability. 
Two participants responded by stating that disability is “to help someone” and 
“to care people and helping people out”. By drawing upon Wetherell’s work on 
practice, the notion of help was analysed as a social practice of disability. Social 
practices can be understood as “rules of behaviour”, which help us understand 
what it is desirable to do and say, or not do and say, in relation to disability. This 
understanding of social practice has a strong alignment with Butler’s work on 




are certain practices which subjects are expected to partake in if they wish to be 
constituted as a viable subject. In short, helping disabled people is a powerful 
social practice in relation to disability, one which enables people to establish 
themselves as viable subjects.  
The social practices of help produce a variety of outcomes. As the 
examples in this chapter demonstrate, the social practices of help are deeply 
embedded in social complexities that produce many positive outcomes, as well 
as many challenges and complexities. In particular, the modernist ideal of 
independent, autonomous, always-in-control and self-reliant individuals is 
confronted, shaping the desire to give, but not receive, help. The practice further 
keeps hidden the interdependence of all lives,  ensuring that certain types of 
help remain naturalised and difficult to see, while other forms of help are viewed 
as exceptional and attention-worthy (Wearing et al., 2015). Furthermore, as it is 
currently enacted, the practice of help positions helpers in a position of power 
over helpees. This functions to ensure that disabled people are continually 
positioned as passive and lacking in agency.  
However, help also emerged as a force with disruptive potential during 
the hui. In particular, two key moments were discussed, wherein I opened myself 
up to being vulnerable with participants and asked for help. Participants’ 
enthusiasm for helping me enabled us to progress past some seemingly 
intractable knotty points, and supported the development of positive discussions 
regarding disability, albeit briefly. I believe that these moments highlight the 
potential of help in the production of ethical responses between beings; they 
allow us to accomplish our humanity through opening ourselves to being 






Conclusion and Implications for 
Policy and Practice 
This thesis has centred around a key problem: why do learning disabled 
people remain positioned on the margins of humanity, decades of hard work 
from the disability rights movement (DRM), family and whānau29, legislators, 
academics, support workers and many more? In this chapter, I summarise the 
key findings related to what is producing this marginalised positioning, and 
outline suggestions for how this situation can be changed.  
Background Contexts  
The thesis opened with an examination of what is meant by the 
statement, “positioned on the margins of humanity”. Statistics related to the big 
picture of disability oppression demonstrate that, overall,  disabled people fare 
worse than people without disabilities on almost every life domain that is 
measured. Compared with people who do not have disabilities, disabled people 
have worse health outcomes, lower life expectancy, are subject to higher rates of 
abuse, higher rates of mental illness, have reduced access to education and 
employment, are paid less and, unsurprisingly, are more likely to live in poverty 
(Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014; Goodley, 2017; IHC 
New Zealand, 2017; Scior et al., 2015; World Health Organisation, 2011). Further, 
people assigned the label of learning disabled stand out as the most affected 
group in all of these areas.  
My experiences working in the disability support sector left me vexed by 
the sense that this situation continues despite concerted efforts to enact change. 
                                                     




Despite pockets of innovative work the problem has not been adequately 
addressed by the efforts of support workers, policy developers, or learning 
disabled people themselves to teach people about disability rights, and to 
change people’s “attitudes” regarding disability. Something clearly needs to 
change.  
In this thesis I have argued that disability is an artefact of the recent 
historical, political, spiritual and social structures in the Western world. Further 
the concept of modernity, a framework which places great focus on universal 
truths, logic and reason (Crotty, 1998), assisted in the development of ideas 
related to “normality”. These ideas come together in the conceptualisation of 
the “ideal human”; an individual who is autonomous, always-in-control and self-
reliant (Crotty, 1998), as well as ideally white, heterosexual, male, able-bodied, 
capable, responsible and middle-class (Davies, 2016; Goodley et al., 2014). Above 
all else, this ideal individual is rational, a point critical to the development of the 
conceptual framework for this thesis.  
I argued further that disability functions as the “constitutive outside” for 
the notion of the “ideal human” to exist; that is, the idea of rationality, self-
reliance and able-bodiedness require an “other” (Campbell, 2005). The 
ascendant term within this binary, “normal”, functions to signify what is 
desirable, while the descendent term, “disability” functions to signify what is 
undesirable (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, & Davies, 2017; De Schauwer, Van de 
Putte, Van Goidsenhoven, et al., 2017); that is, as a “problem” in need of fixing. 
The positioning of disability as “naturally” inferior within this binary plays a 
crucial role in the validation and perpetuation of disability oppression.  
The background context in Aotearoa New Zealand related to disability 
was also an important point of enquiry for this thesis. In particular, the key 
conceptual frameworks related to learning disability were examined, including 
the medical model, the principle of normalisation / social role valorisation (SRV), 
the social model, the rights-based approach and Māori perspectives on disability. 
Each framework has enabled significant progress gains for disabled people. 
Medicalised perceptions of disability have led to many medical advances which 




deinstitutionalisation movement, the social model drove the development of 
national and international legislation regarding physically accessible 
environments, and rights-based perspectives enabled the inclusion of disability 
into rights-based legislation, such as the Human Rights Act 1993 (2017). Further, 
Māori perspectives helped to shape contemporary understandings that 
foreground relationships as an integral part of the disability experience. 
However, with the exception of Māori perspectives on disability, each of 
the frameworks outlined is underpinned by the modernist notion of the ideal 
human; that is, an ontological foundation which positions learning disabled 
people as “other” and as inferior. One particular problem which arises from this 
ontological foundation is the inability to challenge exclusionary structures and 
practices which are founded in the assumption of the ideal human, and which 
lead to disability oppression. I came to understand that these frameworks are 
both largely invisible in the day-to-day lives of those of us in the disability sector, 
whilst also being powerfully agentic in shaping the thoughts and feelings of those 
working in the support sector, as well as learning disabled people themselves. I 
concluded this section of the thesis by arguing that a new way of conceptualising 
disability is needed if the changes sought by the DRM are to be progressed. In 
particular this new conceptualisation of disability cannot be founded in the 
notion of the ideal human, but should instead seek to reimagine disability 
outside of the bounds of rational humanism.  
Shaping the Research  
In the data generation and analysis phase of the research, I wanted to 
explore whether the notion of pride presented potential for a positive 
reimagination of disability. As the results from Chapter Seven indicate, I was 
unable to obtain a conclusive answer as to whether pride presents this potential, 
because I was not able to clearly see that a state of pride had been achieved in 
the hui. However, the difficulty I faced in achieving a state of pride within the hui 
ultimately laid the foundation for a new conceptual framework, one which is 
grounded in Barad’s work on agential realism. In agential realism, all entities are 




activity of life. Further, these phenomena are viewed as agentic; as having the 
capacity to affect and interfere with all other phenomenon, including discourses, 
the material world and affective practices. Stepping away from the realm of 
rational humanism, the notion of the “human” is radically re-conceptualised. 
“Humans”, Barad argues, are an effect of the boundary-making practices of intra-
activity; as beings which are produced within, and go on to shape, the ongoing 
intra-activity of life.  
Drawing upon agential realism, I propose that disability be reimagined as 
an entanglement, rather than as a static, bounded and always-familiar entity. In 
this view, disability is a difference which emerges as a knowable entity through 
the iterative entanglements of multiple, performative agencies. It is a series of 
entanglements which are never exactly the same twice-over, yet which have 
sufficient repetition to create identifiable patterns. Further I argue that, in their 
current state, the entanglements of disability materialise in such a way that 
disability is held in a perpetual state of “otherness”, and disability oppression is 
reiterated.  
After coming to this view of disability, the analysis was framed around the 
following problem statement: the entanglements of disability materialise in such 
a way that they reiterate disability oppression. The research questions stemming 
from this problem statement include exploring what the entanglements of 
disability are, what the performative agencies within the entanglements are, 
how these entanglements enable disability oppression to be perpetuated and 
what potential these entanglements present.  
In order to answer these research questions, I drew upon five other 
conceptual frameworks. These include citational chains, lines of flight, Butler’s 
work on performativity, Wetherell’s work on affective and social practice, and 
Jackson and Mazzei’s work on desiring silence. I also explored the notion of 
disability pride, an under-theorised concept which I suggest can be used as a tool 
to disrupt the problematic iterative entanglements of disability.  
The methodology for this project was also shaped by an entanglement, in 
this case of ideas drawn from inclusive research, participatory action research, 




methodologies, and decolonising methodologies. These frameworks were 
chosen for their alignment with the theoretical framework, and their emphasis 
on power sharing, co-creation, and the desire to enact change, rather than as a 
means of investigating an existing situation. The methodological framework was 
further underpinned by the drive to mitigate the potential for harm for the 
learning disabled participants involved, and the desire to do research that 
worked for people with learning disabilities; that is, it did not rely on 
participants’ cognitive ability alone. The data were generated through a series of 
nine hui, which were planned and enacted utilising a co-creation approach with a 
learning disabled co-facilitator and a group of seven learning disabled 
participants.  
The data were analysed utilising the framework of diffractive analysis. 
This analysis tool utilises ideas inherent in agential realism, taking into account 
the view that all phenomena – research questions, participants, emotions, 
theory and the researcher/s included – necessarily affect and interfere in the 
process of the analysis. Data were chosen for the analysis using MacLure’s (2013) 
notion of hot spots; that is, data which hold an intensity which is as much 
embodied as it is cerebral. The phenomena within these hot spots were not 
necessarily proximate in space and time, and sometimes involved multiple 
“moments” which evolved over a long period.  
The analysis followed Jackson and Mazzei’s (2011) process of plugging in, 
which develops diffractive analysis into a more explicit analysis framework. 
Plugging in is a process which highlights how theory and data constitute one 
another, operating through the bodymind of the researcher in ways that 
researchers are not always conscious of. Rather than fitting data into neat, pre-
established categories, diffractive analysis takes a rhizomatic approach. Plugging 
in means that the line of questioning within an analysis can take off in 
unexpected directions, connecting together phenomena which are not 
connected in space or time.  
The Deleuzian questions of how does it work and what does it do not 
what does it mean, proved formative in the analysis. Through applying these 




looking at what particular entanglements produce, rather than what they mean.  
This meant that I did not seek to uncover the “truth” of the data, but rather that 
I worked to uncover “a reality that already exists among the multiple realities 
being enacted in an event, but which has not previously been ‘disclosed’” (Lenz 
Taguchi, 2012, pp. 274–275, emphasis in original).  
Territorialising Forces and the Entanglements of 
Disability  
One particularly generative hot spot which arose during the data 
generation was participants’ reactions to videos and discussions which 
showcased people displaying pride in their disabilities. Whilst some participants 
indicated that they enjoyed the videos, others had a powerful adverse response. 
This reaction was a surprise, as I had anticipated that participants would find the 
videos fun and enjoyable, as Glen (the co-facilitator) and I had. There appeared 
to be territorialising forces at play within the hui, holding the lines of flight firmly 
onto a line of descent, where disability was reiterated as an ontology of 
inferiority. 
The first notable territorialising force was participants’ affective 
responses to the videos and discussions. In particular, Carl became “panicked” by 
the discussions on wheelchairs, Luke reeled back in a display of ableist disgust 
when watching a video of a one-legged man, and many of the participants said 
they found the video “weird”. Drawing upon Wetherell’s work on affective 
practice, alongside agential realism, I examined these reactions as the embodied 
enactment of the normative orders of disability. Within these normative orders, 
notions of disability intertwine with affective practice, memory, and discomfort 
regarding the frailty of the human condition. These entanglements served as a 
territorialising force at multiple points throughout the hui, inhibiting the 
production of disability pride and preventing positive discussions regarding 
disability. 
The second territorialising force which emerged through the hui related 




word “ability” over “disability”, and expressed a desire to be treated like an 
“ordinary” or a “normal” person; although, most participants were unable to 
articulate what this meant. Further, Jonathan stated “I don’t want to be disabled 
anymore”, indicating a desire to reject the disability identity. Rather than viewing 
these responses as the “authentic” thoughts and desires of participants, they 
were examined as the mobilisation of forces evident in wider society. In 
particular, these forces shape the desire to be placed on the ascendant side of 
the ableist binary, and to preserve the categories of “normal” and “abled”.  
However, the practices of focusing on “ability”, and focusing on being 
treated like “normal” and rejecting the disability identity proved to be 
problematic. Focusing on the sameness of disabled people, rather than 
celebrating difference plays into the “politics of assimilation”, and unwittingly 
reaffirms the questionable connection between disability and diminished 
personhood. Further, attempts to reject the disability identity are often rendered 
unintelligible, as the rejection does not work within the ableist matrix of 
intelligibility. These practices ensure that the disability identity is perpetuated as 
an ontology of inferiority, and the disability identity is not able to be taken up as 
a source of pride.  
The entanglements of silence also arose as a territorialising force within 
the hui. This entanglement was particularly evident when participants’ 
understanding of disability was explored, showcasing a significant lack of 
knowledge regarding the disability category generally, and their own diagnostic 
labels in particular. For instance, Jonathan informed us that he was diagnosed 
with Down Syndrome at age five, Luke informed us that he did not know anyone 
without a disability, and Carl asked simply “what is it?” when asked to identify 
someone with and someone without a disability. These silences can be 
understood as an embedded practice within the social norms of disability, where 
disability is only to be spoken about in a limited range of ways, and in a limited 
range of circumstances. Further, this practice can be connected with the desire 
for recognition and the desire to belong, where the closer to “normal” one 
achieves, the greater the promise of future acceptance and belonging. The lack 




of disability, served as a territorialising force within the hui; how can one be 
proud of disability, if one does not know what it is? 
The final problematic iterative entanglement explored in this thesis is the 
entanglements of “help”. The notion of “help” was a powerful and perplexing 
phenomenon which arose at multiple points throughout the hui. In particular, 
several participants used the word help when asked to define disability; 
although, none of the participants were able to explain what this meant. Drawing 
once again upon Wetherell’s work on practice, I viewed the phenomenon of help 
as a social practice of disability. This social practice can be viewed as an integral 
component of the establishment of what Butler terms “viable subjects” (1997b), 
where subjects are expected to partake in these practices if they want to be 
constituted as viable.   
Whilst this social practice has many positive outcomes, it also produces 
some complexities and challenges. In particular, the way this practice is currently 
enacted places the helper in a position of power over the helpee. The helpee is 
expected to be grateful and not tell the helper their help was unwanted, or 
wrongly enacted. As people labelled as disabled are often in a position of 
needing help, this serves to continually position people placed in this category as 
passive and lacking in agency, whilst reinforcing the position of those labelled as 
non-disabled as powerful and agentic.   
The Agency to Rupture 
The ideas in this thesis have culminated in an exploration of agency. What 
are the performative agencies which constitute the problematic iterative 
entanglements of disability, and how can we in the sector harness the agency 
necessary to challenge these entanglements? I have found that the problematic 
iterative entanglements of disability are formed from multiple intra-active forces, 
many of which have significant agency in shaping how disability is 
conceptualised, and how the people to whom the label disabled is assigned are 
treated.  
One particularly powerful agency shaping the entanglements outlined in 




outlined earlier, necessarily positions disability as inferior. The notion of the ideal 
human emerged through participants’ embodied, affective responses to videos 
and discussions on pride, and through the performance of identity, where the 
drive to showcase one’s status as an ideal subject was mobilised through 
participants’ desire to focus on “abilities” and to reject the disability identity. 
Further, the notion of the ideal human emerged as a force shaping the 
discourses and ensuing silences regarding disability, and rubbed up against the 
social practice of help, shaping the desire to give, but not receive help. Through 
all of these entanglements, the notion of the ideal human was reified as the 
archetypal way of being, and was subsequently left unchallenged.  
I have argued that the ontological underpinning of the ideal human is a 
key reason why learning disabled people continue to be positioned on the 
margins of humanity. This underpinning is inherent not only in the 
entanglements explored through the analysis chapters, but can also be seen in 
strategies driving the disability rights movement (DRM) and Government policy, 
as outlined in Chapter Three.  This means that the tools being utilised to 
challenge exclusionary structures and practices, such as the drive to “focus on 
abilities” rather than speak of disability, the social model and rights-based 
models, are ontologically grounded in the very ideas which position learning 
disabled people as “other”, and subsequently as inferior. As C. Gordon (1980),  
remarks, this ontological foundation provides the very rationality which “grounds 
the establishment of a regime of acceptability” (pp. 257-258) for placing 
particular types of people on the margins of humanity. I argue that if we are to 
tackle the “problem” of learning disability, we need to utilise tools which do not 
replicate this ontological foundation. Further, I believe that the issue of disability 
oppression will not adequately be addressed until new ways of thinking about 
ourselves as “humans” which do not rely on the pejoration of learning disability, 
and which enable us to embrace our full being-ness – vulnerabilities and 
imperfections included, are adopted.  
The entanglements outlined in this thesis culminate in a situation where 
the ability to challenge the marginalisation of learning disabled people is largely 




When people labelled as learning disabled are not fully aware of their subject 
positioning, and do not have the language to understand or describe their 
positioning, the ability to challenge the material consequences of this positioning 
is significantly constrained. The desire not to speak of disability inhibits the 
agency necessary to reimagine disability, and continues to grant other intra-
active forces agency in shaping how disability is conceptualised. Examples of 
these forces include medicalised conceptions of disability, and the modernist and 
capitalist foundations of Western society. Whilst I have explored each of the 
entanglements in this thesis as separate phenomena, it is important to 
remember that they continually intra-act and entangle with each other. For 
instance, how can learning disabled people take up the disability identity with 
pride, if they do not know what that identity is? How does one go about 
challenging the silences regarding disability, when it feels so wrong to do so? 
How are we to develop more empowering social practices related to disability, 
when we are working so hard to not focus on disability?   
Harnessing the agency necessary to shift these intra-active forces is no 
small challenge. As Davies (2008) argues, ruptures to the citational chains, or 
ongoing entanglements of life, are often forcefully resisted in order to maintain 
the known order. However, building upon a key idea from Barad, that “[the] 
world and its possibilities for becoming are remade with each moment” (p. 396), 
I have come to see  that the possibilities for rupture to the problematic iterative 
entanglements of disability are always at hand. The task becomes to find out 
what those ever-present possibilities are and how we can harness them to 
remake the world in a new and more promising direction. I believe the drive to 
make this happen already exists. The intuition that I started this project with, 
that disability oppression is not caused by wide-scale malicious intent, poor 
intentions and “bad attitudes”, has been reinforced through the findings in this 
thesis. I have found that many of the problematic practices which underpin 
disability oppression come from a place of “good” intentions. Examples include 
the desire to help people, the desire to belong, and the desire to be kind to one 




attention to a disability. I have discovered that I am complicit in many of these 
practices, at the same time as I am trying to challenge disability oppression.  
Implications for Policy, Practice and Future 
Research  
There are many implications for policy and practice which arise from the 
entanglements outlined in this thesis. In particular, affective practices have 
proven to be a powerful force which I was unaware of prior to the hui, yet which 
function as a powerfully agentic force in the lives of the participants in this 
research. I now believe that more work needs to be done in this area to 
understand how best to support learning disabled people with these often 
painful, unidentified and/or unacknowledged “emotions”. Furthermore, affective 
practices present potential for rupturing many of the entanglements of 
inferiority. I agree with Cheyne (2016) who argues that, “[a]ffective and 
emotional factors are often much more powerful at changing attitudes [and 
practices] than ideas based in reason and logic” (34:11). In order to harness the 
agentic potential of affect, however, we need to acknowledge its existence and 
work to identify these practices, to be able to take them on to a new line of 
flight. Yet how do we do this effectively as disability service providers and 
community members?  
One immediate implication for disability support service personnel is to 
start paying attention to how we engage with affect in our work with learning 
disabled people. The research in this thesis indicates that we need to 
acknowledge that the people we support have a wide variety of emotions, and to 
ensure we communicate to the people we support that it is OK to feel sad / 
angry / upset sometimes. We also need to stop trying to “fix” people when they 
are not happy, and to instead support them to work through their emotions.  
Another implication for the DRM relates to the potential for the disability 
identity to be used as a tool to rupture the ongoing processes of inferiorisation 
and individualisation of the “problem” of disability. Whilst data from the hui did 




reimagination of disability, I believe that the concept holds potential. Perhaps 
“pride” is the wrong word, and another concept such as “embracing disability”, 
or another term which enables us to embrace our full being-ness, vulnerabilities 
and imperfections included, has greater agentic potential. However, regardless 
of the specific term chosen, I believe the concept is necessary for two reasons. 
Firstly, an embrace of the disability identity works with the matrix of 
intelligibility, rather than against it. The moment in which the disability identity is 
(re)cited is the point at which relations of power are exercised (Foucault, 1980), 
and it is at this point that the potential for rupture lies. In rejecting the identity, 
this potential is lost.  
Secondly, I argue that an embrace of the disability identity is essential in 
order for a collective to form which has the agency necessary to challenge 
disability oppression. Like a rug woven from many small, individually weak 
strands, collectives hold greater capacity to take the entanglements of disability 
onto a new line of flight than individuals alone. This is an already-present 
possibility within the disability community, alluded to during the bullying role-
plays when participants informed me that I would get “new mates” and meet 
“other people that can help [me] out” if I was to become blind (see Chapter 11).  
Yet, in order for a collective to form, people have to first see themselves as a 
collective. It is exceptionally challenging to form a large collective when people 
reject the label necessary for the formation of a collective identity. I have argued 
that by stepping within the terms which constitute us and embracing the 
disability identity, there is much greater potential to grasp the agency necessary 
to shift the ongoing problematic entanglements of disability. 
The third implication for policy and practice relates to the entanglements 
of silence. In challenging this practice and openly speaking of disability, we may 
be able to confront the unnamed and unchallenged notion of the ideal human, 
and to acknowledge the problematic entanglements of disability. On the surface, 
this entanglement appears to be relatively unproblematic to rupture, for in order 
to shift the lines of flight, we only need to start speaking of disability. However, 
the entanglements of silence are also intertwined with the affective practices of 




Jonathan, who at various times indicated powerful emotions associated with 
disability, and informed us “I just stop thinking about it when it [disability] comes 
back up”. There may be some situations where this practice is easy to rupture, 
and others where the ruptures are more forcefully resisted. Furthermore, it is 
likely that there are many more productive forces generating the entanglements 
of silence than what has been outlined in this thesis. For instance, what role does 
the need for augmentative communication (such as picture exchange 
communication) play in these silences? Are these silences being actively 
encouraged by funding contracts, disability service providers and support 
workers? If so, in what way is this happening? What role does the more psychic 
dimension of life play in these silences, shaping what Campbell (2009) would call 
internalised ableism?  
 
The entanglements of silence also intersect with my practice as a support 
worker. In particular, I have realised a key issue which arises from not speaking 
of disability with people labelled as learning disabled; when I do not speak of 
disability, I rarely speak with people about the way they want to be supported. I 
even know of support workers who were asked to call themselves “special 
friends” for the people they support, so that the support is entirely 
unacknowledged.  
 
When thinking about the implications for support workers, this practice 
raises some questions. What kind of change would it make if support workers 
openly acknowledged the support they provide, rather than pretending it is 
some kind of unseen “magic” in a person’s life? How much more could we – 
support workers, family and the people who receive support –  learn from one 
another by openly acknowledging the support that was provided to enable a 
learning disabled person to succeed, rather than pretending they were 
“independent” in their success? What kind of difference would it make if learning 
disabled people talked with each other about the support they needed, found 




profound for learning disabled people, as it goes against the training many 
support workers have received.  
The fourth implication for policy and practice relates to the 
entanglements of help.  I argue that we need to find ways of providing the “help” 
and support which many disabled people need to survive and thrive, without 
continually positioning helpees as passive. What would change if support 
workers consciously worked to position themselves as helpees, as well as 
helpers? Further, we need to work to recognise the “help” which all of us rely on 
in our everyday lives, in order to challenge the baseless idea of “independent”, 
“self-reliant” citizens.  
The findings from this research also present some important implications 
for research methodology. In particular, opening myself up to being vulnerable 
and positioning participants as helpers in this research presented some 
interesting possibilities, enabling us to move past seemingly intractable knotty 
points. This response seemed to indicate the productive potential of positioning, 
where I as a researcher stepped away from the mantle of “knowledgeable 
expert”, and positioned myself as someone in need of help. In these moments, 
the change in positioning seemed to disrupt the problematic normative orders of 
life and take us of onto a new line of flight, albeit briefly. I believe that this 
altered positioning presents some important implications for research 
methodology, and is a matter in need of further investigation.  
Lastly, the research for this thesis gives support to the view of disability as 
an entanglement. This view offers a potential way forward in the field of 
disability studies, a field which seems to have lacked clear direction since the 
social model was soundly critiqued and cast aside. The research illustrates that 
there is much to be gained through using the approach outlined in this thesis to 
explore what Davies (2015) terms the taken-for-granted power of the 
ordinariness of life-as-usual. As I have highlighted, much of the foundation for 
disability oppression is embedded within the normative orders of life – in the 
“repeated citations of the way the world is (and, it is believed, ought to be)” 
(Davies, 2008, p. 173). More research is required to explore the entanglements 




entanglements which already challenge disability oppression, and how can we 
foster more of them? What entanglements are particular to disability support 
work, and what impact do these entanglements have on the lives of people who 
receive support? Where are the ever-present possibilities for rupture within the 
problematic entanglements, and what possibilities for change emerge when 
entanglements are ruptured? Much could be gained for learning disabled people, 
their families and whānau30, the wider disability community, and the field of 
disability support work by exploring these entanglements further. This work 
could explore the possibilities for enabling the entanglements of disability to 
materialise in ways that do not reiterate disability oppression, but rather shift 
the lines of flight in new and more promising directions. 
Concluding Thoughts  
I set out in this journey having given little thought to my own status as a 
“non-disabled” person. I never questioned the positioning of myself as “other” to 
the people I was supporting, and I never questioned the notion of learning 
disability as a fixed, essential concept which has always resided in nature. This 
thesis has ended up being not so much about learning disability, but about the 
possibilities for how we think about ourselves as humans. I have learnt that 
those categorised as learning disabled are an integral part of this 
conceptualisation of humans, that the way I think about myself is shaped by the 
existence of these “others”, and that the positioning of those categorised as 
learning disabled as “naturally inferior” is an integral part of these processes. 
This thesis has been a journey which has completely reshaped how I see the 
world, the people in it, what we do and why we do what we do. I have come to 
question why it is that those of us with higher-than-average intellectual abilities 
are viewed as somehow “better” than others, and why it seems so natural to 
think that people with higher intellectual abilities should be rewarded with 
significantly higher pay and other forms of privilege. I find myself wondering why 
                                                     




we place such little value on the roles which play such an integral role in enabling 
society to function, but which do not require intense cognitive thinking, such as 
the office cleaners, the supermarket trolley collectors, and the drain layers; all of 
whom I rely on to function in my daily life.  
I found there are many benefits to working with learning disabled people.  
There were countless points of reflection during the hui where I thought to 
myself this would never happen with a group of people without learning 
disabilities. The particular group I worked with were unfailingly kind and 
supportive of each other and me during the hui, in a way which I have never 
experienced with a group of non-disabled people. They complimented each 
other’s “stretches” at the beginning and end of the hui, and went out of their 
way to help me and each other whenever possible. Furthermore, participants 
were honest about their thoughts and feelings in raw and unexpected ways; at 
times I had to remind myself that the best way to honour this gift was to 
foreground these phenomena in the thesis, so that others can learn from them. 
Thinking back, I realise that participants’ were providing responses which many 
people would think or feel, yet which a lot of non-disabled people would not 
want to be open about for fear of being judged as rude or “getting it wrong” in 
relation to disability. Because of this honesty, I was able to see some of the 
powerful and painful normative orders of life which operated through the 
participants; these orders are much harder to access when they remain hidden 
and difficult to see.   
I would like to finish with some final “reflections” about the ways in 
which our lives have been limited by the imposition of certain expectations onto 
bodies and minds. Much of the joy I experience from working with learning 
disabled people comes from non-normative encounters. During the hui, 
participants had many jokes and fun experiences that I cannot imagine 
happening with a group of non-disabled people. For example, in hui eight 
participants were asked to indicate which activities and resources they liked 
most from the hui. Some participants started raising their hands to “vote” for 
their favourite activities, and after a while, Natalie started “voting” by waving 




and before long there was raucous laughter. By the end of this, Jonathan, Carl 
and Glen somehow ended up on top of each other with their legs in the air, 
crying with laughter. In my experience this was entirely non-normative; I have 
never seen this happen with a group of non-disabled adults, and I cannot 
imagine it happening. These sorts of non-normative events arose at multiple 
points throughout the hui, and I have experienced many more like them 
throughout my years working in the disability support sector; they are 
“different”, and they are totally enjoyable.  
 
The reflections in this research have been a huge journey for me, and I 
have come to realise how much all of us – myself included – are impacted and 
constrained by the normative orders of life. How much do we limit ourselves by 
trying to be and act “normal”? How much of the vivacity of life is lost in this 
endeavour? How much time and effort do we put into dressing” normal”, acting 
“normal”, and supressing non-normative desires such as the yearning to skip or 
sing or laugh loudly in public? How much of our day is filled with these 
suppressed phenomena, and how much richer would our lives be if we were 
more free to express ourselves?  Perhaps the task at hand is not so much about 
reimagining disability, but about reimagining a world which embraces disability 
and difference. If we can imagine and design a world that works for learning 
disabled people – in our education system, our political system, our social 
structures – would it not work better for all of us? If we stop chasing “normal” 
and embrace learning disabled people for being who they are, with their quirks 
and differences, not despite them, couldn’t we all stop having to try so much to 
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Please note: Some appendices have been re-formatted (that is, font sizes 
and page layout may have changed) so as to fit within the University publication 
guidelines.  
Appendix 1: Call for Pilot Participants 
Call for Participants 
 
Hi there. My name is Ingrid Jones and I am looking for people to 
participate in my research. I have put some information below about 




What is research?  
Research is when someone does a study or an 
activity to get information about something so 
they can learn something new. I am doing this 
research for my PhD, which is a degree from the 
university.  
 
What is this research about?  
This research project is looking at learning 
disability pride, or intellectual disability pride. I 
am looking for about 6-8 people with learning 
(intellectual) disabilities to participate in my 
research.  
 
Who can join?  
Anyone who has a learning disability or 
intellectual disability, or who uses a disability 









What will you be asked to do?  
 Participants will work as a group and have one 
meeting, which is called a hui.  The hui will be 
about two hours long and will be on a Thursday 
morning. I will let you know the date closer to 
the time.   
At the hui you will be asked to look at some 
photos, videos and other things that show ideas 
about disability. You will be asked what you 
think about the ideas, and, most importantly, you 
will be asked to add your own ideas. There are 
no wrong ideas, so you don’t need to worry 
about getting anything wrong.  I want to know 
what you think.  
 
Our talk will be videoed. The only people who 
will get to see the video are me, the co-facilitator 
and my supervisors at university. Supervisors are 
like teachers who help me with my research.  
 
What will I do with the information from the 
research?  
When I am finished the research I will write a 
big book called a thesis. This will talk about 
what we did and what we found out together. I 
will also present at conferences, which are like 
big meetings where people come to talk and 
learn about different things. I will also write 
some articles for journals, which are like special 
magazines for people at university. I might also 
present the information in other places such as in 
newspapers, newsletters, other magazines, by 




















I will make a plain-language summary of my 
research at the end and I will come back and talk 
to you about it.  
 
I’d like more information, what do I do?  
Fill in the form below and give it back to me. I 
will then meet with you and your key advocate 
to talk more about the research. I can only work 
with 8 people for my research. I might get a lot 
of people who want to join the group. Then I 
will have to choose. I will tell you if you have 
been chosen or not. 
 




Phone Number:   
 
Researcher contact details: Ingrid Jones  
Email: irj2@students.waikato.ac.nz 
Phone: [information removed for appendix] 
Post: [information removed for appendix] 
  
 







Appendix 2: Pilot Hui Participant Information 
Sheet 
Information Sheet – Participants 
Ingrid Jones PhD Research Project 2015 
 
 
What is research?  
Research is when someone does a study or an 
activity to get information about something so 
they can learn something new. I am doing this 
research for my PhD, which is a degree from the 
university.  
 
What will I do for the project?  
This is a pilot for my research, which is like a 
practice. This research project is looking at 
learning disability pride, or intellectual disability 
pride. We will work as a group and have 1 
meeting, which is called a hui. At the hui we will 
look at getting to know each other. We will also 
talk about what research is. You will be asked 
some questions and we will do some activities 
together. You don’t have to join in the activities 
or answer any of the questions if you don’t 
want. The hui will be videoed. This is so I can 
remember what we did and learn from it.  
 
What will I do with the information from the 
research?  
When I am finished with the research I will write 
a big book called a thesis. This will talk about 
the research, what we did and what we found 
out. This will include plain-language sections for 
people who like easy-read.  I will put my book 
on the internet so lots of people can read it. It 



















present at conferences. These are like big 
meetings where people come to and learn about 
a lot of different things. I will also write some 
articles for journals, which are like special 
magazines for people at university. I might also 
put something in newsletters, newspapers or 
other magazines, and I might talk to other people 
in the media such as on television and radio if I 
get a chance.  I might also present at other 
seminars and talk to different groups. If you 
want I can come and talk more to you about it as 
well.  
 
What will happen with the data (such as 
videos)? 
When we have the hui I will video our time 
together. This helps me to remember what 
happened.  The only people who will see the 
videos will be you, the other participants, the co-
facilitator, me (Ingrid) and my supervisors at 
university. Supervisors are like teachers who 
help me get my research right. After the research 
these videos will be kept at a secure place at the 
university for five years. Then I will take them 
myself. If I want to use the videos at a 
conference or other place after the research is 




Confidentiality means that when I write up this 
project and when I present at conferences people 
won’t be able to tell who you are. There are two 
choices for confidentiality. You don’t have to 
choose which one you want straight away. You 
can choose which one you want when we finish 
our research.   







Option 1: Full confidentiality. This means that 
when I am telling people about my research I 
will make it so that people can’t tell it is you I 
am talking about. For instance, I might change 
your name and your age, or other information so 
people can’t tell it is you. If I want to use any of 
the video clips at a conference or other place I 
will first come to you, show you the clip, and ask 
for permission. 
Option 2: Limited confidentiality. After we 
have done the research I would like some of the 
group members to help me present the 
information. This might be at conferences or 
other places where we talk to people. This means 
that people will know that you have been in the 
research, and people might know you have said 
some things. If I want to use any video clips at a 
conference or other place I will first come to 
you, show you the clip and get your permission. 
 
Important:  
If you join the research project and don’t like it 
you can leave at any time. BUT all of the 
information you have given will still be used. 
This means if come to the hui and leave part way 
through, I will use your information from when 
you were there. This is because we are doing 
everything as a group and it will be hard to 
remove one person’s information.  I will do my 
best to make sure that other people can only tell 
if information is from you with your permission. 
If you are OK with this then it is OK to sign 
this form. If you are not OK with it please do 

















Who do I talk to if I’m worried or unhappy?  
It is very important that you feel safe in the hui. 
If you are unhappy or worried about anything 
you can talk to me. If you don’t think you can 
talk to me, or if you have talked to me and you 
are still concerned, you can contact my 
supervisor at university. I have put our contact 
details below.  
 
Researcher: Ingrid Jones 
Email: irj2@students.waikato.ac.nz 
Phone: [information removed for appendix] 
 
Supervisor: Lise Bird Claiborne 
Email: [information removed for appendix] 
Phone: [information removed for appendix] 
 
 








Appendix 3: Pilot Participant Consent Form 
Consent Form for Participants 
 I have been read what is on the information sheet 
 I understand what the research project is about  
 I know that I will be looking at videos and books about 
research at the hui 
 I can choose not to give my opinion about anything at 
any time at the meetings and I do not have to say why 
 I can choose to leave the research project at any time 
and I do not have to say why 
 I understand that I will choose if my information will be 
used by Ingrid for her PhD at the end of the hui.  
 I agree to take part in the hui 
 I agree to keeping confidentiality about the meetings - 
what is shared in the meetings stays in the meetings 
 I understand what is written on the consent form and I 
agree to it 
 I understand that if Ingrid wants to use video later on at 
a conference or other place she will show me what she 










Appendix 4: Full Hui Participant Information 
Sheet 
    Information Sheet – Participants 
Ingrid Jones PhD Research Project 2015 
 
What is research?  
Research is when someone does a study or an 
activity to get information about something so 
they can learn something new. I am doing this 
research for my PhD, which is a degree from the 
university.  
 
What will I do for the project?  
This research project is looking at learning 
disability pride, or intellectual disability pride. 
We will work as a group and have 8-9 meetings, 
which are called hui. At the hui the group will be 
asked about disability and what they think of it. 
Then we will look at some photos, videos and 
other things I have got together for my research. 
You will be asked what you think about some of 
the ideas and will be asked to add your own 
ideas. Later on, after the photos and videos, we 
will talk about what out group thinks about 
disability. All of our talks will be videoed too. 
At the end of the project you can help me look at 
videos of our talk and tell me what you think 



















What will I do with the information from the 
research?  
When I am finished with the research I will write 
a big book called a thesis. This will talk about 
the research, what we did and what we found 
out. This will include plain-language sections for 
people who like easy-read.  I will put my book 
on the internet so lots of people can read it. It 
will stay on the internet forever.  I will also 
present at conferences. These are like big 
meetings where people come to and learn about 
a lot of different things. If you want you might 
help me present at conferences. I will also write 
some articles for journals, which are like special 
magazines for people at university. I might also 
put something in newsletters, newspapers or 
other magazines, and I might talk to other people 
in the media such as on television and radio if I 
get a chance.  I might also present at other 
seminars and talk to different groups. If you 
want I can come and talk more to you about it as 
well.  
 
What will happen with the data (such as 
videos)? 
When we have the hui I will video our time 
together. This helps me to remember what 
happened. We will look at some of the videos 
later. The only people who will see the videos 
will be you, the other participants, the facilitator, 
me (Ingrid) and my supervisors at university. 
Supervisors are like teachers who help me get 
my research right. After the research these 
videos will be kept at a secure place at the 
university for five years. Then I will take them 
myself. If I want to use the videos at a 
conference or other place after the research is 















Confidentiality means that when I write up this 
project and when I present at conferences people 
won’t be able to tell who you are. There are two 
choices for confidentiality. You don’t have to 
choose which one you want straight away. You 
can choose which one you want when we finish 
our research.   
Option 1: Full confidentiality. This means that 
when I am telling people about my research I 
will make it so that people can’t tell it is you I 
am talking about. For instance, I might change 
your name and your age, or other information so 
people can’t tell it is you. If I want to use any of 
the video clips at a conference or other place I 
will first come to you, show you the clip, and ask 
for permission. 
Option 2: Limited confidentiality. After we 
have done the research I would like some of the 
group members to help me present the 
information. This might be at conferences or 
other places where we talk to people. This means 
that people will know that you have been in the 
research, and people might know you have said 
some things. If I want to use any video clips at a 
conference or other place I will first come to 
you, show you the clip and get your permission. 
 
Important:  
If you join the research project and don’t like it 
you can leave at any time. BUT all of the 
information you have given will still be used. 
This means if you do the first and second hui and 
then leave, I will still use your information from 












everything as a group and it will be hard to 
remove one person’s information.  I will do my 
best to make sure that other people can only tell 
if information is from you with your permission. 
If you are OK with this then it is OK to sign 
this form. If you are not OK with it please do 
not sign the form. Talk to me about any worries.  
 
Who do I talk to if I’m worried or unhappy?  
It is very important that you feel safe in all the 
hui. If you are unhappy or worried about 
anything you can talk to me. If you don’t think 
you can talk to me, or if you have talked to me 
and you are still concerned, you can contact my 
supervisor at university. I have put our contact 
details below.  
 
Researcher: Ingrid Jones 
Email: irj2@students.waikato.ac.nz 
Phone: [information removed for appendix] 
 
Supervisor: Lise Bird Claiborne 
Email: [information removed for appendix] 
Phone: [information removed for appendix]  
 












Date: Friday October 30th  
 
Time: 9am – 12 pm  
 
Where: 108 Alexandra Street, Hamilton – 






Date: Friday November 13th   
 
Time: 9am – 12 pm  
 
Where: 108 Alexandra Street, Hamilton – 





Date: Friday November 27th   
 
Time: 9am – 12 pm  
 
Where: 108 Alexandra Street, Hamilton – 
WaQuY (Waikato Queer Youth)  
 
 
Contact details:  Ingrid Jones 
Email: irj2@students.waikato.ac.nz 
Phone: [detail removed for appendix] 
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Appendix 5: Full Hui Participant Consent Form 
Consent Form for Participants 
 I have been read what is on the information sheet 
 I understand what the research project is about  
 I know that I will be looking at videos and books about 
disability at the hui 
 I know I will be asked for my opinion about disability 
 I can choose not to give my opinion about anything at 
any time at the meetings and I do not have to say why 
 I can choose to leave the research project at any time 
and I do not have to say why 
 I understand that I will choose if my information will be 
used by Ingrid for her PhD at the end of the final hui.  
 I agree to take part in the hui 
 I agree to keeping confidentiality about the meetings - 
what is shared in the meetings stays in the meetings 
 I understand what is written on the consent form and I 
agree to it 
 I understand that if Ingrid wants to use video later on at 
a conference or other place she will show me what she 













Appendix 6: Facilitator Information Sheet 
Information Sheet - Facilitator 
Ingrid Jones PhD Research Project 2015 
 
 
What is research?  
Research is when someone does a study or an 
activity to get information about something so 
they can learn something new. I am doing this 
research for my PhD, which is a degree from the 
university.  
 
What will I do for the project?  
This research project is looking at learning 
disability pride, or intellectual disability pride. 
We will work as a group and have 8 meetings, 
which are called hui. Your job will be to 
facilitate the group, to ask questions and to 
encourage people to answer them. You will also 
help to look over the things we will be 
discussing at the group and have a chance to 
have some input into what we talk about. You 
can also help set up the room when we have the 
hui. This means you will need to set aside one 
afternoon or morning a week for the research, 
and you might need to have another 
afternoon/morning to prepare. We can talk about 
this together to figure out what will work best 
for you. You will be able to contact me at any 
time during the research if you have any 
questions or want some more information.  
 
At the hui the group will be asked about 
disability and what they think of it. Then we will 
look at some photos, videos and other things to 












will be asked what they think about some of the 
ideas. Later on, we will have another talk about 
what everyone thinks about disability. All of our 
talks will be videoed. At the end of the project 
you can help me look at some of the videos and 
tell me what you think about them if you want. 
This is called an analysis.  
 
What will I do with the information from the 
research?  
When I am finished with the research I will write 
a big book called a thesis. This will talk about 
the research and what we found out together. 
This will include plain-language sections for 
people who want an easier version to read. This 
will be available on the internet so lots of people 
can read it. It will stay on the internet forever. I 
will also present at conferences. These are like 
big meetings where people come to and learn 
about a lot of different things. If you want you 
might be able to help me present at conferences. 
I will also write some articles for journals, 
which are like special magazines for people at 
university. I might also put something in 
newsletters, newspapers or other magazines, and 
I might talk to other people in the media such as 
on television and radio if I get a chance.  I might 
also present at other seminars and talk to 
different groups. If you want I can make a plain-
language summary of my research at the end for 
you to read, or I can come and talk to you about 
it.  
 
What will happen with the data (such as 
videos)? 







When we have the hui I will video the sessions. 
This helps me to remember what happened in the 
sessions. We will look at some of the videos 
later to see what happened in the research 
project. The only people who can see the videos 
will be me, people who join in the research 
(including you) and my supervisors at university. 
Supervisors are like teachers who are helping me 
with my research. After the research these videos 
will be kept at a secure place at the university for 
five years. If I want to use the videos at a 
conference after the research is over I will come 
back and ask your permission first. 
 
Confidentiality:  
It is really important that you keep any 
information you get from the project 
confidential. This means that you don’t talk to 
anyone except me about any personal 
information or personal things you have heard 
during the research. This is so that everyone 
feels safe to talk about personal things. If you 
have any questions or concerns you can talk to 
me or my supervisor Lise.  
 
You will also have a choice about how much 
confidentiality you want in the project for 
yourself. This means that when I write up what I 
have found from this project and when I present 
at conferences people won’t be able to tell who 
you are. There are two choices for 
confidentiality. You don’t have to choose which 
one you want today. You can choose which one 
you want when we finish our research.   
Option 1: Full confidentiality. This means 
that when I am telling people about my research 
in writing, at conferences or other places I will 
make it so that people can’t tell it is you I am 











talking about. For instance, I might change your 
name and your age, or other information so 
people can’t tell it is you. If I want to use any of 
the video clips at a conference I will first come 
to you, show you the clip, and ask for 
permission. 
Option 2: Limited confidentiality. After we 
have done the research I would like to involve 
some of the group members when I present the 
information. This might be at conferences or 
other places where we talk to people. This means 
that people will know that you have been helping 
with the research, and people might know you 
have said some things.  
 
Who do I talk to if I’m worried or unhappy?  
It is very important that you feel safe in all the 
hui. If you are unhappy about something or you 
are worried you can talk to me. If you don’t feel 
like you can talk to me, or if you have talked to 
me and you still aren’t happy, you can contact 
my supervisor at university. I have put our 
contact details below.  
 
Researcher: Ingrid Jones 
Email: irj2@students.waikato.ac.nz 
Phone: [information removed for appendix] 
 
Supervisor: Lise Bird Claiborne 
Email: [information removed for appendix] 
Phone: [information removed for appendix] 
  
 








Appendix 7: Facilitator Consent Form 
Consent Form Facilitator  
 I have been read what is on the information sheet 
 I understand what the research project is about  
 I understand what my job will be as a facilitator and agree to do 
the job 
 I know that I will be looking at videos and books about 
disability at the meeting 
 I know I will be asking participants for their opinions about 
disability, and might be able to give some of my own.  
 I can choose not to give my opinion about anything at any time 
at the meetings and I do not have to say why 
 I understand that I will choose if my information will be used 
by Ingrid for her PhD the end of the final hui 
 I agree to keeping confidentiality about the meetings - what is 
shared in the meetings stays in the meetings 
 I understand what is written on the consent form and I agree to 
it 
 I understand that if Ingrid wants to use video if me later on at a 















Appendix 8: Participant Safety Information  
Important Information  









Safety information (How will I tell when you are upset, what will 




























Appendix 10: Confidentiality Agreement  
Confidentiality Agreement 
Ingrid Jones PhD Research Project 2015 
 
Confidentiality means that when I write up what I have found from 
this project and when I present at conferences people won’t be able to 
tell who has been talking. There are two choices for confidentiality.  
 
Option 1: Full confidentiality.  
When I (Ingrid) am telling people about my research at conferences or 
other places I will do my best to make sure that people can’t tell who 
it is that I am talking about. I will change names, ages, addresses and 
other information so people can’t tell who I am talking about. Choose 
this option if you don’t feel OK about a lot of people finding out 
about what you have said.  If you choose this option you won’t be able 
to present at conferences and other places because people will know 
who you are.  
 
Option 2: Limited confidentiality.  
People will know your name and that you have been involved in the 
research. They will find out some of the things you have said, but 
sharing very personal things will be your choice alone. Choose this 
option if you feel OK about sharing your information with a lot of 
people. If you choose this option you may co-present at conferences 
and other places to help share what we have 











I choose (circle Option 1 or Option 2) 
 
o Option 1 (full confidentiality) 












Appendix 11: How we will Work Together  













Appendix 12: Traffic Light  
 
 




Appendix 13: Feelings Cards 
NB: the following cards were approved by Glen for publication. He chose 
not to include the “sore”, “sad”, “angry”, “happy” and “upset” cards.  
   
    Scared        Nervous 
 
   
Stressed         Tired 
 




Appendix 14: Ableism Cards 
*Images and text size have been shrunk for placement in appendix. Place 
































































































Kelly and Jane 
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Sarah 
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images/gallery/Clipart/Healt
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Jake 
http://cliparts.co/cliparts/
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Sally 
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